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A N N E M A R I K E  S T R E M M E L A A R or the UK (Fabos, p. 24). Such changes in self-definition 
are not predictable, as the Moussaoui family illustrates—
despite a shared history, one family member turned to 
Salafism while the others made different choices (Dona-
hue, p.18). Dominant views of migrants and Muslims also 
have an impact on how they adapt. Salafi beliefs hold 
an attraction for young Muslims living in Europe as they 
offer ways of overcoming feelings of exclusion. After all, a 
major Salafi ideologue, Al-Albani, was himself a migrant 
in Saudi Arabia, which might well have contributed to his 
popularity among Salafi youth who feel equally margin-
alized (Lacroix, p. 6). 
Not everyone stays on. Some migrants may eventually 
undertake a journey back home, where the demands of 
integration seem less daunting. Indeed, some Arab fami-
lies living in Germany, who find their way of life at odds 
with their environment and the authorities, opt for remi-
gration, settling not necessarily in their country of origin, 
but in those which offer better economic prospects and 
more suitable cultural setting (e.g. the United Arab Emir-
ates (Al-Hamarneh, p. 26)). Some Salafi youth in France 
also think of adopting a new home to suit their convic-
tions (Adraoui, p. 12). Yet people opting for remigration 
represent a very small, though possibly growing, number. 
The overwhelming majority wish nothing less than to be 
part of their adopted societies.
Day by day Moroccan men and women cross the border 
to Ceuta, a city on Spanish territory, from which they 
bring back merchandise to sell at home (see back cover). 
Such images of border crossing reflect only one small 
instance of a ceaseless process, a massive movement of 
people traversing borders for the sake of trade, employ-
ment, education, or marriage. Notwithstanding govern-
ments’ increasing restriction on migration, the fact re-
mains that such migrants have been the foundation of 
much economic gain, from the United Arab Emirates to 
Europe. 
Whereas the presence of foreigners is creating anxi-
eties in many parts of the world, in Europe the focus is 
mainly on their Muslim populations. Here, the “problem” 
is not migration per se, but is especially Islam which is 
believed to prevent Muslims from integrating fully into 
European societies. Images of Islam as a religion aspiring 
to world domination reflect the fear of Western citizens 
who are increasingly concerned about the presence of 
Muslim migrants in their midst. Thus, Muslim commu-
nities may, for example, experience great difficulties in 
finding spaces for worship (Kuppinger, p. 48).
Muslim migrants and minorities in Europe are expected 
to adjust themselves to the majority culture and prove 
that they are worthy citizens. Imams are to instill in them 
liberal and democratic values and promote their integra-
tion into the host society (Boender, p. 22), while mosque 
designs are to demonstrate their willingness to adapt 
to the surrounding communities (Roose, p. 50). Behind 
these concerns lies the implicit fear that Muslims may 
adhere to beliefs and views that subvert their integration 
into society or that may even undermine its core values.
The anxiety over a Muslim threat stands in sharp con-
trast with the reality of the life most Muslim immigrants 
experience in Europe. Like other migrant groups, they 
are struggling to survive and strive to turn their adopted 
environs into places where they feel at home. In trying 
to cope with the unknown, different people develop dif-
ferent strategies which have often been shaped both by 
their personal histories and the societies they inhabit. 
Thus, Sudanese migrants trying to avoid the “stigma” of 
being seen as ‘black” emphasize different aspects of their 
identity according to their place of habitat, whether Egypt 
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) 
develops, supervises, and engages in innovative, high quality research 
on social, political, cultural, and intellectual trends and movements in 
contemporary Muslim communities and societies. Its research and research 
network comprise ISIM’s societal capital: ISIM provides insights gained in its 
research programmes to the benefit of society at large. 
ISIM’s research approaches are interdisciplinary and comparative, cover-
ing a large geographic range that includes North Africa, the Middle East, 
sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Muslim 
communities in Europe. Broad in scope, ISIM brings together the various 
areas of disciplinary expertise in anthropology, sociology, religious studies, 
political science, and cultural studies. 
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In the current debate on migration to Europe, a central concern 
has emerged over the “marginality” of Muslim communities, 
in other words, their seeming failure to “integrate” into the 
mainstream life world. Migrants congregating in mosques or 
Muslim community centres, attending Islamic schools, wearing 
headscarves and exotic “traditional” clothes, and turning to non-
European television programmes are seen as an anomaly in the 
social body of European societies. Underlying this anxiety is the 
implicit assumption that Muslim peoples have an exceptionally 
primordial attachment to “tradition”—some immutable “Islamic 
ways of life”—that is incompatible with modern European 
values and which stands in the way of their integration. 
A S E F  B A Y AT
If by “integration” is implied the expectation that minorities should become just like 
the majority, that they should assimilate, this can neither be realistic nor just. But 
if “integration” means, as I take it to mean, a two-way process of give and take be-
tween different cultural collectives, then any real integration would involve move-
ment from both minority and mainstream communities. The minorities are expect-
ed to interact with the mainstream, and engage in the economy, civil society, and 
the state institutions while the mainstream is expected to facilitate such exchange 
and engagement, recognizing “minorities” as a part of the national citizenry. 
Given this perception, how much can the claims of “Muslim non-integration” be 
justified? I like to suggest that “integration” is not simply a voluntary “matter of will” 
process where individuals “choose” or “refuse” to integrate; nor are “cultural groups” 
uniform collectives whose members supposedly hold the same aspirations, orien-
tations, and capacities. Rather “minority groups,” whether Muslim or non-Muslim, 
each possess differential capacities for mixing and exchanging with the main-
stream; they hold varied resources to cope with the exigencies of integration. While 
segments of the European Muslims have indeed succeeded in this path, others are 
in the throes of a protracted struggle.
Recent studies confirm that the Muslim minority in Europe represents a mixed 
entity differentiated by ethnicity, class, educational background, and religious in-
clinations. In terms of integration, at least three patterns can be roughly observed.1 
First, “secular Muslims” who seem to be fully integrated as they try to reach out to 
the majority culture, economy, and social interaction, even though they are occa-
sionally frustrated by incidents where many natives refuse to recognize them as 
“Europeans.” Indeed there are some 2,000-3,000 influential Muslims leaders who are 
active in politics, media, business, religious and civil society organizations, and who 
represent the core of an expanding Muslim professional class whose participation 
in the political process, as a new interest group, may affect the European politics. 
These Muslims embrace liberal democracy, resent religious radicals, respect human 
rights as a God-given gift, and wish to build a “European Islam.” Possessing the nec-
essary resources—higher education, respectable jobs, information, and relevant 
knowledge—the group is enabled to handle and live a European life. They enjoy 
and take advantage of what their adopted societies offer and know how to ma-
noeuvre within them.
The second strain within the Muslim minority consists of very small numbers of 
young radicalized groups, about which we know very little for certain. Roughly, 
they tend to be mainly second or third generation Muslims, well versed in the local 
vernaculars, and linked to transnational networks. Yet detached from the governing 
values of ancestry, but engulfed by the multiplicity of lifestyles and flow of informa-
tion, the truth of which they can seldom ascertain, these youngsters tend to re-
sort to an imagined “authentic” reference—a trans-local, global, and abstract Islam 
stripped of cultural influences, one that can serve as vehicle for resentment and 
dissent.
And then there is a significant third group of Muslims which includes largely the 
first generation immigrants who while struggling to speak the European languages, 
striving to hold regular jobs, and establishing the props of a normal life are still 
oriented to practicing many aspects of their home culture—food, fashion, rituals, 
or private religious practices. Most of them struggle to survive and to live in peace 
and with dignity, invest in their children to get by in the societal settings they often 
find too complex to operate. So they tend to restore and revert to their immediate 
circles, the language and religious groups, informal economic networks, and com-
munities of friends and status groups built in the neighbourhoods or prayer halls. 
They feel at home on the margin of the mainstream.
As such, this “feeling at home on the margin” is hardly a thing of Islam, nor a sign 
of resentment against the mainstream, or a primordial desire for “tradition.” Rather, 
it represents a familiar trend—a typical coping strategy that lower-class immigrants 
often pursue when they encounter complex foreign life-worlds. It reflects the para-
doxical reality of peripheral communalism that enables the members to get around 
the costs, to endure the hardship, and to negotiate with the mainstream in an at-
tempt to be part of it. Because to immerse fully in the mainstream requires certain 
material, cultural, and knowledge capabilities that most plebeian migrants, Mus-
lim or non-Muslim, do not possess, which in turn compels them to seek alterna-
tive venues. Thus, being part of an organized economy demands regular payment 
of various dues and taxes; if you cannot afford them, then you go informal. When 
a migrant cannot afford to pay for the cost of fixing his kitchen through regular 
firms, then he or she will look for, or generate, a network of friends, relatives, and 
locals to mobilize support. If he cannot afford to shop in the mainstream modern 
supermarkets, or to borrow money from regular banks (because he does not have 
the credit and credentials), then he resorts to ethnic street bazaars to get his/her af-
fordable supplies, and to informal credit associations to secure loans. When he lacks 
the necessary information and skill to function within the modern bureaucratic or-
ganizations—which do not accommodate flexibility, negotiation, and interpersonal 
relations—he relies on the locals with whom he establishes flexible transactions 
based upon mutual trust and reciprocity. If people cannot operate within the cul-
tural settings that are perceived to be inhospitable, too formal and strict, then they 
are likely to get involved with the ones that allow them to fit.2
An unintended consequence of these economic and cultural processes is the 
likely revitalization of “negative integration,” in parallel and peripheral communi-
ties, where ethnic networks or religious rituals are revived and reinforced to serve 
as structures of support and survival. It is no surprise that “ghettoization” is espe-
cially more pronounced among lower-class British Muslims where unemployment 
remains three times higher than among other minority groups. This process of 
“feeling at home on the margin” represents a way of coping with the imperatives 
of modernity embodied in the bureaucratic arrangement, the discipline of time, 
space, fixed and formal contract, and the like. As such this process is not specific 
to Muslims, but includes all comparable migrant communities. Nor is it limited to 
international migration. Rural migrants in Cairo, Tehran, Istanbul, or Casablanca un-
dergo more or less similar experiences (and receive similar levels of hostility from 
their national elites) as many residents with Turkish or Moroccan origin in Germany 
or in the Netherlands. However, the hostile sentiments of the mainstream political 
and intellectual circles in Europe serve as an additional factor to push such Muslim 
minorities to seek sanctuary within themselves to build a life-sphere on the margin 
which they can call home. Otherwise, they yearn for an integrated status of relief 
and recognition, while they strive to manage and minimize its detriments. “Feel-
ing at home on the margin” is not necessarily the antipode of integration, but can 
instead serve as an antidote. 
Asef Bayat is Academic Director of ISIM and holds the ISIM Chair at Leiden University.
Feeling 
at Home 
on the 
Margin
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Salafism
S T É P H A N E  L A C R O I X
Al-Albani’s Revolutionary 
Approach to Hadith
When on the first of October 1999, 
Shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Al-
bani passed away at the age of 85, he 
was mourned by virtually everyone 
in the world of Salafi Islam. To many, 
he represented its third main con-
temporary reference, after ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz bin Baz (who himself had died a 
few months before) and Muhammad 
bin ‘Uthaymin (who would pass away 
in January 2001), both leading figures of the Saudi religious estab-
lishment. Salafi newspapers, journals, and websites celebrated this 
Syrian son of an Albanian clock-maker—whose family left Albania 
in 1923, when he was nine years old, and re-established itself in Da-
Portrait of 
Al-Albani 
from Ibrahim 
Muhammad al-
’Ali, Muhammad 
Nasir al-Din 
al-Albani, 
Damascus: Dar 
al-qal’, 2001. 
mascus—who had become known as 
the muhaddith al-‘asr (traditionist of 
the era), that is, the greatest hadith 
scholar of his generation.
How did al-Albani, with his undis-
tinguished social and ethnic origins, 
come to occupy such a prestigious 
position in a field long monopolized 
by a religious elite from the Saudi re-
gion of Najd? The answer, as we shall 
see through the example of al-Albani himself and some of his disci-
ples, lies in his revolutionary approach to hadith.
The Wahhabi paradox
Common knowledge considers Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani to be a 
staunch proponent of Wahhabism, the discourse produced and upheld 
by the official Saudi religious establishment.1 This is undoubtedly true 
in terms of ‘aqidah (creed), yet al-Albani strongly disagrees with the 
Wahhabis—and especially with their chief representatives, the ulama 
of the Saudi religious establishment—when it comes to fiqh (law). 
There, al-Albani points to a fundamental contradiction within the Wah-
habi tradition: the latter’s proponents have advocated exclusive reli-
ance on the Quran, the Sunna, and the consensus of al-salaf al-salih 
(the pious ancestors), yet they have almost exclusively relied on Hanba-
li jurisprudence for their fatwas—acting therefore as proponents of a 
particular school of jurisprudence, namely Hanbalism. According to al-
Albani, this also applies to Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab whom he 
describes as “salafi in creed, but not in fiqh.”
For al-Albani, moreover, being a proper “salafi in fiqh” implies making 
hadith the central pillar of the juridical process, for hadith alone may 
provide answers to matters not found in the Quran without relying on 
the school of jurisprudence. The mother of all religious sciences there-
fore becomes the “science of hadith,” which aims at re-evaluating the 
authenticity of known hadiths. According to al-Albani, however, inde-
pendent reasoning must be excluded from the process: the critique of 
the matn (the content of the hadith) should be exclusively formal, i.e. 
grammatical or linguistic; only the sanad (the hadith’s chain of trans-
mitters) may be properly put into question. As a consequence, the cen-
tral focus of the science of hadith becomes ‘ilm al-rijal (the science of 
men), also known as ‘ilm al-jarh wa-l-ta‘dil (the science of critique and 
fair evaluation), which evaluates the morality—deemed equivalent to 
the reliability—of the transmitters. At the same time—and contrary 
to earlier practices—al-Albani insists that the scope of this re-evalu-
ation must encompass all existing hadiths, even those included in the 
canonical collections of Bukhari and Muslim, some of which al-Albani 
went so far as to declare weak.2
Revolutionary interpretations 
As a consequence of the peculiarity of his method, al-Albani ended 
up pronouncing fatwas that ran counter to the wider Islamic consensus, 
and more specifically to Hanbali/Wahhabi jurisprudence. For instance, 
he wrote a book in which he redefined the proper gestures and formu-
lae that constitute the Muslim prayer ritual “according to the Prophet’s 
practice”—and contrary to the prescriptions of all established schools 
of jurisprudence. Also, he stated that mihrabs—the niche found in a 
mosques indicating the direction of Mecca—were bid‘a (an innovation) 
and declared licit to pray in a mosque with one’s shoes. Another con-
troversial position was his call for Palestinians to leave the occupied 
territories since, he claimed, they were unable to practice their faith 
there as they should—something which is much more important than 
a piece of land. Finally, al-Albani took a strong stance against indulging 
in politics, repeating that “the good policy is to abandon politics”—a 
In spite of his undistinguished social 
background al-Albani became known as the 
greatest hadith scholar of his generation. His 
reliance on hadith as the central pillar of law 
at the expense of the schools of jurisprudence 
caused him to take up controversial positions. 
This brought him into conflict with the Saudi 
religious establishment but also made him 
popular in Salafi circles.
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phrase implicitly aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political 
views he consistently denounced. 
The presence of al-Albani in Saudi Arabia—where he was invited in 
1961 by his good friend Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz to teach at the 
Islamic University of Medina—prompted embarrassed reactions from 
the core of the Wahhabi establishment, who disagreed with him but 
could hardly attack him because of his impeccable Wahhabi creden-
tials in terms of creed. The controversy sparked by his book The Veil 
of the Muslim Woman, in which he argued that Muslim women should 
not cover their face—a position unacceptable by Saudi standards—, 
finally gave the Wahhabi establishment the justification needed to get 
him out of the Kingdom in 1963. He then re-established himself in his 
country of birth, Syria, before leaving for Jordan in 1979.3
However, the opposition al-Albani encountered from the Wahhabi 
religious establishment was not merely intellec-
tual. By putting into question the methodologi-
cal foundations upon which the Wahhabis had 
built their legitimacy, he was also challenging 
their position in the Saudi religious field. 
From its inception, Wahhabism had estab-
lished itself as a religious tradition—at the core 
of which laid a number of key books, both in 
creed and law. This tradition had been mo-
nopolized by a small religious aristocracy from 
Najd, first centred around Muhammad bin ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab and his descendants (known as the 
Al al-Shaykh) before opening up to a small 
number of other families. In the Saudi system as 
it took shape, the members of this aristocracy 
would become the only legitimate transmitters 
of the Wahhabi tradition; in this context, inde-
pendent scholars were excluded because they 
had not received “proper ‘ilm” from “qualified” 
ulama.
Traditional Wahhabi ‘ilm, therefore, was the 
fruit of a process of transmission and depended on the number of 
ijazas—a certificate by which a scholar acknowledges the transmis-
sion of his knowledge (or part of it) to one of his pupils, and author-
izes him to transmit it further—given by respected Wahhabi scholars. 
This is the very logic al-Albani—who, himself, owned very few of these 
certificates—would challenge by promoting his critical approach. As a 
matter of fact, according to al-Albani, transmission has no importance 
whatsoever, because, every hadith being suspect, the fact that it was 
narrated by a respected scholar cannot guarantee its authenticity. On 
the contrary, the important process is accumulation—a good scholar 
of hadith being someone who has memorized a large sum of hadith 
and, more importantly, the biographies of a large number of transmit-
ters. Thus, the science of hadith can be measured according to objec-
tive criteria unrelated to family, tribe, or regional descent, allowing for 
a previously absent measure of meritocracy. More importantly, al-Alba-
ni’s claim of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab himself made the former’s ideas very popular among Salafi 
youth.
Religious entrepreneurs
For all these reasons, al-Albani’s ideas would rapidly become a means 
for Salafi religious entrepreneurs from outside the Wahhabi aristocracy 
to challenge the existing hierarchy. Al-Albani himself quickly gathered 
a large following, in Saudi Arabia and beyond. He would soon have to 
be recognized, despite the initial hostility of the Wahhabi religious es-
tablishment, as one of the leading figures in Salafism. 
In the mid-1960s, a number of al-Albani’s disciples in Medina founded 
al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (The Salafi Group which Commands 
Good and Forbids Evil), a radical faction of which, led by Juhayman al-
‘Utaybi, would storm the grand mosque of Mecca in November 1979. 
Many of the group’s members—and especially its scholars—were either 
of Bedouin descent or non-Saudi residents, and were thus marginalized 
in the religious field. Their activism came, in part at least, as a response to 
their marginalization.4 One of the main religious figures of this group—
who was “lucky” enough to have been thrown out of the Kingdom in 1978 
and therefore did not take part in the 1979 events—was Muqbil al-Wadi‘i, 
who subsequently re-established himself in his native Yemen and be-
came the country’s most prominent Salafi scholar.
In the late 1980s, some of al-Albani’s pupils, led by a Medinan shaykh 
called Rabi‘ al-Madkhali, formed an informal religious network gener-
ally referred to as al-Jamiyya (“the Jamis”, named after one of their key 
members, Muhammad Aman al-Jami). Beyond their focus on hadith, 
the Jamis became known for emphasizing al-Albani’s calls not to in-
dulge in politics and for denouncing those who did. Again, many of 
the Jamis were of peripheral origin (al-Madkhali was from Jazan, on 
the Yemeni border, while al-Jami was from Ethiopia) and had therefore 
been excluded from all leading positions in the religious field. They 
would finally gain prominence in the early 1990s, when the Saudi gov-
ernment supported them financially and institutionally, in the hope 
of creating an apolitical ideological counterweight to the Islamist op-
position led by the al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Awakening), an 
informal religio-political movement which appeared in Saudi Arabia 
in the 1960s as a the result of a hybridization 
between Wahhabism, on religious issues, and 
the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, on po-
litical issues.5 
In the 1990s, a few students of al-Albani 
would go so far as to challenge both the 
Wahhabi religious aristocracy and al-Albani 
himself. Following the teachings of an In-
dian shaykh called Hamza al-Milibari,6 they 
would promote the centrality of hadith, while 
criticizing al-Albani for relying, in his critique 
of hadith, on the methods used by late tra-
ditionists—at least so they claimed. On the 
contrary, they would pride themselves for re-
lying exclusively on the methodology of the 
early traditionists (that is those anterior to 
al-Dar Qutni (917-995)) and would therefore 
name their approach manhaj al-mutaqad-
dimin (the methodology of the early ones). 
Again, most of these scholars were peripheral 
figures, such as Sulayman al-‘Alwan, a very 
young—al-‘Alwan was born in 1970 and started to become known as 
a scholar while he was in his twenties—shaykh of non-tribal descent, 
and ‘Abdallah al-Sa‘d, whose family had come from the city of Zubayr 
in Modern Iraq. The two of them would later become key figures in 
the Saudi Jihadi trend, challenging the political order after they had 
challenged the religious order. As a consequence, 
they would be arrested and jailed after the May 
2003 bombings. 
Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani’s denuncia-
tion of the “Wahhabi paradox” and his promotion 
of a new approach to the critique of hadith as the 
pillar of religious knowledge have prompted a 
revolution within Salafism, challenging the very 
monopoly of the Wahhabi religious aristocracy. As 
a consequence, al-Albani’s ideas have given inde-
pendent Salafi religious entrepreneurs a weapon 
with which to fight their way into previously very 
closed circles. Although none have yet achieved 
al-Albani’s prestige, some have become recog-
nized scholars. Interestingly enough, al-Albani’s 
rise to prominence as a de facto part of an estab-
lishment he once rejected has encouraged some 
of disciples, proponents of the “methodology of 
the early ones,” to call—along al-Albani’s earlier 
line—for an even “purer” approach to the critique 
of hadith. As this shows, the revolutionary power 
of his method remains intact.
Notes
1. As opposed to Wahhabism, Salafism refers 
here to all the hybridations that have taken 
place since the 1960s between the teachings 
of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and 
other Islamic schools of thought. Al-Albani’s 
discourse can therefore be a form of 
Salafism, while being critical of Wahhabism.
2. Stéphane Lacroix, “Muhammad Nasir al-Din 
al-Albani’s Contribution to Contemporary 
Salafism,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New 
Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer 
(London/New York: Hurst/Columbia 
University Press, 2008 (forthcoming)). 
3. On the controversies surrounding al-Albani, 
see ibid.
4. See Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane 
Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi 
Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi 
Revisited,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 39, no. 1 (2007): 103-122.
5. For more details, see ibid.
6. The book is called Al-muwāzana bayna al-
mutaqaddimīn wa-l-muta’akhkhirīn fī tashīh 
al-ahādīth wa-ta‘līlihā [The balance between 
the early ones and the late ones regarding 
the identification of authentic and weak 
hadiths].
For Al-Albani … 
hadith alone may 
provide answers to 
matters not 
found in the 
Quran …
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The Local & the Global 
in Saudi Salafism
Global jihad is a constructed category, 
perpetuated in the discourse of aca-
demics, think tank consultants, politi-
cians, policy makers, terror experts, and 
journalists on the one hand, and Jihadi 
ideologues and sympathizers on the 
other hand. The first group identify a 
global menace that requires the mobi-
lization of governments, military strat-
egists, civil society activists, and media 
campaigns across the world to justify 
the global War on Terror. The second 
group endeavours to mobilize Muslims across cultures, nations, and 
geographies in the pursuit of deterritorialized battles that nevertheless 
take place in specific localities, including world financial centres, train 
stations, and discos, expatriate residential compounds, tourist resorts, 
shrines, mosques, and markets.
The contradictions and tensions within the Saudi Jihadi project are 
the focus of this short exposition.1 Saudi Jihadis represent post-nation-
al non-state actors who draw on the rhetoric of the global jihad, yet 
remain immersed in the locality of Saudi Arabia.2 Rather than select-
ing famous contemporary Jihadi ideologues, this article draws on the 
messages of lesser known Saudi authors of Jihadi texts to demonstrate 
the centrality of the local in the global project: Faris al-Shuwayl writes 
about the priority of local jihad while Lewis Atiyat Allah3 glorifies the 
global project. Both seem to exhibit the tension between the local and 
the global. 
Contesting the local state
In both Faris al-Shuwayl and Lewis Atiyat Allah’s writings, the first 
Saudi state (1744-1818) is glorified as dawlat al-tawhid (the state 
of monotheism), a political entity unbounded by defined territorial 
boundaries, unrecognized by the international community, and uncon-
taminated by international treaties and legal obligations. The first state 
is a local political configuration that defied regional and international 
contexts and promised to make true Islam hegemonic. They regard this 
state as a revival of the state of prophecy where the community was 
subject to divine law. Membership was determined not by recognized 
frontiers but by submission to the rightful Imam, whose authority over 
distant territory was recognized by paying zakat, 
receiving his judges, and performing jihad under 
his banner. In the first state, unity was expressed 
in the belief in the one God, applying His com-
mands, and swearing allegiance to His political 
authority on earth.
Both Faris al-Shuwayl and Lewis Atiyat Allah re-
gard the main agent of this state to be Muham-
mad ibn Abd al-Wahhab rather than Muhammad 
ibn Saud; the former was the interpreter of God’s 
words while the latter was the executive force 
that enforced these words. This state had no 
name apart from dawlat al-tawhid, a deterritori-
alized polity pursuing the ultimate message of 
Islam, subjecting the individual to the sovereignty 
of God. As such, this state cannot be confined to 
man-made borders, cultural and historical factors, ethnic and linguistic 
considerations, or any other attribute common in defining the modern 
nation state. As such it was the ideal Muslim state that rebelled against 
blasphemy, religious innovations, and man-made law. The collapse of 
this state in 1818 at the hands of Ottoman troops temporarily sealed 
the fate of dawlat al-tawhid whose advocates impatiently waited for its 
revival in the twentieth century. 
In contrast, the current state of 1932 
evokes only negative responses among 
Saudi Jihadi Salafis. They contest its le-
gitimacy, name, law, borders, and for-
eign policies. Many of them regard it 
as an aberration of the first experience. 
They attribute its creation to an illegiti-
mate relationship with an infidel power 
(Britain). Its name “Saudi Kingdom” is 
denounced as a family fiefdom; its na-
tionality is rejected as a modern inno-
vation that is not anchored in Islamic 
text or historical practice; its foreign relations, especially its alliance 
with the West, violate the tenth principle of iman (faith) in Wahhabi 
theology, namely al-wala wa al-bara (association with Muslims and dis-
sociation from infidels). Against the global Jihadi message, the local 
state remains a rejected aberration. 
Faris al-Shuwayl (detained in Saudi Arabia since 2004), and also known 
as Shaykh Abu Jandal al-Azdi (nom de plume), replies to queries posted 
to him on the Internet about differences between the first state and the 
contemporary one. His reply outlines how a Muslim should proceed in 
his evaluation of the first state. He glorifies the first state and argues 
that in each family there are those who are good and those who are 
bad. One must distinguish between the good and the debauched from 
among the Al-Saud family. The first state was one that corresponded 
most to the ideal Islamic polity. He lists its assets: making religion tri-
umphant, fighting blasphemy, applying Sharia, and purifying Islam 
from Sufis, philosophers, and innovators. Its unity is derived not from 
the cultural or ethnic characteristics of people, common economic in-
terest, or geographical boundaries, but from belief in one God.
The first state embodied a borderless Salafiyya uncontaminated by 
practices of the contemporary nation-state. Rather than spreading the 
flames of jihad, the contemporary state prohibited it under foreign 
pressure. Furthermore, it opened its territories to foreign troops and al-
lowed military bases to be established in the land of Islam. In addition, 
it allowed istitan, the settlements of foreigners who brought their ways 
of life to sacred space, which should have remained pure and uncon-
taminated by the kafir ways of Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists. 
Local and global identities
Jihadis who reject the contemporary state accept only two identities, 
one extremely narrow defined in either regional or tribal affiliation, and 
one extremely global defined in a deterritorialized utopia, the Muslim 
ummah. Jihadi ideologue Faris al-Shuwayl clearly articulates this posi-
tion. In a famous letter entitled “Saudi Nationality Under my Foot,” he 
introduces himself as Faris ibn Ahmad ibn Juman ibn Ali al-Shuwayl al-
Hasani al-Zahrani al-Azadi, thus anchoring his identity in Zahran, one 
of the Hijazi Qahtani tribes of contemporary Saudi Arabia. 
Faris al-Shuwayl asserts that he does not recognize Saudi nationality 
in stating: “I am a Muslim among Muslims. I read history and did not 
find something called jinsiyya (nationality). Each Muslim must operate 
in Dar al-Islam wherever he wants and without borders restraining him 
or passports confining him and without a taghut watan (despot nation) 
to worship. My fathers are known, my family is known, my tribe Zahran 
belong to the Azd. Therefore I do not belong to Al-Saud who have no 
right to make people belong to them.”4
Faris al-Shuwayl calls upon the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to 
remember that the return of their glory will be dependent on their 
return to Islam and rejection of a state that reveals kufr bawah (obvi-
ous blasphemy), governs by rules other than those of God, opens the 
land for Jews and Crusaders, and kills pious Muslims, arrests people of 
knowledge, and steals public wealth. He calls upon the “lions of the 
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“I do not belong to 
Al-Saud who have 
no right to make 
people belong to 
them.” 
Jihadi ideologues in Saudi Arabia are advocates 
of global jihad aiming to establish an Islamic 
world order. At the same time they remain 
closely tied to local Saudi identities. Rejecting 
the national Saudi state and emphasizing 
tribal affiliation, Saudi Jihadis construct 
a discourse in which the Arabian peninsula 
is crucial. Yet when action is concerned, as 
in the pursuit of jihad, the tension between 
the local and the global creates contradictions 
that remain unresolved. 
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Peninsula,” the grandsons of muhajirun, 
early Muslim converts who migrated 
with the Prophet to Medina, and ansar, 
the Medinians who supported them, 
to dissociate themselves from the con-
temporary state. 
Tribal affiliation becomes the first 
important marker of a narrow identity 
that defines the individual and anchors 
him in an old hierarchy of noble tribes, 
whose prestige and standing stem from 
their early historic support for the mes-
sage of the Prophet. While this identity 
is constructed on the basis of kinship 
and blood ties, the tribe acquires local 
significance in the war on blasphemy 
and the purification of the land from 
polytheism. It is incumbent on this nar-
row tribal construction to make Islam 
dominant and hegemonic. The narrow 
local identification should be put at the 
service of the global message. 
From the narrow confines of local 
tribal identity, Faris al-Shuwayl moves 
to the global Muslim ideal, where 
brotherhood is established as a result 
of tawhid, in its spiritual rather than ge-
ographical meaning. In this typology 
of identities that move from the very 
local to the global, there is no space for 
modern constructions such as jinsiyya 
(nationality) and wataniyya (citizen-
ship). Faris al-Shuwayl invites Muslims 
to reject these modern constructions, 
considered as instruments of division between Muslims, whose unity 
cannot be established on common economic interest or any other in-
terest except belief in one God. 
Nationality and citizenship cannot mediate between the very local 
and the very global, as had become the norm and practice in the world. 
There is only one path that can mediate between the local and the glo-
bal. This is the space of jazirat al-Arab or bilad al-haramayn, an identity 
that derives its legitimacy from Arab heritage and sacred space, the two 
holy mosques. The Arabian Peninsula becomes the regional mediator 
between the tribe on the one hand and the ummah on the other hand. 
This model is the only possible and legitimate one. Arab identity, where 
it first emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, becomes a source of pride. 
Between the local and the global
Lewis Atiyat Allah, who has a prominent presence on Jihadi websites, 
advocates global jihad. His vision encompasses an Islamic world order 
that opposes and defies the current international world order labour-
ing under US hegemony.5 His jihad is very much dependent on the 
notion of an Islamic ummah, encompassing different races, nationali-
ties, and cultural groups. The unity of this ummah is derived from faith 
rather than race. However, Lewis Atiyat Allah turns his attention to his 
homeland, the most sacred territory and the core of the Muslim world, 
the “Land of the Two Holy Mosques.” His homeland is central in the es-
tablishment of the Islamic world order, but unfortunately, according to 
Lewis Atiyat Allah, it has become, under the current Saudi leadership, 
a vehicle for Western hegemony. Lewis Atiyat Allah seems to blur the 
boundaries between the so-called national and the transnational Is-
lamists, a dichotomy that has become fashionable in several academic 
studies of the Islamist movement after 9/11. 
When Lewis Atiyat Allah “returns” to bilad al-haramayn, he is trans-
formed into a nationalist who invokes notions of sacred territory, 
historical responsibility, and the glorious past. For Lewis Atiyat Allah 
bilad al-haramayn is not only Mecca and Medina, theoretically closed 
to non-Muslims, but the whole Arabian Peninsula. As such, the land 
of Islam needs to be freed from acts of defilement, manifested in the 
actual physical presence of non-Muslims. This foreign presence en-
compasses not only US soldiers and military bases, but also non-Mus-
lim workers, especially Western expatriates. According to Lewis Atiyat 
Allah, foreigners, obviously regarded as profane, violate the purity 
of this geographical entity. Here the 
boundaries of bilad al-haramayn are 
seen as having become porous, allow-
ing in the process a greater defilement 
and molestation to take place not only 
on the periphery but also in the core of 
this sacred territory. 
He calls upon the “grandsons of the 
companions of the Prophet to expel the 
infidels from jazirat al-arab,” following 
the prophetic tradition. Jazirat al-arab 
is a central term for Lewis Atiyat Allah. 
Syntactically, it invokes “Arab” posses-
sion of a territory, which the descrip-
tive nomenclature al-jazira al-arabiyya 
fails to capture. Furthermore, jazirat al-
arab conveys a different meaning from 
that implied by bilad al-haramayn. The 
first implies the centrality of the Arab 
dimension of the jihad option and the 
historical responsibility of the inhabit-
ants of the Arabian Peninsula to take 
the lead in the struggle. When Lewis 
Atiyat Allah invokes jazirat al-arab, 
there is no doubt that he is an Arab 
nationalist, thus exposing the tension 
between the universal Muslim commu-
nity, the ummah, and the particular, his 
own homeland. He tries to resolve this 
tension by ascribing a central role to his 
own native land, fusing the local—his 
homeland—in the global project, the 
envisaged Islamic world order. 
The centrality of the local in the glo-
bal Jihadi project manifests itself in the desire to cleanse the Arabian 
Peninsula and Arabs from the sin of not only having actively contribut-
ed to the destruction of the Islamic Caliphate in the First World War but 
also of having been the vanguards of this destruction. While the Otto-
man Caliphate is not held to be the desired Islamic Caliphate especially 
in its later years, Jihadis lament its downfall and the Arab contribution 
to its demise. Accordingly, the participation of Saudis in Jihadi projects 
on the periphery of the Muslim ummah (for example in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) is an act of both purification and reclamation of a lost glory. 
Saudi Jihadi discourse and practices create unresolved contradic-
tions. In Saudi Arabia, dissident Jihadis recognize 
only two identities, one originating in tribal affilia-
tion and one in a global Muslim construction with 
the Arabian Peninsula mediating between these 
two distant poles. Other mediating constructions 
such as nationality are rejected as forms of inno-
vation and blasphemy whose main purpose is to 
divide and undermine Muslim unity. However, 
when action is concerned, for example pursuing 
jihad, there is an on-going debate that may not 
be resolved in the near future. Some Saudi Jihadis 
will remain at home to correct the aberration and 
topple the contemporary Saudi state while others 
will choose to pursue jihad abroad as an act of pu-
rification of Arab sins. From afar, they will aspire to 
make Islam once again dominant and hegemonic. 
In pursuing this project, Saudis are called upon to 
play a leading role. Their local identity is para-
mount in the global project, yet the local remains 
problematic, or at least in need of justification. 
Notes
1. This article draws on Madawi Al-Rasheed, 
Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from 
a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
2. Although Saudi involvement in Jihadi 
projects abroad was initially state 
sponsored, for example in Afghanistan, it 
later escaped the control of its sponsors.
3. I can only speculate on why this Jihadi chose 
this unusual nom de plume. He explains it as 
resulting from a conversation he had with a 
US immigration officer. When Lewis said that 
his name was Lewis, the immigration officer 
remarked that this name was not the one 
written in the passport, Lewis then replied 
that he was “gonna change it to Lewis.” See 
Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, 175-
176.
4. Faris Al-Shuwayl, www.islah.tv.
5. For a full biography, see Al-Rasheed, 
Contesting the Saudi State.
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British Muslim communities comprise 
a diverse range of traditions, in which 
four major tendencies are identifiable: 
the largest numbers of followers come 
from the Barelwi tradition, followed by 
Deobandi, then Jamaat-i Islam inspired 
institutions, and finally the Ahl-i-Hadith 
network. All of these are theological and 
ideological trends imported into the UK 
with the arrival of the early South Asian 
settler communities in the 1960s and 
1970s. The remainder of British Muslims 
tend to be organized around ethnicity. Only a handful of mosques openly 
identify themselves as Salafi; key among them are institutions like the 
Green Lane Mosque in Birmingham, Salafi Institute, Birmingham, Masjid 
Ibn Taymiyyah in Brixton, and the Islamic Centre of Luton. Pinpointing the 
precise entry of Salafi ideas into the UK is speculative at best, but it is 
thought to have occurred towards the late 1980s.1 
The Emergence of British Salafism
The instrumental organization for the spread of Salafism in the UK was 
the Jamiyyat Ihya Minhaj as Sunnah, “The Society for the Revival of the 
Prophetic Way” (JIMAS).2 Its leader Manwar Ali, also known as “Abu Mun-
Salafism
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The Development of 
British Salafism
tasir,” is credited by many as being the 
father of “Salafi dawah”(proselytizing) in 
the UK. He is largely responsible for the 
spread of Salafism among young people 
through his delivery of countless “study 
circles” at mosques, community centres, 
and universities across the country. Fur-
thermore, replicating global patterns, 
the spread of Salafi interpretations of 
Islam in the UK was underwritten by 
the financial investment into religious 
institutions and distribution of litera-
ture from Saudi Arabia and the return of religious studies graduates from 
Saudi Arabia’s two main universities.
Methodologically, Salafism relies upon scriptural literalism and re-
volves around a set of binary opposites: tawhid (oneness of God) and 
opposition shirk (all forms of divine association-ism), loyalty to the 
sunnah (prophetic example) in matters of belief and religious ritual 
as opposed to bid‘a (innovation), an emblematic respect for the pious 
first three generations of Muslims, and general loss of confidence 
and interest in subsequent phases of Muslim intellectual history, and 
rejection of taqlid (adherence/loyalty to one school of Islamic law) in 
favour of literalist approaches to Islamic jurisprudence.
The early 1990s was the defining era for second-generation 
Islamic activism; indeed this decade was perhaps the most in-
tense for its identity politics. Adherents to Salafi perspectives 
were drawn mainly from second generation male and female 
South Asian Muslims with a significant number of black and 
white converts. The average age of followers was between 
eighteen and thirty years; they were geographically located 
most often near the mosque communities already mentioned. 
Membership to religious organizations provided opportuni-
ties for the creation of communities of shared meaning and 
strong friendship networks important to younger people 
wanting to feel part of something bigger than themselves.
Muslims tired of what they saw as “cultural Islam” found in 
the Salafi perspective an approach to religious commitment 
which seemed to be intellectually rigorous, evidence-based, 
and stripped of the perceived corruptions of the folkloric reli-
gion of the Barelwis, or the “wishy washy” alternatives offered 
by rival Islamic tendencies such as Young Muslims UK or Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. Adopting a Salafi identity was in effect a process of 
exchanging and re-routing religious language and symbols. 
For subscribers to Salafism, the messages of other groups 
were not seen as convincing due to their lack of scholarly 
reference points and perception of compromise with kafir 
(heathen) culture. British Salafis could also frequently cite the 
senior scholars of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz (d. 1999), Ibn al-Uthay-
min (d. 2001), and the hadith specialist al-Albani (d. 1999), to 
buttress arguments from authority and silence those with an 
inferior command of scholastic frames of reference. 
Towards the middle 1990s, Salafism as an alternate reli-
gious paradigm became well established through mosques, 
networks, publications, media, and a large body of literature 
available on the Internet. Joining the Salafi dawah meant ac-
quiring membership into a multi-ethnic, supranational identi-
ty which offered a revival of “pure” Islamic practices that were 
seen as lacking in other Islamic trends. These communities of 
meaning provided an intellectual as well as physical refuge 
from readings and practices of Islam that were judged to be 
inauthentic, inferior, or deviant. In comparison to other Mus-
lim groups, the Salafi trend seemed to offer a cohesive iden-
Still from JIMAS 
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The popularity of Salafism in the UK is 
attributable to the convergence of the 
globalization of Salafi discourse, the search for 
religious identity among second generation 
British Muslims seeking “pure” religion, and 
the competition for recruits between rival 
Islamic currents. British Salafism has become 
diversified to such an extent that it is no longer 
recognizable as a single movement, with the 
development taking unexpected turns that 
belie popular monolithic representations.
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tity option that young people could purchase which might explain 
its relatively greater attraction for converts seeking “a ‘rationalized 
Islam’, one already stripped of the niceties and ambiguities of juristic 
reasoning, the complexities of theology, and the subtleties of Suf-
ism.”3
Rise of the “Super Salafis”
The development of British Salafism reached a critical juncture in 
1995 when tensions that had been simmering for a year or so between 
factions inside JIMAS eventually caused the organization to rupture 
and leave an ideological split that remains to this day. Ever since the 
first Gulf War in 1991, Salafi scholars have been divided over the pres-
ence of US troops in the heart of the Muslim world. The origins of this 
division started within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia when a faction 
of younger scholars began questioning why its rulers had invited the 
Americans to fight another Muslim country, and worse still, establish 
military bases. Ideologically they were led by Salman al-Audah and 
Safar al-Hawali who gained prominence for their rebellious stances 
against the government.
Quintan Wiktorowicz provides a helpful typology in differentiat-
ing three main global trends that were identifiable as a result of this 
emerging intra-Salafi factionalism; purists, politicos, and Jihadis.4 The 
“purists” remain loyal to the principles of Salafi ‘aqida (creed), and the 
Saudi state and therefore resisted any attempt to challenge the author-
ity of the rulers. Their priority was peaceful preaching—reform and cor-
rection of Muslim belief and ritual practice. The “politicos” agreeing to 
the importance of the Salafi creed nevertheless argued that the reform 
manhaj (methodology) had to include a consideration of the complex 
and changing social-political realities taking place in the world, which 
need to be addressed in addition to the concerns of the Salafi dawah. 
The Jihadis, on the other hand were impatient of the status quo, had 
participated in theatres of conflict like Afghanistan and wanted to take 
direct action, using violence to affect social change. All three tenden-
cies share the Salafi positions in matters of theology but differ in their 
analysis of problems in the Muslims world and on how they should be 
solved.
These shifting currents had direct consequences on the UK Salafi 
scene as JIMAS and individuals associated with them made direct 
links with Salafi figures in Saudi Arabia. The split similarly started ap-
pearing in Britain with the pro-Saudi government position member, 
Abdul Wahid, also known as Abu Khadeejah, leading the polarization 
of positions within the group. He challenged Abu Muntasir and those 
who were sympathetic to the anti-Saudi government stance, causing a 
process of fragmentation over a period of one year. Despite attempts 
by senior figures within the UK Salafi community, the rift became ir-
reconcilable with the Abu Khadeejah faction eventually breaking away 
and taking a significant number of people with them to form OASIS 
(Organization of Ahl al Sunnah Islamic Societies), the precursor to Salafi 
Publications, and associated websites.5 
This faction then established the Salafi Institute and became known 
for their intolerant and polemical attitude to former colleagues and 
other Muslim groups. A form of theological Inquisition was initiated 
where people were condemned for not being Salafi enough. The de-
tails of these differences between various protagonists are a labyrinth 
of theological argument, counter claims, accusations and rebuttals, a 
flavour of which can be sampled by visiting their main websites. This 
mindset eventually led Abu Khadeejah and his followers to be deroga-
torily labelled by moderates as the “Super Salafis,” because of their 
ruthless witch-hunt tactics of non-conformist Salafis who refused to 
capitulate to their version of correct Salafi belief and methodology. 
People were accused of being “Hizbiyyah,” “Qutbiyyah,” “Sorouri,” pejo-
rative terms referring to ideas and figures deemed beyond the pale, 
which resulted in a form of religious McCarthyism. The term Hizbiyyah 
would imply that someone was influenced by movements like the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, while Qutbiyyah refers to the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
ideologue Sayyid Qutb; Sorour was a prominent Salafi figure based in 
the UK for two decades until the late 1990s. Black lists, boycotts, and 
character assassinations continue to divide British Salafis to this day. 
This dark period had other impacts on the relationships between peo-
ples and their families, with some people becoming socially estranged, 
couples divorcing, and individuals suffering what became known as 
the “Salafi Burnout,” when individuals suffered a dramatic loss of faith 
and religious practice. 
The counter attack of “traditional Islam”
Another major factor in the evolution of Salafism in the UK has been 
the increasing appeal of “traditional Islam,” an activist and scholarly 
form of Sufism, which was initially popularized by charismatic Ameri-
can convert scholar Hamza Yusuf.6 He seemed 
to mesmerize audiences with the depth of his 
knowledge of Islam and apparent polymathic 
command of subjects as diverse as music, litera-
ture, and science. Prominent moderate Salafis at 
the time, though privately in awe of his learning, 
publicly dismissed him as Sufi. The traditional 
Islam trend in effect appropriated some of the au-
thority from the Salafi scholars, resulting in a re-
duction of some of the aura of knowledgeability 
from British Salafis and offering a broader, richer 
understanding of Islam that emphasized the spir-
itual dimensions of religion. The impact of Hamza 
Yusuf’s message was reinforced and echoed by 
two other prominent convert scholars, the Eng-
lish Abdal Hakim Murad (b. 1960), a Cambridge 
professor of Islamic Studies, and the American 
Shaykh Nuh Keller (b.1954) who is based in Jor-
dan. The three figures spearheaded a strategy 
of discrediting the politicized readings of Islam 
found in the literature of the reformist Islamists 
and deconstructing the claims to textual ortho-
doxy of the Salafi groupings. Especially Abdal Hakim Murad has been 
prolific in this regard; his writings consititute one of the most popular 
resources for “traditional Islam.”7
The influence of Salafi trends on British Muslim communities has been 
larger than its numerical presence among communities; their influence 
is disproportional as a result of the effectiveness of their literature dis-
tribution and web presence. Today, people that subscribe to Salafi per-
spectives can broadly be described as either those that gravitate to the 
outlook of the “Super Salafis,” or feel more comfortable with the JIMAS 
approach; those whose religious praxis is what could be described as a 
“methodological Salafism”—a literalist reading of scripture but which 
is not aligned with any particular group or institution; or those who 
might be described as “post-Salafi.” Leading British Salafis such as Abu 
Aliyah, Abu Muntasir, and Usama Hasan are not obsessed with defining 
themselves as Salafi. More complex hybridized identities are emerging 
where, for example, Usama Hasan goes as far as to refer to himself as a 
Wahhabbi–Sufi! In an interview with the author, he argued that some 
of the categories used by analysts miss the complex, evolving nature of 
contemporary British Salafi trends. Leading Salafi 
activists are now trying to bridge the sectarian di-
vides once thought impossible. In the aftermath 
of the Iraq invasion and resulting intra-Muslim 
violence, there have been high profile attempts 
to reconcile opposing theological trends, through 
initiatives such as the Amman Message8 and the 
Sunni Pledge,9 a pledge of mutual respect and 
cooperation between Sunni Muslim scholars and 
organizations. These developments challenge the 
nuance-lacking representations of Salafism in re-
cent times as well as indicate the dynamic and or-
ganic nature of religious identity formation.
Sadek Hamid teaches Muslim Youth Work at the University of Chester, England, where he is 
also a Ph.D. candidate researching British Muslim youth, religious activism, and the role of 
Islamic movements.
Email: s.hamid@chester.ac.uk
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Purist Salafism
in France
Salafis are usually qualified as revolu-
tionary or reformist Muslims mainly in-
terested in gaining primacy around the 
world and overthrowing perfidious re-
gimes which have betrayed the cause 
of Islam. However, this image covers 
only one aspect of Salafism, that of the 
Jihadi Salafis, who present themselves 
as partisans of using political violence 
and combating corrupt Muslim leaders. 
External to Jihadi Salafism is a quietist 
Salafism, that of the so-called purists. 
Whereas both types of Salafis reject 
Western society, purist Salafis, unlike Jihadi Salafis, do not strive to de-
stroy it. Neither do purist Salafis in Muslim countries put up resistance 
against the government, even if they find it insufficiently Islamic. 
Whereas the purist view is built around non-political opinions, revo-
lutionary Salafis think that Muslims have a political obligation to estab-
lish a strict Islamic society rid of apostate leaders and to Islamize the 
state and its institutions. Therefore Jihadis target 
Muslim leaders, charged with trampling Islamic 
laws underfoot because of their cooperation 
with the United States and their negligence of 
“their brothers” in Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. 
But according to the purist Salafis, human beings 
are created for a strict religious purpose: obeying 
Allah and following His moral and judicial com-
mands. Purists promote a strict religious view 
focusing on the duty to worship Allah who pre-
scribes them obedience to political chiefs so as 
to prevent Muslim communities from fitna (chaos 
and anarchy).1
Purist Islam
For a decade and a half in France, in some sub-
urban areas close to Paris,2 Lille-Roubaix,3 and 
Lyon,4 purist Salafism has become a significant 
social reality within Muslim communities. With 
about 5,000 people said to be purist Salafis in 
France according to Intelligence Services, this 
current is growing in areas traditionally known to 
shelter many Muslim families coming mainly from 
migratory flows after the 1950s-1960s. Generally, 
they are young people and many of them come from Algerian families. 
However, converted people are overrepresented within Salafi groups. 
Within French Muslim communities, converts do not constitute more 
than three or four percent whereas they stand for almost twenty to 
twenty-five percent of the Salafis that I have met through my work. 
They mainly attribute their decision to take up the Minhaj Salafi (Path 
of the Virtuous Ancestors) to the influence of friends who had entered 
Salafi groups.
Cultivating a way of life based on the search for purity, Salafis usually opt 
for a strict break with what they think of as causing their perdition. Practis-
ing moral codes which they identify as coming straight from the salaf (the 
ancestors of early Islam)—thus the best and purest Muslims ever—they 
claim for themselves legitimacy and superiority. Salafis claim to be the 
only Muslims who know the true sense of tawhid (oneness of God) as op-
posed to other currents such as the Muslim Brothers whom they accuse 
of being too far from a true knowledge of the sources.
Moreover, Salafis think they are closer to Islamic authenticity and 
truth because their methodology is based on the primacy of ortho-
dox scholars. They appeal to Salafi scholars—teaching mainly in Saudi 
Arabia—for religious rulings because 
they have mastered Islamic learning 
and answer any question supporting it 
with proof. Put differently, Salafi Islam 
presents itself as rational compared to 
“passionate Islam.” Such was the claim 
made by a young Salafi to distinguish 
“his” Islam from l’Islam de France repre-
sented by famous figures such as Tariq 
Ramadan. Legitimacy based on the ex-
pertise of judicial norms seems to be 
the key to understanding the feeling 
of Islamic superiority associated with 
Salafi Islam. In France, where Islam is a much stigmatized religion, it 
can be easily understood why some people overturn this stigmata by 
insisting on their exceptional predestination. The Minhaj Salafi as it is 
understood in France grants answers to young people facing anomie 
and trying to position themselves within the French context.
Breaking with society
When we observe “the Salafi way of life” from the period of its emer-
gence we see that from their clothing to their cultural habits every-
thing is related to the desire to break with the surrounding society. For 
instance, whereas many young Muslims (many young people living in 
the suburbs, actually) prefer wearing suits because of their profes-
sional life or others wear sporting caps, Salafis wear the qamis, a long 
tunic over loose pants, their heads are covered by a taqiyya, and they 
wear izhar (shorter pants that end before the ankles). Their dress aims 
at stating at an immediate glance that they do not belong to modern 
times.
Before conversion many Salafis lived an un-Islamic life including 
the consumption of alcohol and sexual promiscuity, after which they 
started looking for an ideal provided by Islamic purity. Maybe for this 
reason they act as if they do not want to stay connected with their 
former environment. This can also be an explanation for their refusal 
to participate in politics within French society. For example, almost all 
the purist Salafis I met claimed they do not vote on religious grounds. 
However, it turned out that most of them have never voted for their 
whole life, even before becoming Salafis. Consequently, this can ex-
plain Salafis’ weak involvement in political issues.
Moreover, since purist Salafis do not identify with French social 
customs, and more generally with Western moral codes, they tend to 
leave France to join Muslim countries where they believe they will 
be able to practise true Islam and experience real religious freedom. 
They call this a hijra (salutary migration), or a “return to the lands of 
origins” (from where their parents should never have left). However, 
though until a few years ago, main destinations were the countries of 
their parents, currently, through a process of “globalization of hijra” 
new geographical targets such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi can be men-
tioned.
Whereas France stops being their country and they get a new iden-
tity based strictly on a religious feeling of belongingness, it must be 
stressed that the hijra made by French Salafis obeys a Western logic. 
For example, they are attracted by modern and dynamic trading cit-
ies which enable them to set up businesses and become wealthy. 
Instead of reaffirming their parental culture by returning to Algeria 
or Morocco for instance, they are more akin to the globalized youth 
involved in computer or electronic goods businesses who travel fre-
quently between Europe and the Gulf so as to advance their personal 
situations. By learning foreign languages (mostly English) and con-
necting to new ways of lives, they improve their cultural skills and 
their knowledge of the world.
Although Islam in France is composed of 
currents found in Muslim societies around the 
world, France is currently primarily affected 
by the assertion of purist Salafis, whose main 
concern is to bring Muslim believers back to the 
path of Islamic orthodoxy. Purist Salafi Muslims 
strictly differentiate themselves from non-
Muslims and Muslims alike. They emphasize a 
break with society in order to return to Islam 
practiced in its “original” form, but their purist 
Salafism nonetheless retains some trappings of 
the modernity it shuns.
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Intra-religious competition
Salafi imams play hardly any role in 
the turn to Salafism in France. Most of 
the time, when we study the Salafis’ 
trajectories, we are led to traces of the 
Tablighi Jamaat, or more rarely, instances 
of attending conferences of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They come to the da‘wa 
salafiyya (Salafi mission) through their 
disappointment with these forms of 
Islam which they later see as “false.” Sala-
fis justify their negative view of the Mus-
lim “other” by referring to the magical el-
ements they find in Tablighi Islam or the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s taste for accom-
modation and politics. For example, they 
call the Islam of Muslim Brotherhood 
“Islam light” and claim that the ikhwan 
muslimin (Muslim Brothers) are, in fact, 
ikhwan muflissin (Corrupt Brothers) who 
have given too much value to politics. 
Purists level similar criticism at Jihadis, 
adding political violence to the list.
Purist Salafi groups in main suburban areas in France consider them-
selves the cream of Islam. They feel they do not belong to oppressed 
social classes because they have joined a kind of sacred caste that is 
the elite of society. Allah chose them to be the taifa al-mansura (victori-
ous branch) and the farqat al-najiya (saved group), in reference to the 
famous and much debated hadith that Muslims will divide into seventy 
three factions all of which will end in hell except for the one Allah saves 
because it had stayed faithful in the face of temptations. Many Salafis 
think they form that only group destined for eternal salvation, because 
they have resisted the allure of “new” gods such as money, democracy, 
or secularism. Having been saved, they have to be grateful toward Allah 
and obey His Laws. This exclusive feeling is very different from Muslim 
currents such as the Muslim Brotherhood which insists on the need to 
unify Muslims and to come to an agreement with all of them so that 
Islam and Muslims restore their glory.
On a cultural and social level, purist Salafism can be defined as an 
attempt to rationalize time and space. Life, work, and education are 
fields for religious investment. However, there is a real contradiction in 
French Salafis’ way of life and their desire to be recognized as the pos-
sessors of Islamic truth. While Salafis intend to live apart from the rest of 
the society on religious grounds they are also involved in a competition 
with other Muslims. The Islamic field in France can thus be described 
as a market within which each “firm”; each Muslim current, emphasizes 
comparative advantages to win “religious market shares.”
Salafis emphasize authenticity as opposed to, for instance, Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Islam as seen in the Union des Organisations Islamiques 
de France (UIOF), which prioritizes the need for a contextualized Islam 
that will allow one to be fully Muslim and fully citizen at the same time. 
Understandably, purist Salafism is overwhelmingly popular for a major-
ity of young Muslims who do not succeed at school and are above all 
mistrustful of the surrounding society. Muslim youth who are attracted 
by the message of UOIF for example are seeking social enhancement 
which leads them to look for a religious discourse that legitimizes their 
choices. In other words, contextualizing Islam does not lead to integra-
tion but integration leads to reformulating religious imperatives.
Negotiated identities
Escaping professional careers that might corrupt them, Salafis are 
often led to establish their own businesses such as fast-food restau-
rants, phone shops, Internet cafes, and bookshops. Ironically, many 
Salafi entrepreneurs reach social positions thanks to their successful 
businesses. Attributing their social ascension to the correctness of their 
religious orientation they take their worldly success as a further sign of 
their religious superiority. Briefly, many Salafis change from a “down 
and outs” state to a “chosen ones” state and they see Islam as the cause 
of their progress: true Islam has empowered them.
Furthermore, instead of keeping Salafis separate from the rest of the 
non-Muslim community, this counterculture contributes to a kind of 
integration between Salafis and others. This integration is based on 
purist Salafi wishes to hold on to many attractive features of Western 
modernity such as its business spirit or consumer culture. Thus purist 
Salafism engenders a “negotiated identity” which allows its adherents 
to appear as more honourable believers while retaining the undeni-
able advantages that French nationality provides. They do not consider 
themselves as citizens but as people whose bond with the state is not 
allegiance but utility. Though they abstain from political participation 
in a non-Islamic state, Salafis have no scruples in taking welfare from 
that very state. No Salafi has ever admitted that accepting welfare is 
prohibited and none of the several Salafi websites I have seen discuss 
the prohibition of receiving social help from the non-Muslim state.
French purist Salafism appears to be a manifestation of post-Islamism 
since it can be defined as the plan to foster Islamic militancy without 
using real political means as creating parties or involvement in elec-
tions and political campaigns. Its main characteristic is the will to “re-
Islamize” Muslims by reinvesting in the “core business” of Islam, namely 
tawhid, worship, and spirituality. In their view, Islamists have not been 
of real service to the ummah since their actions have only created fitna. 
Contrary to Islamists who generally want to get political power either 
violently or legally, purist Salafi thinking insists on using non-political 
methods.
The purists focus on purely religious elements such as faith and ado-
ration. Society has to be “re-Islamized” by means of preaching and pro-
viding “a good model.” The institutions however have to be Islamized 
through inspired scholars who are able to reform the state thanks to 
their religious knowledge. “Ordinary” believers have to stay away from 
theses struggles and focus on preaching, worshipping, and deepening 
their knowledge of religion, because they can easily lose their self-con-
trol.
No longer down and outs, purist Salafis set up some kind of new 
“bourgeoisie” whose goal is to maintain a “top culture” which will reach 
any Muslim or even any person on earth. Purist 
Salafis believe they form the avant garde and will 
become moral models for anyone. They are to be 
the followed ones and not the followers. Thus, 
it seems justified to speak of purist Salafism in 
France as a religious answer to social, symbolic, 
and cultural feelings of domination that are wide-
spread among Muslim populations. This discourse 
of true Islam can be used to reformulate power re-
lations to the advantage of the dominated. 
Notes
1. During French elections, Salafis reprimanded 
Muslims planning to vote. Quarrels erupted 
in mosques between elderly Muslims who 
urged the young to vote, and Salafis, who 
declared that it was illicit to take part in 
non-Islamic institutions. I witnessed an old 
man quoting Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi as 
allowing political participation, after which 
a Salafi retorted that Salafis did not heed 
deviant scholars.
2. In Les Mureaux, Stains, Argenteuil, Nanterre, 
and Épinay-sur-Seine.
3. In Roubaix and Tourcoing.
4. In Vénissieux.
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Mujahidin in Bosnia
From Ally to Challenger
The existence of the remaining muja-
hidin, foreign Muslim warriors, in Bos-
nia following the Dayton agreement in 
1995 has occasionally been portrayed 
by Croat and Serb religious and po-
litical leaders alike as a threat towards 
their existence and coexistence in Bos-
nia. This article disputes this view and 
argues instead that mujahidin have be-
come a challenger to the Islamic lead-
ership, namely the Islamska Zajednica 
(Islamic Community), and the Hanafi 
interpretation of Islam practiced by Bosnian Muslims. The Islamic Com-
munity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, founded in 1878, is the sole reli-
gious authority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and authorized 
to appoint imams to approximately 1,700 mosques and to provide reli-
gious education from secondary to post-graduate level.
Mujahidin entered Bosnia in 1992 through Croatia, mainly as hu-
manitarian aid workers. Although initially welcomed during an arms 
embargo in the fight against Serbian aggressors, they have gradually 
become a problem. Beside several confrontations with UN Peacekeep-
ing forces, their operations against Croat armed forces and civilians 
aggravated relations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Their em-
phasis on the religious character of the war did not only create conflict 
between the two allies (Bosnian Muslims and Croats), but also created 
tensions within local Muslim populations.
In the early 1990s, the Bosnian Muslims were at a serious disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis the Serb army which seized the ammunition of the Yu-
goslav army. In this context, the appearance of the mujahidin received 
much support, not least from Izetbegović, who was president at the 
time. However, the political anxieties triggered by 9/11 brought an end 
to this welcome. In 2002, six Bosnian citizens of Algerian origin were 
deported to Guantanamo and the accounts of ten humanitarian or-
ganizations were frozen. Since March 
2007, the government has stripped 661 
individuals of their Bosnian citizenship, 
arguing that it had been granted ille-
gally. Such incidents show that after a 
decade of cooperation the mujahidin 
have now become a nuisance to Bos-
nian Muslims, not just because they 
negatively influence the image of 
Bosnian Muslims in the eyes of non-
Muslim Bosnians and the international 
community, but also because they 
challenge the very core of Bosnian religious identity and its everyday 
representations. 
Between “brothers” and “neighbours”
Following the end of the 1992–1995 war, resulting in around 200,000 
dead, two million refugees and over 3,000 destroyed or damaged mon-
uments, the Islamska Zajednica faced the difficult task of facilitating 
understanding and confidence among the previously warring parties. 
In this context, the representatives of Croat and Serb religious and po-
litical leaders in Bosnia occasionally referred to the “increasing Islami-
zation” which they saw as a threat to their existence and to the possibil-
ity of coexistence. Although these statements have reflected a vague 
and ambiguous framework on subjects ranging from the increasing 
number of mosques to constitutional arrangements for a centralized 
state or the political statements made by Reis ul-Ulama Dr. Mustafa ef. 
Cerić, they have centred on the presence of mujahidin.
In the post 9/11 era Bosnia has been under scrutiny as a potential 
hotbed of Al-Qaida terrorism. It has been this alleged potentiality that 
has fed into anxieties and suspicions. The aforementioned statements 
started to be pronounced publicly in Bosnia in 2000. Until now three 
attacks have been committed by Salafi-oriented groups1 towards 
non-Muslim Bosnians. These were the 
murder of three members of Andelic 
family on 24 December 2002, a fight 
in Maoca on 13 March 2003, and an at-
tack on Mihajlo Kisic from Brcko on 15 
July 2006. Furthermore, “verbal provo-
cations” were reported by Serb return-
ees in the Jablanica and Gornja Maoca 
near Brćko where the settled mujahi-
din reside since they moved from Boc-
inja in central Bosnia in late 2000 and 
early 2001.
Certainly, the accusations are not 
just rhetoric: mujahidin have indeed 
used Bosnia as a battle front to fight 
“infidels” and as a training field for fu-
ture campaigns. However, a compari-
son of the extent of the incidents and 
the discourses on this “threat” reveals 
that although the relatively limited di-
rect threats to Croats and Serbs can in-
evitably give rise to anxiety, the state-
ments of a so-called Wahhabi threat in 
Bosnia towards coexistence is prima-
rily incited by the memories of the war 
and the aforementioned “potentiality,” 
which is also politically manipulated. 
For example, the Serb terrorism expert 
Darko Trifunović urged preservation of 
Cars damaged 
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war communal 
tensions in 
Bocinja, Bosnia
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Rather than forming an actual terrorist threat, 
Muslim warriors in Bosnia have become 
prominent challengers to Bosnian Islamic 
leadership. By propagating Salafi teachings 
which target the forms of Islam practised by 
the Bosnian Muslims, this former ally came to 
be seen as a threat—not only because their 
presence fuelled stigmatization of Bosnia as 
a potential terrorist hotbed, but also because 
their Salafi ideas go against the very essence of 
Bosnian Muslim identity. 
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the institutions of the Serbian Republic despite the current dysfunc-
tional state structure of Bosnia “to keep a track on Muslim spies,” the 
number of which was exaggerated to 400,000 by Mihajlo Mitrović, 
another Serb terrorism expert.2 Furthermore, Serb politicians such as 
Milorad Dodik employ discourses similar to those used prior to the 
1992-95 war, such as “to prevent the creation of a Muslim state in the 
heart of Europe.”3 However, facts on the ground reveal that it has been 
particularly the Bosnian Muslims who have been challenged by their 
former allies.
Importing “true Islam” 
Following a war into which Bosnian Muslims drifted partially due 
to their religious identity, the remaining mujahidin have attempted 
to transform the dominant socio-cultural framing by further solidify-
ing and channelling the increased interest in religion in particular 
ways. The remaining humanitarian relief organizations have not only 
reconstructed destroyed mosques, but also started educational and 
publishing projects. Translated Salafi-oriented literature (such as the 
“Family Library” financed by High Saudi Committee), new magazines 
(such as SAFF published by the pro-Salafi youth organization Active 
Islamic Youth), and websites (such as www.islambosna.ba and www.
bih.org) have been the main instruments for the transmission of Salafi 
thought among Bosnian Muslims. They especially brought new cultural 
framings and related discussions into the agenda of Bosnian Muslims. 
Besides denouncing the local practices as bid‘a (religious innovations), 
such as mawlid celebrations, tawhids (commemoration rites), or rela-
tively fast performance of prayers, they also introduced visual symbols 
in public life such as niqab and long beards. Since 1992, these interpre-
tations have often caused tensions between Bosnian Muslims perform-
ing the customary, Hanafi way of rituals and those adopting a Salafi 
interpretation. 
These conflicts moved to the next stage when differences in appear-
ance and performance of rituals started to disrupt the established 
order in Bosnian mosques and evolved into physical conflicts between 
the two groups. In February 2007, the doors of the Careva Mosque were 
locked, probably for the first time in its history, to avoid clashes be-
tween the congregation and the followers of Jusuf Barčić (the deceased 
Salafi imam from Barčići) who intended to give religious lectures. Sev-
eral cases have reported “Wahhabi young men” being beaten up by 
Bosnian mosque-goers. For example, during the past Ramadan, such 
young men were beaten and thrown out of the mosque when they in-
tended to do i‘tikaf (spend time in devotion to God) in a mosque. Simi-
lar cases occurred in Barčići in March and in Sarajevo in April 2007.4 Not 
only did these intra-Muslim conflicts create impatience with the Salafi-
oriented groups, but due to such instances, the Islamska Zajednica and 
Reis-ul Ulema Cerić have now been harshly criticized for not looking 
after the Bosnian Muslims’ centuries-old trust.
The authority of the Islamska Zajednica 
While these events targeted the Bosnian interpretation of Islam and 
the authority of the Islamska Zajednica as the sole legal and traditional 
representative of the Bosnian interpretation of Islam since 1878, the 
alleged passivity of the Islamska Zajednica has also been severely criti-
cized. The critics were mainly learned Bosnian Muslims such as several 
professors at the Faculty of Islamic Studies and Gazi Husrev Beg Madra-
sa of the Islamska Zajednica in Sarajevo as well as “former Wahhabis” 
such as Jasmin Merdan.
The Islamska Zajednica, which has been criticized for not having 
taken timely measures, had indeed attempted to take the initiative in 
the midst of the war with an almost now forgotten fatwa dated 13 No-
vember 1993, concerning “the obligation of honouring the principles 
of the Hanafi madhab.”5 Despite current requests to adopt a coercive 
approach by implementing legal measures, the Islamska Zajednica 
typically tries to sustain its hegemony by legitimizing its discourse and 
reconfiguring alliances horizontally and vertically to gain the consent 
of the members of the traditional congregation, as well as followers 
of the Salafi-oriented movements. The only exception was its later re-
quest from legal authorities (resulting in a law enacted in 2006) not to 
register any organization or institution with the attribute “Islamic” in 
its name, which can be regarded as an implicit coercive instrument. 
However, the developments on the ground, revealing that this fatwa in 
1993 had been ignored by some segments of the society, opened the 
way to new initiatives. 
Rijaset, the leadership of the Islamska Zajed-
nica, issued two subsequent resolutions in March 
and November 2006.6 By these resolutions, the Is-
lamska Zajednica underlined its determinacy “to 
protect the uniqueness of the centuries-long tra-
dition of Bosnian Muslims” and support “an institu-
tional interpretation of Islam in this region, based 
on Quran and Sunna and the traditions of the 
Bosnian Muslims,” while calling “those who want 
to make interpretations outside the institutional 
set-up, perhaps some humanitarian organizations 
or others [to] harmonize their programmes with 
the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community.” 
Here, it was also stated that mosques are open to 
everyone, while approval of the imam is required 
to do “anything in an organized fashion.”
Although the Islamska Zajednica aimed to 
strengthen its leadership, it has abstained to ex-
clude the dissident individuals and groups and 
conduct a kind of witch-hunt. The Islamska Zajednica has even refused 
to name and stigmatize these dissidents, not to “repeat the mistake 
made in 1949” when the religious leadership declared some ulema and 
members of the Young Muslim association as “traitors and terrorist.” 
Cerić preferred to blame “those who have not understood the ‘Islamic 
tradition of the Bosniaks’.”7 
Beside these attempts to form a horizontal alliance at the domestic 
level, the Islamska Zajednica has also initiated a vertical alliance in syn-
onymy with the debate on so-called Euro-Islam with the initiatives of 
the Reis-ul Ulema Dr. Mustafa ef. Cerić. Following his “Declaration of Eu-
ropean Muslims” in August 2005, Cerić has portrayed the Bosnian expe-
rience as a genuine form of the European experience of Islam. This has 
also reminded Bosnian Muslims that preservation of their moderate 
stand could promote their image. Now, the mujahidin have not only 
been figures who “sowed discord” within mosques and on the streets, 
but are also an obstacle in attempts of Bosnians to regain their posi-
tive image and to be part of the house of Europe. The dissidents had 
already damaged these goals by prompting connotations of terrorism. 
However, the resolution of November 2006 was found “inadequate 
and euphemistic” by several Bosnian Muslims, such as Prof. Esad 
Duraković, professor at the Institute for Eastern Studies in Sarajevo, 
who stated that “it has not even named the threat that is looming over 
Bosnia-Hercegovina,” while “it is necessary to act more adequately 
and with more urgency.”8 Such a call for action has already been pro-
nounced by Prof. Adnan Silajdžić, who even proposed that Wahhabi 
activities in Bosnia-Hercegovina must be penalized.9 Furthermore, the 
strongest accusations came from another professor from the Faculty of 
Islamic Sciences, Rešid Hafizović, who accused the Islamska Zajednica 
of being indulgent, by delineating the situation as follows: “Bosnian 
Muslims have been infected by a new lethal virus, as a recurrence of 
the recent aggression [1992–1995 war]” which “manifests itself in the 
form of an arrogant, rigid, aggressive, and anachronistic phenomenon 
called Wahhabism.” 
From 1992 to 2007, mujahidin have changed 
from an ally to a threat in the eyes of many Bos-
nian Muslims. For over a decade the traditional 
interpretation of Islam by the Bosnian Muslims 
and their religious leadership have been the main 
targets of the Salafi ideologies of the remaining 
mujahidin in Bosnia. They have not only fuelled 
the discourses to depict Bosnia as a hotbed for 
international terrorism, but also challenged the 
very core of Bosnian religious identity and its 
main representative, the Islamska Zajednica. It is 
now the representatives of the traditional Bos-
nian interpretation of Islam who undertake the 
struggle to regain self-confidence and trust be-
fore their fellow Bosnians and Europeans. 
Notes
1. “Salafism” is a more comprehensive and 
neutral notion used in Bosnia, while the 
term “Wahhabism” is mostly used by critics 
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reject the term. 
2. SRNA news agency (Bijeljina), 17 October 
2003.
3. Dnevni List (Mostar), 24 November 2007.
4. See http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/
articles/2007/5/24/134645.shtml?s=sr.
5. Glasnik 1–2 (1994): 198.
6. See www.rijaset.ba.
7. Nezavisne Novine (Banja Luka), 17 February 
2007.
8. Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 18 November 2006.
9. Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 11 November 2006.
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S A M I  Z E M N I
From Local Insurgency 
to Al-Qaida Franchise
On 11 December 2007 two car bomb-
ings targeting UN buildings and the 
Constitutional Council in different 
neighbourhoods of the Algerian capi-
tal caused at least sixty two casualties 
while injuring more than a hundred 
others. The bombings moved the inter-
national community and disgruntled 
the Algerian public as “Al-Qaida in the 
land of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) 
claimed responsibility for the attacks 
calling the UN “the international den of infidels.” The bombings sig-
nalled the transformation of a localized Islamist insurgency, the Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Predication 
and Combat, GSPC) into a member of the Global Jihad movement. 
While AQIM, just like the GSPC, still acts first and foremost to desta-
bilize the Algerian state, the movement has adopted an international 
discourse in which it fulminates against the West in general and against 
the US and France in particular. Far from being a sign of strength, it is 
the weakness of the movement and the unintended consequences of 
the War on Terror that have radicalized the movement. 
During the 1990s Algeria was enmeshed in a civil war that caused 
more than 150,000 casualties but from which emerged a period of 
relative calm and stability. While there remained 
several armed Islamist groups at large, it was the 
GSPC that had been the most active one in fight-
ing the Algerian regime. The group emerged from 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) after it broke down 
into several splinter groups in the second half of 
the 1990’s, as a result of the extremist attitude 
of its leadership under the emirs Djamel Zitouni 
(1994-1996) and after him Antar Zouabri (1996-
2002).1 It was in late 2006 that the local franchise 
of Al-Qaida became active with repeated bomb-
ings and attacks and the first suicide attacks the 
country witnessed on 11 April 2007. The AQIM 
group is now seen as a potential threat by the in-
ternational community. This became even clearer 
in the beginning of 2008 when the Paris-Dakar 
rally—passing through Mauretania and Mali—was 
cancelled after a statement, presumably issued by 
AQIM, that branded the race neo-colonialist and accused Mauritania of 
collaborating with “crusaders, apostates, and infidels.”2
The War on Terror
Throughout 2005 and 2006 most observers in and outside Algeria 
agreed that the GSPC found itself politically isolated, under pressure of 
the security forces, and lacking basic infrastructure and means (money, 
weapons, logistics, popular support). The combined action of the govern-
ment with its efficient security policy and its reconciliation programme 
seemed to bear its fruits. However, the “framing” of the fight against the 
GSPC into the logic of the global War on Terror has prompted the United 
States to grant military, logistic, and intelligence support to the Algerian 
regime. The active cooperation between the US and Algiers led to a grow-
ing number of youngsters in Northern Algeria wanting to fight in Iraq and 
a mounting displeasure in the Sahel-region, a hitherto peaceful region 
turned into a securitized area “seemingly full with terrorists.” Since 2003 
the Sahel region has become a second front against terror. US and Alge-
rian troops have militarized and securitized a vast Saharan region stretch-
ing over parts of Mali, Mauretania, Niger, and Chad. Today, it becomes 
clear that the Algerian government tried to link the GSPC to the “Saharan” 
corridor as a means to “attract” US military help.3
Marginalized, the GSPC’s “Afghan” core, 
the militants who fought in Afghani-
stan against the Russians and who 
came back to Algeria in the 1990s, 
made some appeal to Al-Qaida for 
help in order to win the franchise of 
the movement. After contacts with the 
leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, 
the GSPC officially shifted in Septem-
ber 2006 from a local group which was 
active within Algeria into an organiza-
tion with—at least in discourse—regional ambitions…thus becoming 
in a way something that the Algerian and US security communities 
were saying already existed.
The shift became complete with the adoption of the new name and 
the espousal of new strategies of violent action, including suicide 
attacks. While the group carries out symbolic attacks in the heart of 
Northern Algeria (capital and central cities), it also uses the tribal areas 
of the East and the mountainous regions of the West as its strongholds. 
The choice is based on the consideration that the militants can better 
adapt to this area on the borders of several countries than in the sub-
urbs of the heavily policed cities of the North. 
The new name does not really change the movement’s organiza-
tion but offers the possibility for the movement to access more easily 
the channels and funds of recruitment networks of people around the 
globe who are sympathetic to the fight against the US army in Iraq. 
This shift does not entail a shift in authority over the movement as no 
international or foreign player (Bin Laden or otherwise) can dictate the 
movement’s strategy. Some observers even suggest that the adoption 
of an Al-Qaida affiliation has been a conscious effort of the movement 
to: “keep Algerian fighters from leaving their home country and to at-
tract them to the fight against the Algerian government.”4
New tactics
While AQIM still tries to destabilize the Algerian regime—just like the 
GSPC before—it has nevertheless introduced new tactics that aim to 
rekindle the insurgency and increase the number of recruits. First of all, 
there was since the end of 2006 a growing number of smaller attacks in 
the tribal areas of the East of the country and in provinces far from Algiers 
that seem unavoidably linked to the movement’s search for funds and 
the control over parts of the trade routes through the desert. AQIM seems 
to be in part reliant on the proceeds of trading in stolen vehicles, smug-
gling cigarettes and drugs, and people-trafficking as well as “tax-levies” 
on smugglers looking for safe passage through the Algerian desert. Alge-
rian newspapers have regularly reported on the link the jihad groups and 
criminal activities. These allegations should be taken with precaution but 
it is nevertheless likely and logical that AQIM is in search of funding.5 
Secondly, the group clearly started targeting foreigners working in the 
oil and gas industry as well as in the development sector. For example, ac-
cording to the al-Jazeera website, the AQIM stated on 21 September that: 
“This morning, the morning of the blessed Friday, 9 Ramadan 1425 AH 
at 0715, the martyr hero Othman Abou Djaafar drove a vehicle—brand 
Mazda—loaded with more than 250 kg of explosives to target the French 
crusaders who are building the biggest dam in El Hammam Maala vil-
lage near Lakhdaria.” Algerian security services admitted that nine people 
were wounded, including two French nationals and an Italian.
Defying “foreign” nationals and their presumed interests has always 
been a tactic that aims to show the strength of the group as well as 
putting the foreign support of the Algerian regime under pressure. New 
for the AQIM—in comparison with the GSPC—is that these operations 
bolster its media presence by taping the operations and posting the vid-
eos online, particularly the attacks that target foreign workers. The usage 
One of the unintended consequences of the 
global War on Terror in the Maghreb is the 
transformation of the local Islamist insurgency 
into an Al-Qaida franchise. The Salafi Group 
for Predication and Combat, which in the past 
targeted the Algerian government, has now 
become part of the global jihad against the 
enemies of Islam. With the transformation new 
tactics such as suicide-attacks and assaults on 
foreigners have emerged.
The new tactics and 
the merger with 
Al-Qaida have led to 
generalized internal 
dissent …
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of multimedia technology (especially the Internet) is a new component in 
the ideological battle for the movement, which signals the fact that AQIM 
has stepped up its global propaganda. Posting its attacks on Al-Qaida af-
filiated websites has given the movement the opportunity to recruit new 
militants from several other countries in the Maghreb. 
Thirdly, the group also introduced the use of suicide attacks against of-
ficial buildings such as army barracks, security services buildings, police 
stations, or other governmental agencies. These attacks are carried out 
by a new generation of younger militants, foremost interested in fighting 
the Americans in Iraq and mainly recruited in Algerian mosques that are 
not controlled by the state. However, after their training, they are more 
and more asked to carry out attacks in the country itself. The enlistment 
of young teenagers who have been excluded from the educational sys-
tem and who come out of impoverished backgrounds of the capital city’s 
suburbs (where the GSPC has numerous contacts) as well as the recruit-
ment of foreigners (mainly Libyans, Malians, Mauritanians, and Tunisians 
but only few, if any, European Muslims until today) is presumably a sign of 
the movement’s loss of members which for months has been emptying 
the terrorist organization of its resources. 
Internal dissent
The new tactics and the merger with Al-Qaida have led to general-
ized internal dissent, massive defections, and a general disarray over 
what course to follow. The rather unilateral decision of the emir of the 
GSPC, Abu Mus‘ab Abd al-Wudud, aka Abd al-Malek Droukdel to join 
the Al-Qaida movement directly led to divisions and disagreements. 
The emir was—until his removal during last summer—facing harsh 
criticisms and strong opposition to his methodology of carrying out 
attacks using explosives in public areas and robbing the money of 
Muslims and terrorizing them. Hassan Hattab, the founder of the GSPC, 
denounced on several occasions the new methods used by the group 
and has accused Abd al-Malek Droukdel of turning Algeria into a sec-
ond Iraq. He also tried to convince the terrorists still active to lay down 
their weapons and give themselves over to the authorities. He finally 
rendered himself to the authorities in September.
Another prominent leader, Salim al-Afghani from the Humat Al-
Da‘wah Al-Salafiya (Protectors of the Salafi Da‘wa) declared that he was 
against joining Al-Qaida for many reasons, including the fact that AQIM 
treats innocent civilians as crusaders or blasphemers plus its abandon-
ing of the doctrines of Sharia and focusing on recruitment of young 
men whom are used to carry out suicide attacks. The issue of suicide at-
tacks has indeed divided the Islamist armed groups. Newly “imported” 
into Algeria in 2006, most of the armed groups have rejected the strate-
gy. This became all the more clear when, after the first suicide attack of 
2008 on 29 January in Thenia, AQIM stated in a press release its disgust 
at the radio programmes on Quranic teachings and the scholars that 
proved that suicide attacks were illegitimate in Islam.6
The continuous bomb attacks have shown however that the nu-
merous defections of both leaders and militants from the movement, 
the internal conflicts, and the government’s reconciliation policy are 
incapable of completely bringing an end to the violence. While there 
are inherent deficiencies in the national reconciliation policy (lack of 
resources, no ideological or psychological help) it is clear that the pro-
gramme has also had success. Around 6,000 militants have renounced 
terrorism since 1999 (as part of the civil harmony law), and another 
2,000 repented over the past two years as part of the Charter for Peace 
and National Reconciliation.7
With the 11 December attacks and a string of lesser publicized am-
bushes and bombings during the fall of 2007, 
AQIM seems to be increasing the level of violence 
again. It looks like Algeria will be facing terrorist at-
tacks under Islamist banners in the coming years. 
However, it is also obvious that these groups can-
not really count on large popular support. Only a 
growing feeling of insecurity and destabilization 
of the Algerian state could bring into turmoil a 
population that is largely against terrorism. Dis-
satisfaction with the government (that is already 
struggling to keep up its legitimacy in the face of 
growing socio-economic problems) can make it 
easier for AQIM to recruit the disappointed youth. 
While the access to the collection of funds from 
protection rackets and smuggling, and an increas-
ingly sophisticated Internet-based exposure will 
keep the material basis of the insurgents stable, it 
is the growing dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq 
and the global War on Terror that will remain the 
underlying political basis of the movement’s per-
petuation and its global Jihadi agenda. The “duty” 
to fight the “enemies” of Islam will remain a po-
tent slogan in the coming years as the War on Ter-
ror keeps generating unintended and unwanted 
consequences. One thing is sure: it has not made 
the world any safer. 
Sami Zemni is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Third World Studies, Ghent 
University, where he heads the Middle East and North Africa Research Group (http://www.
psw.ugent.be/menarg).
Email: sami.zemni@ugent.be 
Notes
1. On the history of the armed groups, see Luis 
Martinez, La guerre civile en Algérie (Paris: 
Karthala, 1998).
2. See http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/
usnBAN648110.html.
3. For a thorough critique of this policy see 
Jeremy Keenan, The Dark Sahara: America’s 
War on Terror in Africa (forthcoming 2008); 
idem, “The banana theory of terrorism: 
alternative truths and the collapse of the 
‘second’ (Saharan) front in the War on Terror,” 
Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies 25, no. 
1 (2007): 31-58.
4. Guido Steinberg and Isabelle Werenfels, 
“Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ enemy: 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” 
Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3 (2007): 411.
5. See, for example, Al-Khabar, 29 December 
2007 and Liberté, 24 April 2007.
6. The Algerian daily Al-Khabar was sent a 
communiqué from the movement (see its 
issue of 31 January 2008). 
7. See http://www.asharq-e.com/news.
asp?section=3&id=10220.
Aftermath 
of the 11 
December 2007 
bombing in 
Algiers
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 L
O
U
A
F
I 
L
A
R
B
I 
/
 ©
 R
E
U
T
E
R
S
, 
2
0
0
7
Not available online
1 8  I S I M  R E V I E W  2 1  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 8
Migrants & Minorities
K AT H E R I N E  D O N A H U E
The Religious Trajectories
of the Moussaoui Family
Zacarias Moussaoui’s mother can look 
out of her kitchen windows past her 
terrace to the Golfe du Lion of the 
Mediterranean. She can also look into 
her own heart to find the source of her 
Islam. In an interview at her house in 
Narbonne in February 2007, she told 
me that she carries Islam in her heart, 
and that she does not have to wear it 
on her sleeve or in outward manifesta-
tions of religiosity. She wrote in a let-
ter to her son Zacarias when he was in 
detention in New York, before his in-
dictment for six charges of conspiracy 
in December, 2001, that: “The jihad we are asked to do on earth is to 
fight the evil within ourselves in order to be able to live in harmony 
with others, whatever their religion or their ideas.”1 The jihad she had 
in mind bridges borders between people and cultures. But long before 
she wrote that letter, Zacarias had chosen a different jihad.
The story of the Moussaoui family, all of whose members lived to-
gether in the same household for a while, therefore sharing the same 
social milieu, brings into focus the importance of 
understanding individual action and choice. Each 
family member was embedded in the same socio-
cultural conditions and situations, and yet each 
made different choices. It is the problematic role 
of the anthropologist to balance an understand-
ing of those individual choices with the necessity 
of placing such individual action into a context 
that acknowledges the role of sociocultural con-
ditions in framing those choices.
The parents of Zacarias Moussaoui are Moroccan 
by birth, as are two of their four children. Mous-
saoui’s mother, Aïcha el-Wafi, was married at 14, 
against her will, she said. The couple’s two sons, 
Abd Samad and Zacarias, were born in France. 
The Moussaouis were not observant Muslims, and 
Aïcha on occasion celebrated Christmas with her 
children. Zacarias was, according to his brother 
Abd Samad, first introduced to Islam when visit-
ing relatives in Morocco on summer vacations. Zacarias was by all ac-
counts a normal French teenager, who loved Bruce Springsteen and 
Bob Marley and dance competitions with his blonde-haired girlfriend 
who lived just down the street. He was, according to his sister Jamila, 
“the sweetheart of the family.”2
Leaving home
But there were problems. Zacarias was of Moroccan descent, and the 
target of French racism. He and his brother were called “dirty Arabs.” 
The nightclub at the bottom of the hill in his middle-class neighbour-
hood was the site of fights between French youths and those of North 
African descent. His girlfriend’s parents did not approve of Zacarias. 
He dreamed of going to university, but he and his brother were both 
diverted to a technical high school from the lycée attended by their 
neighbours and friends. As Zacarias was finishing school in the early 
1990s, Bosnian Muslims were being killed, Algerian elections were 
derailed over Islam, and the United States was involved in Kuwait and 
Iraq.
Zacarias moved to London in February of 1992. He told his family 
he wanted to learn English, and he did so. He applied to South Bank 
University’s international business master’s programme, was accept-
ed, and received a degree. While a student there he attended Friday 
prayers at several moderate mosques, 
including one in Brixton. While finish-
ing his degree the imam of the Brixton 
mosque, himself a Jamaican convert to 
Islam, noticed that Moussaoui increas-
ingly dressed in Arab thobes and was 
becoming more militant. Moussaoui 
demanded that the imam tell him 
where the next jihad would be. When 
Moussaoui appeared in the mosque 
wearing military fatigues and carry-
ing a backpack, the imam asked him 
to leave. Moussaoui had already been 
proselytized by groups such as al-Mu-
hajiroun (“the Emigrants”), who leafleted people emerging from the 
moderate mosques such as in Brixton. Moussaoui was of interest to 
these groups because of his education and knowledge of the West, 
and he was drawn to a militant Islam as well, apparently because of 
his experiences with French racism and his inability, despite his gradu-
ate degree, to follow his dreams of finding a good job in international 
business.3
By the time Moussaoui left the Brixton mosque he was cutting off ties 
to his family, except for one return visit in the summer of 1997. His mother 
did not see him again until she arrived in Alexandria, Virginia, in 2002 for 
hearings concerning his pending trial for six counts of conspiracy to com-
mit terrorist acts, four of which could carry the death penalty. Testimony 
later admitted into court, and available on the court’s website, indicates 
that the French police knew about Moussaoui’s conversion and had fol-
lowed his movements to Chechnya and Afghanistan in the 1990s. He him-
self admitted to his travels in court, and he actually pleaded guilty to the 
conspiracy charges against him in April 2005. He insisted, however, that 
he was not part of the 9/11 plot. He was sentenced to life in prison, escap-
ing the death penalty because one juror held out for life.
War of words
Meanwhile, his brother Abd Samad had married a Moroccan cousin. 
Abd Samad joined a mosque run by the Ahbash, or Habache, group, the 
Association des Projets de Bienfaisance Islamiques en France (APBIF). 
Al-Ahbash in Arabic translates as “the Ethiopian” or more properly, “the 
Abyssinian.” In Arabic, the group is Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya 
al-Islamiyya, in the US and other English-speaking countries, the As-
sociation of Islamic Charitable Projects (AICP). The movement has now 
spread beyond Lebanon to France, where it has 17 mosques or prayer 
halls, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, North America, and elsewhere. 
Abd Samad’s wife Fouzia, according to Moussaoui’s mother, is exces-
sively religious, wearing long clothing covering her arms and head. 
She too is a member of the APBIF. Aïcha and the couple do not speak. 
Aïcha is unhappy that her son Abd Samad wrote a book, Zacarias, mon 
frère, in which he exposed events in the Moussaoui family’s life that 
made her seem a less than loving mother, and there has been discus-
sion in the French press about why he would do so. 
Part of the reason lies with the poor relations between the two 
Muslim groups the Moussaoui brothers joined. There is little love lost 
between the Ahbash and the Wahhabis, or Salafis. Ali Laïdi reported 
that Abd Samad Moussaoui was present at a meeting in Montpellier in 
December, 1999, on the subject of “Islam in the Republic.” Abd Samad 
is reported to have told a Muslim speaker that he was “worse than the 
Jews and the crusaders.” A fight broke out, chairs were thrown, and the 
police were called in.4
Aïcha el-Wafi says that her son Abd Samad, a high school teacher in 
France, is a fundamentalist much as is her son Zacarias. In an interview 
with a Time magazine reporter, she said of Abd Samad: “…he is also an 
“The jihad we are 
asked to do on 
earth is to fight 
the evil within 
ourselves”
A glimpse into the family of Zacarias 
Moussaoui, the only person to be tried in 
a US court for conspiracy in the attacks of 
9/11, brings into focus the importance of 
understanding individual action and choice in 
religious behaviour. Though rooted in the same 
social and cultural background, the members 
of this family have embarked on radically 
different religious trajectories: Moussaoui and 
his brother are adherents of very different 
forms of organized Islam, while his mother 
looks inward for her faith, and his sister 
identifies with Judaism.
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Different paths
Abd Samad and Zacarias Moussaoui’s older sisters, Nadia and Jamila, 
are not observant Muslims. Jamila receives psychiatric care, as does Omar 
Moussaoui, Aïcha’s ex-husband and the children’s father. Nadia has said 
that in her own heart, she is Jewish, that she listens to Jewish radio sta-
tions such as Radio Shalom, and reads extensively about Judaism.8 Her 
fascination with Judaism may stem from a con-
nection with discrimination and oppression. In an 
interview videotaped in France for her brother’s 
trial, she said that she and Zacarias often talked to-
gether about racial relations. Zacarias was opposed 
to violence, she said, and tol-
erant of racial difference. One 
of Zacarias’s best childhood 
friends had a Jewish parent. 
Both Zacarias and Nadia were 
impressed with the work of 
Martin Luther King Jr., for so-
cial justice and the cause of 
black Americans, with whom 
they both identified because 
of their feelings of difference 
and exclusion in France.9 This 
difference and exclusion has 
taken each one of the Mous-
saouis on a different path in 
life. Aïcha el-Wafi would pre-
fer that some of these paths 
had taken different turns.
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Islamist radical: a Habishite, who hates the Wahabists like Zacarias, and 
consider them traitors and rivals.”5
The connection to the Ahbash would explain Abd Samad’s own de-
sire to distance himself from the actions of his brother even though 
they had been close before Zacarias left for London. A Rand Corpora-
tion report calls the Ahbash a Sufi group which is “militantly moder-
ate,” emphasizing moderation and tolerance and opposing political 
activism and violence. Anti-habashite groups say that this stance is 
merely a comforting face put on for western consumption, and point 
to the fact that members of the Ahbash have been implicated in the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, former prime minister of Lebanon. Tariq 
Ramadan has written that the Ahbash “carry on a 
permanent double discourse” by saying they sup-
port laicism and the emancipation of women and 
oppose fundamentalism on the one hand, yet at 
the same time accusing many Muslim religious 
scholars of being impious unbelievers.6
The Ahbash and the Wahhabis vehemently 
disagree about such points as God’s omnipo-
tence and personification; whether the Word of 
the Quran is from the angel Gabriel (Ahbash) or 
from God (Wahhabi); whether one can reach God 
through veneration of saints (Ahbash), or not 
(Wahhabi); and whether one can live as a Mus-
lim inside states which include Christians and 
Jews (Ahbash) or not (Wahhabi). In France, this 
struggle moved beyond doctrinal views to ac-
cusations of brother against brother and friend 
against friend. An FBI communication presented 
as evidence in the Moussaoui trial said that in 
September 2000 French security interviewed an un-named source 
concerning the death in Chechnya of a friend of the Moussaoui broth-
ers. The source was a “hibachi,” and in favour of religious moderation, 
which, the source said, Zacarias Moussaoui rejected. Moussaoui was 
said to be cold and cynical and a danger should he return to France. 
The source of this information was not to be revealed, but the informa-
tion reflects knowledge that Abd Samad would have had of his own 
brother’s movements.7
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Moussaoui 
demanded that 
the imam tell him 
where the next 
jihad would be.
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ous Darul Ulooms, where they train to 
become Islamic teachers or shaykhs. 
The attempt to merge secular with 
religious education seems to be symp-
tomatic of Muslim minority discourses, 
and illustrates their need to fit into a 
society which is shaped by Western 
and Christian values while preserving 
their distinct Islamic identity.
The preliminary results of an empiri-
cal study of selected Islamic schools in 
South Africa which was carried out in 
2006 and 2007 help offer a critical assessment of the question whether 
Islamic schools promote processes of identity formation within a dem-
ocratic society or whether they rather lead to disengagement from the 
wider society. Theoretically, the project is embedded in the discourses 
on the role of democratic citizenship education for the integration of 
Muslim children and the discourses within Muslim communities re-
garding the concept of the “Islamization of knowledge.” Methodologi-
cally the project is divided into two phases. In phase one interviews 
with principal, teachers, and learners, as well as experts were carried 
out. In the second phase qualitative questionnaires were distributed 
to pupils aged fifteen to seventeen, asking about their religious beliefs 
and practices as well as their attitude towards people of other faiths 
and their views on the society they are living in.
The emergence of Islamic education
The pattern of Islamic education in South Africa has to be analyzed 
within the colonial and post-colonial political and social order. The re-
quirements of an increasingly industrializing society at the beginning 
of the twentieth century led to the establishment of a modern Islamic 
educational system. The Muslim community established so-called Mus-
lim Mission Schools in the Cape Province from 1913 onwards. These 
schools were modelled after the Christian Mission Schools which edu-
cated the majority of children at the time. While the Muslim commu-
nity had to provide the building of the school and work out a curricu-
lum for religious education, the government paid for the maintenance 
of schools and salaries of the teachers. These Muslim Mission schools 
were the first institutions to combine secular and Islamic education, 
and teach Islamic Studies and Arabic. With the advent of the apartheid 
government in 1948 these schools were either closed down due to the 
introduction of segregated residential areas or they were absorbed 
by the apartheid education system and became public schools. After 
two decades the demand for Islamic schools resurfaced in the 1980s. 
The revival of Islamic education emerged at a time when the general 
education system was experiencing a deep crisis. The national school 
boycotts of the 1980s had led to a situation where hardly any formal 
education was taking place at public schools as the majority of pupils 
and teachers had become politicized and engaged in resistance move-
ments against the apartheid system.
Muslim educators and parents were concerned about the influence 
of secular ideologies on their children but also the educational stand-
ard of public schools which saw an increasing number of black chil-
dren moving into formally “Coloured” and “Indian” schools due to the 
relaxation of segregation and influx laws. High numbers of pupils per 
class and the disadvantaged education background of black children 
resulted in a decrease of the academic results of these schools. Fur-
thermore, Muslim children were exposed to a dual educational system 
where they would attend a public secular school in the morning and 
a madrasa in the afternoon to learn about their religion. Muslim edu-
cators and academics feared that this parallel system would present 
contradictory values and norms to children and lead to polarizations 
Islamic education is one of the key areas 
identified by the South African Muslim 
community in their effort to cope with 
the challenges of a changing society 
and their wish to preserve a distinct 
cultural and religious identity. In this 
context a number of Islamic independ-
ent schools have emerged in the last 
twenty years. Today, South Africa has 
about seventy five Islamic schools con-
centrated in the urban areas of three 
provinces namely the Western Cape, 
Kwa Zulu/Natal, and Gauteng.1 They are accredited by the South Afri-
can Department of Education and they follow the national curriculum. 
While Islamic studies and Arabic are additional subjects, only Arabic is 
an official examination subject. Like all other independent schools, Is-
lamic schools get minimal financial support from the government rely-
ing on school fees and sponsors. Because their fees are high, a number 
of Islamic schools are regarded as elite institutions that guarantee high 
academic standards and above average pass rates. Access to these 
schools is limited to those who come from wealthy families and a few 
underprivileged children who are able to secure bursaries. 
Interviews with principals, teachers, and pupils show that the dis-
courses taking place within these institutions 
focus on structural aspects like financial limita-
tions, management, and teachers’ qualifications. 
Nevertheless, educational aims are under revision 
regarding curriculum development and the Is-
lamic values and norms which shape the religious 
ethos of the school.2 
Since the schools are independent they often 
struggle to meet financial demands and find 
sponsors. Furthermore, many schools face prob-
lems with regard to management: there are 
conflicts over leadership between the “Board of 
Trustees” or “Board of Governors” which consists 
of the founders and the sponsors of the school 
who have a specific vision for the institution and 
the principal who has to manage the day-to-day 
affairs. Tensions often arise over curriculum and 
teaching practice between the religious teachers 
and the teachers who have a secular education. 
While the former are often representing a particu-
lar conservative religious school of thought, such 
as Deoband, the latter are more open to modern 
teaching methods and liberal worldviews.
Islamic schools are popular among Muslim parents because they 
offer an academic education which provides the learners with the skills 
to cope with the demands of a globalized world, but within a distinct 
Islamic environment. In these schools Muslim children are able to ob-
serve the praying times and fulfil other religious obligations; the school 
uniform requires girls to wear a headscarf and gender separation is ob-
served by either teaching girls and boys in different buildings or segre-
gating them in the classroom. 
By combining secular and Islamic education these institutions differ 
from the traditional madrasa education and the Darul Ulooms where 
only religious training is pursued. The majority of Muslim children is 
educated in public schools and attend the madrasa in the afternoons. 
Madrasa education takes place either at private homes or at local 
mosques and mainly comprises of learning how to recite the Quran, 
the basics of the Arabic language, and Islamic history and rituals. To 
further their religious education, youngsters join one of the numer-
Over the last twenty years independent Islamic 
schools have emerged in many countries 
where Muslims are a minority, among them 
South Africa. Although these schools differ in 
religious and pedagogical orientation, they all 
aim to offer an excellent education and a space 
where the Islamic identity of Muslim children 
can develop. While the curricula of some of 
these schools hardly differ from those of public 
schools, other schools are Islamizing their 
teaching materials and methods. 
Migrants & Minorities
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Islamic Schools 
in South Africa
The attempt to 
merge secular 
with religious 
education seems 
to be symptomatic 
of Muslim minority 
discourses.
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where pupils would be compelled to choose which knowl-
edge system would be of relevance to them. They desired an 
integrated education which would combine Islamic studies 
with the so-called secular subjects.
Islamization of knowledge
The concept of Islamization of knowledge, which emerged 
in the context of the First World Conference of Islamic Edu-
cation in 1977 in Saudi Arabia, influenced the founders of 
Islamic schools around the world, among them also South 
Africa. Muslim intellectuals saw Islamic education in a deep 
crisis as schools and universities in Muslim countries were, 
in their view, influenced by Western ideologies and secular-
ized to an extent where religion hardly played any role in 
these institutions. Leading academics like Ismail Al-Faruqi 
developed the concept of “Islamization of knowledge” which 
would bring Islam into the secular subjects. Textbooks and 
the curriculum at schools and universities had to be revised 
and re-written to make them compatible with Islamic values 
and norms. Nevertheless, the project stayed an ambitious 
ideal and did not, in the case of Islamic schools in South Af-
rica, materialize down to the classroom. 
Islamic schools are obliged to teach democratic citizen-
ship education as part of the national curriculum within the 
subject Life Orientation which deals with, among others, 
diversity, religious beliefs, human rights, rights and responsibilities of 
citizens, and personal issues. Islamic schools teach these topics from 
an Islamic point of view and take out issues such as HIV-Aids education 
and sexual relationships between teenagers. In some schools “Life Ori-
entation” was combined with Islamic Studies to ensure that the subject 
is taught from an Islamic perspective. Islamia College is one of those 
schools which combined the subjects, but according to one Islamic 
Studies teacher most of the teachers found it difficult to teach both 
subjects together.3 
Islamia College
One well established Islamic school in Cape Town is Islamia College. 
Founded in 1984 it expanded steadily over the next twenty years. Today 
the school has over 1000 pupils and 80 teachers and is regarded to be 
among the best schools in the city. It has a Primary School and two High 
Schools (one for boys and one for girls) and its own mosque. It offers 
the national curriculum and, additionally, Islamic Studies and Arabic. 
Islamia College follows a holistic approach of Islamic education: Islam 
is more than the performance of religious rituals, it is perceived to be 
a “way of life” which encompasses every aspect of the mind, body, and 
behaviour of the learner. The college states in its mission that among 
its objectives is to instil in pupils “a consciousness of Allah as the source 
of intellectual, emotional, spiritual, and physical growth.” The founders 
of the school, who are predominantly of Indian origin, represent the 
conservative Deobandi school of thought. 
Like most Islamic schools in South Africa, Islamia College pursues the 
ideal of “Islamization of knowledge.” However, according to the founder 
and director of the school, Maulana Ali Adam, it has not yet achieved its 
goal to introduce Islam into secular subjects since so far no textbooks 
and materials for teaching have been produced which could be used 
by teachers.4 However, it remains a top priority to the newly appointed 
principal, Shaheem Galant; he envisages an ideal situation where Ara-
bic and Islamic studies have the same status as the secular subjects 
and Islam informs the syllabi of all subjects.5 To improve the quality of 
teaching through teacher-training programmes and to realise its goal 
to “Islamize” the secular curriculum, Islamia College has joined an in-
ternational research organization called International Board of Educa-
tional Research and Resources (IBERR). The London based organization 
is supporting Islamic schools mainly in England, South Africa, and USA 
with school management, staff development, and curriculum research. 
Since Maulana Ali Adam is one of the trustees of IBERR, a large part of 
the research and the publication of material are taking place in South 
Africa. Although the organization has not yet published its own text 
books it has produced guidelines on how to teach the main secular 
subject from an Islamic perspective.6 
The internal focus of educators on the project of “Islamization of 
knowledge” raises the question, in which ways is the identity of learn-
ers shaped by it. According to the preliminary analysis, learners seem 
to flourish well in the sheltered environment of the school in terms of 
their spiritual and emotional development, the majority stating that 
Islam is very important for their personal lives. They appreciate the fact 
that they can practice their religion at school and that they learn more 
about Islam in the lessons becoming confident and secure about their 
role within the Muslim community.
On the other hand, learners’ experience with non-Muslim sectors of 
the society appears to be limited. In spite of the inclusion of citizenship 
education in the schools’ curricula, which is supposed to teach toler-
ance and understanding between different religious, cultural, and so-
cial groups, learners have little knowledge about or contact with peo-
ple of other faiths. The questionnaires confirmed the distance: hardly 
any pupil had non-Muslim friends and only a few could recall positive 
experiences with people of other faith while the majority reproduced 
negative stereotypes of other faith groups. Nevertheless, most of the 
learners stated that they would like to learn more about other religions 
and engage in inter-religious exchange programmes.
Islamic schools in South Africa are sites where concepts of Islamic 
education are transformed to address the challenges of a multi-cultural 
democratic society and where curricula requirements of a modern edu-
cation system are modified to suit Islamic educational goals as defined 
by the school. In the case of Islamia College, one sees an internal pre-
occupation with merging Islamic and secular education to reproduce 
an orthodox Islamic worldview. Democratic citizenship education and 
the teaching about inter-religious relations take place within the pa-
rameters of a conservative Islamic knowledge 
system and are viewed critically in terms of which 
aspects are compatible with Islamic values and 
norms and which are not. Learners would like to 
know more about other religions, but within the 
confines of the school they are not able to engage 
in a meaningful dialogue with people of other 
beliefs which is regarded to be a prerequisite of 
democratic citizenship education within a plu-
ralist society. The question remains, whether the 
learners are able to become active citizens in a 
multicultural society, without the experiences of 
how to negotiate differences and resolve conflicts 
as part of inter-cultural dialogue.
Notes
1. According to statistical data from the Census 
2001, 585.000 of the 654.000 South African 
Muslims live in these three provinces, see 
www.statssa.gov.za.
2. The author conducted research in four 
secondary schools: Islamia College and Darul 
Islam in Cape Town and Al-Falaah College 
and the South Coast Madressa in Durban.
3. Interview with Fadlin Ebrahim, 8 October 
2007, Cape Town.
4. Interview with Maulana Ali Adam, 28 
November 2006, Cape Town.
5. Interview with Shaheem Galant, 9 October 
2007, Cape Town.
6. See the IBERR website: www.iberr.org.
Students at 
Islamia College, 
Cape Town
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In numerous public discussions about 
the development of a “Dutch Islam,” the 
question emerges of whether an imam 
can be instrumental in Dutch integra-
tion policies by acting as a renewer of 
the Islamic tradition in a Western liber-
al secular context. Certainly the Dutch 
government expects that, within the 
local migrant mosques, the imams es-
tablish a connection between Dutch 
society and Islam and publicly show 
loyalty to civic values perceived to be at the core of Dutch identity. In 
contrast to this optimistic image of an “ideal imam,” a worrisome picture 
is concomitantly drawn of the “existing imam” who is either conserva-
tive and isolated, or radical and segregated, and therefore not prepared 
for the task of integration. When imams appear in the media who seem 
incapable of fulfilling the government’s expecta-
tions the moral commotion is intense.
Integration policies
The government seems to have high expecta-
tions regarding the formation of a new genera-
tion of Dutch-trained imams to develop a “Dutch 
Islam.” One of the motivating ideas behind this 
is that a grip on imams through training pro-
grammes or citizenship courses will boost the 
integration of Muslims throughout the Nether-
lands. Hopes are put in instrumentalizing the 
imam in integration policies. A central focus in 
public and political debate lies on the imam’s 
potential role in the civic attachment of Mus-
lims. It is deemed politically important that the 
imam demonstrates loyality to values consid-
ered particularly Dutch, such as the equality of 
men and women, non-discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, and the separation of church 
and state.
But to what degree do such hopes chime with 
the expectations of imams and mosque visitors 
in the Dutch context? How realistic is the ex-
pectation that an imam can be instrumental in 
Dutch integration policies? From qualitative descriptive-exploratory 
research in two mosques and an Islamic student association,1 carried 
out between 2000 and 2004, it appears that the imam can indeed 
play an authoritative role in influencing the moral views and soci-
etal options of the believers through moral admonition (for example 
in his sermons), religious education, and social advice. But it is also 
important to note that the imam appears as neither the “villain,” nor 
the “integration wizard” he is stereotypically presented as in govern-
ment documents and media coverage.
Imams
The imams of my research base their message on the Quran, Sunna, 
and fiqh, and encourage believers to participate in society, to dem-
onstrate a strong work ethic, to encourage one’s children to receive 
education at the highest level possible, and not to be too materialistic. 
They also preach sexual morality and stress the importance of mar-
riage.2 These expressions about private 
lifestyle and social participation do not 
seem to oppose civic participation.
Imams thus do speak out about civic 
society, but they consider the main-
tenance and reinforcement of the re-
ligious ties between believers (within 
their individual and community life 
styles) as their primary mission. Indeed, 
imams realise their own limitations be-
yond this: “as imam, we can indicate 
the right position a believer can take and show some alternative op-
tions, but it’s up to the people themselves to make their choice” (Turk-
ish imam). Moreover, the possibilities of an imam to publicly conjure up 
reforming interpretations of orthodox dogmas seem limited. In inter-
views, several imams emphasized that the role of the imam is primarily 
an exponent of the religious tradition which they present as more or 
less fixed. “We focus on the religious aspects and have to follow Islamic 
law,” the imams repeatedly explained.
An important reason for the limited powers of the imam within the 
Dutch context is that, in the lay tradition of Sunni Islam, matters even-
tually depend on the believer him or herself as to whether or not the 
advice of the imam dictates his or her opinions and actions: “The imam 
passes on his knowledge about the religious message of the Quran and 
Sunnah and leads the prayer. That’s it. That’s his job. The decision that 
you eventually take, is made by yourself. You should fear Allah. All the 
others are humans, who make mistakes” (male student). Unlike circulat-
ing role-expectations in public debate, in Islamic tradition, the imam 
is not in the same position as—for instance—a Catholic priest, who is 
supposed to mediate between God and men.
Believers
Particularly for first generation immigrant Muslims, the maintenance 
of their ties with their original home-land culture and religion of ear-
lier days is important. Community formation around familiar structures 
and institutions, such as the mosque, has been relevant to them. Within 
such structures and institutions, the authority of the imam, temporar-
ily, is reinforced. Hence, the expectations of an imam, by first genera-
tion male mosque-goers have always been strong: the imam should 
not only lead prayers, but also support and advise his congregation in 
social matters.
In the eyes of second and third generation mosque-goers, as well, 
it is the duty of the imam to pass on a normative message through 
which the differences between good and evil practices, according to 
the sources of Islam, become apparent. Accordingly believers expect 
him to guide and educate them in ritual practice. They have many 
“technical questions” regarding those things which are halal (legally 
permitted) and those which are haram (forbidden). Yet, increasingly, 
and in contrast to the first generation, young Muslims demand that the 
imam explains, on the one hand, the rationality behind the ritual rules 
and regulations and, on the other hand, inspires them to experience 
the spiritual meaning of the moral codes of conduct.
Thus, for second and third generation young Muslims, the imam 
must not only be authoritative in his traditional institutional position 
as leader of the congregation in prayer and preaching. Rather, he must 
also be convincing in his message and comprehensibly sketch the 
connection between Islamic prescriptions and the context of modern 
Migrants & Minorities
Imams in 
the Netherlands
Expectations & Realities
Imams serving in the Netherlands are 
confronted with diverse expectations. While 
practising Muslims first of all turn to imams for 
advice in religious matters, the government 
expects imams to show believers how to be a 
good Dutch citizen. But although many Muslims 
hold their imams in great esteem, the influence 
of the imam should not be overestimated. 
Young people in particular are looking in other 
directions for religious guidance.
W E L M O E T  B O E N D E R
[Y]oung Muslims 
demand that the 
imam explains 
… the rationality 
behind the 
ritual rules and 
regulations …
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Dutch society. As one of the respondents, a twenty-year old student 
explained: “For example, jihad has many meanings. Holy war really is 
the final meaning in a row: when you have only your body left to fight 
with and no money, no pen to write petitions, or press releases. Our 
imam teaches us that it is also jihad to study. It offers you the same 
forgiveness. He teaches us that you can win with your pen.” An imam 
should possess a certain personal charisma and show empathy regard-
ing the daily situations in which the young and pious find themselves. 
In practice, each imam does this differently. Moreover, according to the 
students interviewed, existing imams are not always able to answer 
their personal requests. “Some special imams have real authority, but 
many ordinary imams do not” (male student).
Also among young Muslims the imam continues to be respected as 
a core institution of Islam. But he is not consulted as the community’s 
sole authority and may not even represent the first stage of inquiry. 
Young Dutch Muslims do not accept his advice indiscriminately, nor do 
they deem this advice obligatory to follow. Thus, the scope and force of 
the preachings of an average Moroccan or Turkish imam in the Nether-
lands should not be overestimated.
Furthermore, diverging levels of Dutch language proficiency often 
make communication between imam and believer difficult. Likewise, 
the imam does not always show empathy and sympathy with the daily 
circumstances of the young. Put these factors together and one soon 
understands why Dutch imams are not always successful with young 
believers. One student explains: “I think an imam should know what 
happens within Dutch society. So he must know Dutch. But he doesn’t. 
That’s why I am open to his advice on religious matters, but I do not feel 
strongly about his advice on civic matters.” Although young highly edu-
cated practising Muslims often state that the imam can be consulted 
on various questions about life in the Netherlands, only a small propor-
tion of the interviewees in this category visit the imam with personal 
questions.
Competing religious authorities 
If this is the case, then why would an imam training in the Nether-
lands, as suggested by the Dutch government in the past two decades, 
not be the obvious solution? Although, because of his institutional 
position as leader of the congregation and his knowledge of Islamic 
sources, the imam maintains a certain level of authority, this does 
not necessarily mean that his audience adhere indiscriminately to his 
moral admonition. His young educated audience, in particular, check 
his views and compare these with the ideas of their peers, relatives, In-
ternet preachers, and Dutch speaking lecturers. Besides these sources, 
female religious teachers should not be overlooked. Though often not 
visible within the realm of public debate, their influence is consider-
able. Women generally prefer to put their questions directly to female 
religious leaders, while eschewing direct contact with imams. Commu-
nication thus occurs through written notes with questions, mediation 
of male relatives, or listening to the Friday sermon.
Possibilities to consult other religious authorities—who operate on 
local, national, and transnational levels—have become increasingly ac-
cessible. In an eclectic manner, young pious believers are influenced by 
“television shaykhs” like the Egyptian ‘Amr Khaled, and “cyber-imams” 
in discussion forums on the Internet, by various authors of (translated) 
books, by female leaders in the mosques, and by their peers and rela-
tives. Whereas first generation Muslims appointed the imam to trans-
mit religious norms and values to their children, these children (who 
now have children of their own) have grown up to be less satisfied with 
the local mosque imam as their (sole) teacher. Influenced by modern 
communication techniques, through which transnational networks 
operate, they have been introduced to a different religious discourse 
than that proclaimed within the established migrant mosque in the 
Netherlands.
Another reason for the imam’s decreased role and authority is related 
to the above observations. Young practising Muslims may associate 
imams in mosques that are directed by first generation men with a “cul-
tural Islam,” which they criticize for reflecting an archaic homeland cul-
ture. This has been strengthened by the emergence of groups of new 
religious leaders—often Salafi—who work outside the established, 
ethnically based mosque. Such groups have developed a religious dis-
course which sets them (and their followers) apart from that of many 
local imams.
New institutions 
Among Muslims in the Netherlands a 
continuous process of interpretation of 
religious sources and traditions takes 
place, influenced by the Dutch con-
text as well as by various transnational 
movements. Practising Muslims in the 
European diaspora are searching for 
religious authorities who can help and 
guide them in processes of interpret-
ing the religious tradition. The imam 
can be one of them. But in trying to 
understand, influence or modify these 
currents, as the Dutch government 
and broader society has sought to do, 
it is unwise to focus too heavily on the 
imams in the local mosques.
As elsewhere in Europe, Islamic re-
ligious leadership in the Netherlands 
occurs through a variety of roles and 
religio-social positions. New institu-
tions like Islamic universities, where 
men and women study together, have 
been established. Certain previously unheard of professions, such as 
Islamic pastoral caretaking in prisons and hospitals, now exist. Muslim 
male and female writers, publicists, and other intellectuals have cau-
tiously entered into public debates with their interpretations of reli-
gious sources. Those evolutions and its accompanying new discourses 
are indeed relevant in the development of Islam in the Netherlands or 
Dutch Islam. At present still “avant-garde,” they will become increas-
ingly visible in future interpretations of the religious texts. Imams will 
remain important. But in their integration policies, the Dutch govern-
ment should not place all its eggs in one basket.
Welmoet Boender works at Stichting Oikos where she is a staff member of the Knowledge 
Centre for Religion and Development, Utrecht, the Netherlands. She was Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM 
from 2000 to 2005 and recently defended her dissertation “Imam in the Netherlands: Views 
about his religious role in society” (Bert Bakker, 2007) (in Dutch) at Leiden University. 
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Two boys study 
in a Rotterdam 
mosque during 
Ramadan.
Notes
1. Based on anthropological observation, 
forty-eight interviews, and analysis of eleven 
Friday sermons in a Turkish and a Moroccan 
mosque community and a Muslim Student 
Association.
2. See the dissertation of Boender for 
translated sermons and teachings of 
a number of imams working in the 
Netherlands.
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Resisting “Blackness”
Muslim Arab Sudanese
in the Diaspora
“Ya wahsha, ya suuda” (You ugly, black 
girl!), Aliya playfully remarked to Nur, 
her brown-skinned maternal cousin. 
Aliya, a young Cairo teenager whose 
mother was a Muslim Arab Sudanese 
immigrant but who identified herself 
culturally and racially after her Egyp-
tian father, then turned to me and said 
in English, “I call her ugly because she 
is from Sudan.” This explicit banter be-
tween the cousins of this family, with 
its (black) Sudanese and (white) Egyptian members, reflects a broader 
racial hierarchy stemming from centuries of asymmetrical power rela-
tions along the Nile Valley. In combination with historical migration 
and recent forced migration from Sudan, the increased mobility of 
Muslim Arab Sudanese into Western cultural spaces such as London, 
Toronto, Houston, and Sydney brings them into contact with new and 
less familiar racial frameworks. Sudanese, in their increasingly transna-
tional circumstances, must now negotiate racial categories in different 
countries, most of which regard them as “black.” 
The term “Muslim Arab Sudanese” here refers 
to Sudanese nationals from the dominant eth-
nic group in northern Sudan, representatives of 
which have been in power since Sudan’s inde-
pendence. Following the Islamist military coup in 
1989 and ensuing political and economic turmoil, 
many Muslim Arab Sudanese left or fled Sudan, 
joining millions of southern and western Suda-
nese forcibly displaced by decades of civil war. In 
countries like Egypt and the UK with large com-
munities of minority Sudanese, Muslim Arab Su-
danese resist being designated as “black,” a cate-
gory that in Sudan is pejorative and generally not 
employed by the Muslim Arab ruling class to refer 
to themselves. Muslim Arab Sudanese identity in 
the UK and Egypt is increasingly shaped by nega-
tive experiences of “blackness” in both of these 
two receiving societies. Different historical, cul-
tural, and socio-legal contexts in each country, 
however, give rise to two distinct approaches to 
building a familiar and recognizable communal 
identity in the diaspora. 
Race and whiteness
The new field of “whiteness studies” is helpful 
in thinking about how, in many societies where 
people of European origins are the majority, 
being “white” is often considered natural—the 
norm—while being a minority implies having a 
racial identity. The comparative study of race has 
demonstrated that racial categories are quite 
different from one society to the next, and that 
these categories are learned and acted out in 
ways that help to maintain the privileges of the 
dominant group. “Whiteness,” like “blackness,” 
can be similarly thought of as a learned cultural 
category even though it characterizes the racial 
majority. While I would argue that the 
particular racial hierarchy in Sudan 
predates the “black and white” Euro-
pean colonial categories, it is useful 
to think of Muslim Arab Sudaneseness 
as the standard norm in Sudan against 
which other minority “black” Sudanese 
are measured. 
Sudanese recognize a wide spec-
trum of skin colours, describing abyad 
(white), ahmar (red), asfar (yellow), 
akhdar (green), azraq (blue), and iswid (black). These designations 
resonate historically with the classification scheme used by slave 
traders in the markets in Cairo, where slaves classified as asfar and 
abyad were sold for larger sums of money than those who were la-
belled azraq or iswid.1 Despite the fact that physical characteristics 
in Sudan are by no means clear-cut markers of ethnic identity, the 
social stigma towards “blackness” as an indication of African or slave 
origins contrasts white skin with attractiveness, wealth, and leisure. 
One of the ways that wealthy and powerful classes of Muslim Arab Su-
danese have maintained and perpetuated their dominance over time 
is through promoting their own (lighter) skin colour as a sign of class 
and beauty. Various traditions of body decoration have developed 
that draw attention to lighter skin. Lip-darkening previously done 
through tattooing but replaced by make-up in contemporary times is 
thought to heighten the contrast between lips and skin, thus enhanc-
ing the appearance of light skin. Henna patterns are also thought to 
contrast with—and thus enhance—lighter skin.
More recently, “whiteness” has become a public issue for Sudanese 
in Sudan and in the diaspora, where the trend of using cosmetic skin 
whiteners that contain bleach is noted and discussed in the Sudanese 
media and in online sites. Beauty salons, pharmacies, billboards, and 
television advertisements promote cosmetic products which pur-
port to lighten women’s complexions. Beswick summarizes the cur-
rent Sudanese preoccupation with race and visual appearance thus: 
“Looking like an ‘African’ is bad; looking lighter is good, and the visual 
markers of skin colour and hair texture define who is an ‘Arab’ (good) 
and who is not (bad).”2
The attention that skin-bleaching in Sudan has recently received is 
noteworthy. A beautician interviewed in Khartoum is quoted as say-
ing, “One hundred percent of women who come here have it done,” 
she said. “People think it’s prettier to look white.”3 A young woman 
quoted in a recent ethnography of middle class women in Khartoum 
states, “Alhamdullillah, my hair is okay and I have got all the right fea-
tures from my mother, but I am dark, thanks be to my father [sarcasti-
cally]. Who would want to marry one with such a colour? Every man 
wants ‘safra’. I myself use all these creams to find a man with a light 
skin colour. If I stayed dark do you think a light man would want his 
children to be ‘dirtied’?”4 Light skin also symbolizes wealth, as illus-
trated by a woman quoted in a newspaper article posted on Sudane-
seOnline: “People judge you here by your colour...If they see me and 
someone else with lighter skin wearing the same clothes, they would 
say she is living a comfortable life and I’m a poor woman.”5 
The same article excited the following comment from a Sudanese 
man: “Thanks for this interesting issue. It’s so important to discuss 
such realities of Sudanese life. Such phenomenon can be interpreted 
in terms of the influence of Arabic culture in the country. In school 
Muslim Arab Sudanese consider light-coloured 
skin attractive and upper class, but in Egypt 
and the UK Sudanese refugees and migrants are 
considered “black”; in each country Sudanese 
Arab Muslims have developed different 
strategies to cope with this situation. While 
Egyptian racial categories demand association 
with the dominant, light skinned majority, in 
the UK the Sudanese aspire to neither the white 
majority nor black identity.
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curriculum, white colour, and particularly 
a white woman, is associated with per-
fection in all aspects of life. A woman is 
praised if she’s white, sometimes regard-
less of whether or not she’s beautiful. Even 
in Holy Quran white color is always postive 
with black color being negative. Sudanese 
people were, and still, brought up with the 
understanding that they are arabs, and part 
of this identity is to acquire an aran [Arab] 
feature: color.”6
Racial hierarchies along the Nile
Like Sudan, Egypt has played a historical 
role in slave-trading and slavery along the Nile Valley. Egyptians whose 
ancestors were slaves—from present-day Sudan, Ethiopia, Albania, and 
elsewhere—are today part of Egypt’s ethnic mix. While subordinate 
groups in Egypt are not necessarily distinguished by skin colour, main-
stream Egyptians use the term qamhi—wheat-coloured—to designate 
the “typical” Egyptian skin tone. As in Sudan, people who look “African” 
receive negative attention, and Africans who have become refugees 
in Egypt are maltreated and regularly harassed by Egyptian security. 
In Cairo, this differential treatment translates into 
the reluctance of Muslim Arab Sudanese migrants 
and exiles to consider themselves “African-look-
ing” in comparison to Egyptians. Unlike private, 
cultural attributes such as food and music, physi-
cal characteristics like skin colour are publicly rec-
ognizable, if culturally constructed, markers of dif-
ference. Muslim Arab Sudanese in Egypt, however, 
do not tend to emphasize their comparatively 
darker skin tone. 
Muslim Arab Sudanese resist being classified by 
Egyptians into socially disadvantaged categories 
like “African,” and they actively pursue practices 
and stress their belonging to a (white) “Arab” eth-
nicity and the Muslim religion. One of the ways 
this is accomplished is through espousing a mo-
rality discourse that ties Sudanese firmly to Arab 
and Muslim concepts of proper behaviour, which 
I have described elsewhere as adab—propriety.7 
Egyptians were largely portrayed as being less 
proper, and in comparison Sudanese felt that their own behaviour was 
more “Arab” and “Muslim” than their Egyptian hosts. Through this strat-
egy, Sudanese were also resisting blackness by distancing themselves 
from their African compatriots while outperforming their “white” hosts 
through proper behaviour. In this way, Muslim Arab Sudanese in Egypt 
were able to avoid taking on a racial minority status yet maintain a 
separate community identity.
Black and Muslim in Britain
In the British context, Muslim Arab Sudanese women and men simi-
larly seek to position themselves at an advantage in the national dis-
course on race. In contrast to a lack of rights in Egypt under Egyptian 
immigration policy, in Britain Sudanese are able to claim British citizen-
ship. However, Britain’s legacy of racial discrimination and the height-
ened social and political anxiety with immigration, especially of Mus-
lims, places Sudanese—who, in the British paradigm, are both black 
and Muslim—in a vulnerable position. In comparison to the Egyptian 
context, Muslim Arab Sudanese are not able to reconstitute their iden-
tity as part of mainstream British culture, and feel somewhat alienated 
by “immoral practices” (such as premarital sexual relations) that are 
seen to be part of British society. At the same time, Sudanese seem 
unwilling to define themselves as part of Britain’s black minority. 
Nagel points out that, in Britain, Arabs and Arab migration have been 
“excluded from ‘race relations’ debates and discourses. They seldom are 
treated as a separate, identifiable cultural entity or as a ‘problem’ mi-
nority group” in mainstream discourse except in reference to terrorism, 
Middle East politics, and oil wealth.8 Nagel describes the strategy of her 
Arab research participants in the UK whereby Arabness is disassociated 
from recognized minority identities and from racialized groups like “Pa-
kistanis” who use the term “black” to underline commonality with other 
visible minorities. 
This disassociation from blackness debates in Britain is difficult for Su-
danese Arabs to maintain. Anwara is a Muslim Arab Sudanese refugee 
interviewed by Nagel who has rejected colour-based identities, despite 
feeling that she is considered “black” in British society. In the context of 
her Sudanese middle class background, embedded in Sudanese racial 
hierarchies Anwara “is disturbed by the thought that she is now black.” 
Rather than searching for commonality with other black groups, she 
has chosen instead to avoid association with them. Revealing her sense 
of black as a stigmatized category, she states, “We 
look at the underclasses here and we say, look at 
those people, how they behave, how loud they 
are. They are in a low position.”9
For Sudanese women and men in the diaspo-
ra, the particularities of negotiating a Sudanese 
Arab Muslim belonging in Egypt and the UK are 
not only shaped by their social and legal status 
as immigrants and refugees, but also by nega-
tive experiences signified by blackness. As famil-
iar aliens in Egypt and foreign citizens in Britain, 
Sudanese may hold on to 
their Muslim Arab identity 
in both places but it is given 
different social meaning in 
these contrasting contexts. 
The position of Sudanese in 
an Egyptian racial hierarchy 
wherein blackness is associ-
ated with slavery requires 
them—with their own legacy of enslaving Afri-
cans and participating in the development of ra-
cial categories in Sudan—to distance themselves 
from other darker skinned people and maximize 
their association with the dominant—and lighter 
skinned—Egyptian majority. In the UK, however, 
Sudanese, as Muslims, do not seek a position for 
themselves among the white Christian-identified 
majority yet neither do they aspire to a black iden-
tity, which would embroil them in the charged de-
bate about racism in British society. “Whiteness” is 
as much of an aspiration for Sudanese in the UK 
but with the goal of inclusion into an Arab Muslim 
identity that sidesteps British racial categories. 
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The post 9/11 discourses of public 
discussion and academic research on 
Arab migration and integration in the 
European countries have been domi-
nated, on the one hand, by processes 
of “Islamization” of the migrants’ com-
munities. On the other hand, security, 
terrorism and crime issues and socio-
spatial segregation patterns are push-
ing for further alienation and isolation 
of larger segments of Arab migrants. 
The theoretical framing of these dis-
courses has been delivered by various 
post-modern approaches of different shapes and colours; transnation-
al, networking, multicultural, post-conflict, diaspora, gender, as well 
as other approaches. The major focus of these approaches is again the 
dynamics of the migrants’ communities in the host countries. Few in-
novative works have discussed the issues of remigration and the po-
litical aspects of emigration for the Arab countries.1
The number of people of Arab origin living in Germany is hard to es-
timate. Numbers between 280,000 and 400,000 have been mentioned 
on various occasions and in various resources. The numbers include 
holders of nationalities of Arab countries, naturalized Arabs, holders 
of dual citizenships, and stateless Arabs. The majority is of Moroccan, 
Tunisian, Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi origins. The different 
histories of migration of various Arab communities are reflections of 
the socio-economic and political histories of their original homelands; 
the Moroccans and Tunisians are descendants of the labour migrants 
(Gastarbeiter) that came to Germany on the basis of bilateral govern-
mental agreements; the Palestinians, the Iraqis, and the Lebanese 
came for the most part as political refugees; considerable number of 
Syrian and Palestinian Arabs came to Germany for study and never 
left.
Histories of collective and individual immigrations find their expres-
sions in various patterns of integration and daily-life practices. Integra-
tion is mainly a local phenomenon. Integration processes take place in 
the living quarter, at work, in school, in public spaces, and venues, etc. 
People integrate primarily on the micro level before achieving a na-
tional (macro) level of integration.2
Types of remigration
A variety of parameters can be used to identify specific categories of 
returned migrants. In the case of Arab returning migrants from Germa-
ny a mixture of the motivations to leave Germany and the expectations 
in the in-bound Arab countries delivers a comprehensive tool to ana-
lyze the dynamics of return and the aspects of interaction between so-
cieties, economies, and cultures. There are five major types of returned 
migrants: Elderly remigration, career remigration, forced remigration, 
political remigration, and social conservative remigration. Beyond 
these groups, other types of motivations and expectations have been 
identified (lifestyle motivations, medical needs, familial reasons, etc.) 
though due to their individual characters and small numbers could not 
be clustered in groups.
To the type of elderly remigration belong elderly people that are 
on pensions and/or not of a working age anymore. These are mainly 
former Gastarbeiter from Tunisia and Morocco that are expecting bet-
ter standards of life in their original homelands and have rather weak 
family ties in Germany. There are no exact numbers of these returnees, 
because they often are still nominally registered in Germany within the 
households of their children. By doing this they keep a postal address 
in Germany through which they deal with the authorities responsible 
for pension payments and health insurance.
Career remigration is taking place 
among highly qualified young peo-
ple who are taking advantage of their 
bi-lingual, bi-national, and bi-cultural 
backgrounds. They belong mainly to 
the second and the third generations of 
migrants as well as naturalized former 
students (first generation) that see bet-
ter career chances in the Arab coun-
tries than in Germany. They consider 
their career chances in Germany lim-
ited in general, due to their migratory 
background. The policies of economic 
liberalization and globalization going on in many Arab countries, but 
especially in the rich Gulf Arab countries, give them a chance to real-
ize themselves as mediators and brokers between German-speaking 
countries and companies from one side, and Arab businesses and mar-
kets on the other side. According to different estimations by the Ger-
man Business Chambers and the German-Arab Trade Chambers their 
number in 2007 reached 2000-2500 people.
Then there is forced remigration of people that lose their residential 
permits for one reason or another (students, criminals with no German 
citizenship, rejected asylum seekers). There are exact numbers availa-
ble by various German official authorities, but it is practically very diffi-
cult to have access to them because they are gathered on state by-state 
base and not on the federal level. According to the numbers available 
by the Auslaenderamt in the city of Wiesbaden (State of Hess), around 
350 persons of Arab origin lost their residential permits in Hess in the 
year 2007 down from 400 persons in 2006.
Political remigration relates to Arab political refugees who voluntar-
ily return to their homelands. Iraqis (Kurds and Arabs) make the main 
group of this type. In the last five years many Arab political refugees 
from Mauritania, Algeria, and Bahrain returned to their home coun-
tries due to improvements in the political situations. Numbers of the 
returnees are very roughly estimated and cannot be used for further re-
search. Social conservative remigration, finally, concerns the remigra-
tion of families with children that decide to live in an Arab country due 
to socio-cultural conflicts in Germany. These are mainly conservative 
and better-off families with young children that can easily find good-
paying jobs in an Arab country. 
Lack of integration
A case study of twenty returned families of Jordanian, Palestinian, 
and Syrian origin pointed out that the most two important motiva-
tions of return, according to the returnees themselves, are the lack of 
social integration in the living neighbourhood and the wish to raise 
their daughters in a traditional Arab social environment. The process of 
measurement of the levels of integration was left to the personal per-
ception of the heads of the households (mother and father) involved 
in the case study, who themselves described their situation as “less-in-
tegrated” or “non-integrated.” The traditional Arab social environment 
is outlined by the heads of the families as a society where “Arab family 
and religious values and traditions prevail, where solidarity and honour 
still have a meaning, and where individual freedoms do not clash with 
the norms of the family, the society, and the religion.”
The returned families belong to the educated upper-middle class. All 
of the male heads of the families (the fathers) hold university degrees 
(physicians, engineers, IT specialists, brokers, solicitors, etc.). Thirteen 
families are Arab-German bi-national families and seventeen fathers 
have a German citizenship while the other three have a permanent res-
idency. All of them used to live in well-off neighbourhoods dominated 
by native German population. All the families have at least one pre-
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Arab-German 
Remigration
 This article discusses the remigration of Arab 
families formerly living in Germany, as well as 
the possible causes and effects of remigration. 
For several families, especially those with 
daughters, social and cultural reasons turn 
out to be the most important motivation for 
leaving Germany. Concerned that they will be 
unable to protect the family honour within 
a German setting, these families decided to 
move back to an Arab country where they hope 
to find a social environment that shares their 
moral concerns.
I S I M  R E V I E W  2 1  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 8  2 7
Migrants & Minorities
teenage daughter. It is indeed note-
worthy that all the families that men-
tioned the socio-cultural conflicts in 
Germany as the major reason for return 
have at least one daughter (eighteen of 
the families have two or more daugh-
ters). Families with only male children 
did not mention in a single case the 
socio-cultural conflicts as a major or 
as an important reason for return. Thus 
only families with daughters indicated 
that socio-cultural conflicts a the moti-
vation for leaving Germany.
The conflicts of daily life as a con-
servative Arab in a German liberal 
neighbourhood, especially for the 
female members of the family, were 
always mentioned by the fathers and 
the mothers as “the problem”; Islamic 
dress code (headscarf ) was openly not 
accepted by the majority neither at 
school nor on the streets; the daughters’ 
avoiding of the gender-mixed physical 
and out-door school activities was not 
accepted by the school administration. 
The integration processes on the local 
level obviously failed. These families 
did not want to move into the so called 
foreigners’ quarters dominated by dis-
advantaged segments of population 
and where the traditional conservative Arab way of life is present in 
public spaces and generally accepted (partially dominated). The heads 
of the families were well aware that they do not belong economically, 
socially, and intellectually to the disadvantaged quarters with their 
multiple problems. They were looking for good and safe quarters.
Looking for belonging
The decision to live in an Arab country is not the classical return to 
the original homelands. Of sixty percent of the families in the study 
four chose to live in Qatar and eight in the UAE. It is interesting to no-
tice that only one family chose the fashionable Dubai as a place of liv-
ing, while the others chose the more conservative Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, 
and Ras Al-Khaima. Three families of Palestinian origin decided to go 
to Jordan and not to the original homeland of Palestine/occupied West 
Bank.3 It is remarkable that two of the returned families are re-born 
Christians who keep a very conservative and religious way of life (no 
alcohol, no smoking, no gender-mixed activities, and for children, par-
tially no TV watching and no Internet).
The high expectations to find a social conservative space to raise 
the children, especially the girls, have been mentioned by fathers and 
mothers as well. The parents accept the traditional interpretation of 
family honour as honour defined through female bodies and sexual 
behaviour. In this context, the sexual behaviour and the individual 
freedom of the female members of the families have to be controlled 
to protect and save the family honour (the male honour as well). The 
issue of male homosexuality has been tackled by seven of the families 
who mentioned the problem of raising boys in liberal societies, where 
gayness is accepted and publicly addressed, as encouraging gay ac-
tivities. All the families see the Arab-Islamic societies as conservative 
traditional social societies where children can be better raised and con-
trolled than in the liberal German society.
The influence of these returned migrants in the local communities 
in Jordan, Syria, Qatar, and the UAE is crucial. Under local communities 
is included extended families, colleagues, friends, and neighbours. In 
addition to their educational and economical status, their bi-national 
character as well allows these returned migrant families to enjoy a high 
social respect and gain even a solid “reference” rank on European mat-
ters and Western cultural issues. During my field research, they were 
pointed out by their friends and colleagues as pioneers and experts in 
the context of lifestyles, ideas, and behaviour. By exemplifying the ex-
periences of integration and return of these families various anti-liberal 
personalities and groups in the local communities construct an amoral 
and xenophobic image of the German (read Western and European) 
society and use this return as an argumentation in the discussions with 
the liberal members of the very same community.
The heads of the returned families have never been engaged directly 
in political activities in Germany and were rather apolitical personalities 
according to their own expressions. Especially their attitudes towards 
the Arab diasporic communities and the Arab states have always been 
politically ambivalent; they were not active in host countries’ Arab po-
litical organizations and activities. Their leitmotifs for social actions and 
articulations are embedded in their conservative cultural and religious 
lifestyles.
Despite their tranquil socio-political activities in Germany,4 they are 
today seen as some kind of icon for the anti-liberal local Arab activ-
ists. However, the impact of the constructed “occidental” images of the 
Western societies is still rather locally limited since the number of such 
returnees from Germany is small. Taking into account the possible re-
turn of numerous social conservative migrants from other European 
and American countries, their social influence and political role could 
rapidly grow and may reach beyond the local circle of friends, families, 
and colleagues. The globalization and internation-
alization of higher education and health sectors 
as well as the development of new economies in 
many Arab countries may, on the one hand, open 
many career chances for Arab experts-migrants 
and, on the other hand, deepen the conflicts in-
side each Arab society between liberal and anti-
liberal social movements on issues of individual 
freedoms, especially female and sexual freedoms, 
as well as values, traditions, and liberal styles of 
raising children.
Notes
1. See Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Theorising Return 
Migration: a revisited conceptual approach to 
return migrants, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS, 
no. 2 (2004); Laurie Brand, Citizens Abroad. 
State and Emigration in the Middle East 
and North Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
2. See Nadia Al-Ali and Khalid Koser, New 
Approaches to Migration? Transnational 
Communities and the Transformation of Home 
(London: Routledge, 2002).
3. Of course the political situation in Palestine 
contributed strongly to the decision to go to 
Jordan.
4. For more information on the life of Muslims 
and Arabs in Germany, see Ala Al-Hamarneh 
and Jörn Thielmann, Islam and Muslims in 
Germany (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 
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As the locus of lived Muslim modernity, 
neither the everyday nor the public 
space in which it occurs fits the para-
digm of mainstream secular liberal-
ism. The civil and ethical particulars 
that give shape to Muslim lifeworlds 
are distinct from and yet overlap with 
Western (and other) modernities. This 
article argues that reimagining those 
particulars—in contexts that range 
from cinema and epic-tales to architecture and urban design—yields a 
cosmopolitanism that avoids lapsing into relativism, and is true to the 
pluralist ethos of Islam itself.
Modernity has many guises. In Jafar Panahi’s acclaimed 2003 film, 
Crimson Gold (Talaye sorkh), Hossein is a stolid, blue-collar veteran of 
the Iran-Iraq war who delivers pizzas in Tehran. This exposes our pro-
tagonist to the full spectrum of urban sprawl, from clogged traffic to 
privileged suburbs, the denizens of which might as well be living in Las 
Vegas. In a poignant encounter at the end of the film, Hossein finds him-
self trying to deliver pizzas in the lavish quarters of the Other. Here, in 
stark contrast to his usual clients, people are lean, loquacious, wealthy, 
and worldly. Yet, Hossein’s delivery is impeded by the police, who are 
busy arresting the decadent young guests of a late-night party. Though 
generous enough to dole out slices of pizza to the policemen thwart-
ing his delivery, such encounters eventually drive Hossein to breaking 
point.
Modernity on a motorcycle
Crimson Gold interrogates more than the 1979 Iranian Revolution’s 
cry of mustaz’afin, “solidarity with the oppressed.” Certainly, there is 
plenty of blame to go around. If the theocratic State stifles the per-
sonal freedoms of many young Iranians, there are other rich youths 
who, as one policeman observes, are left only to “sleep during the 
day.” While the wealthy enjoy every new technology, Hossein is com-
pelled to climb four flights of stairs because the lift is broken. The 
traffic chokes; yet Hossein, on a fair sized motorcycle, contributes to 
this. Avarice is everywhere: “If you want to arrest a thief, you’ll have to 
arrest the world,” comments one cynical felon. It is the human condi-
tion that Crimson Gold engages with plaintively 
in the spirit of contemporary Iranian cinema, 
spearheaded by Panahi’s mentor, Abbas Kiaros-
tami, as well as by Samira Makhmalbaf and oth-
ers. We are invited not merely to observe the 
sins and blessings of onscreen characters, but to 
reflect on the culture, ethics and political reality 
in which individuals and communities live—and 
on the outcomes of choices made by a widening 
circle that finally encompasses history itself.
Cinema as a medium lends itself well to such 
an exploration. This success has much to do with 
its politically transgressive power—a power 
which continues to keep censors busy the world 
over. Crimson Gold was banned in Iran; while 
Jafar Panahi and several fellow directors have 
been denied permission to enter the United Sta-
tes. Of course, this transgressive power concerns 
not only what the images say, but also how they 
say them. In a domain that is mundane or even 
profane, cinema captures the visual flattening 
of time. Its images, meanwhile, like the fire of 
Prometheus, are stolen from the realm of the 
sacred. 
It is in this sense that Charles Baudelaire’s 
essay, “The Painter of Modern Life” 
(1860) draws attention to the narrative 
power of images. To this work is ascribed 
the first use of the term “modernity.” 
Like Panahi’s roving camera, Baudelaire 
seeks to extract meaning from the eve-
ryday with its crowds and masks. Find-
ing much to embrace and disdain in the 
everyday, he persists in his quest for an 
elusive present. In hindsight, Baudelaire’s approach was derived from an 
appreciation and measure of time that, in more recent years, has come to 
be regarded as the quintessence of modernity.
Time, technology, the cherishing of subjectivity amid class differ-
ence, civil society, and a heightened consciousness of the presence 
of the State, all these lend substance to the varying guises of moder-
nity. The ways in which they do so may, like the relentless traffic in 
which Hossein delivers pizzas, appear inevitable. Yet, the outcomes 
of myriad choices are certainly not inevitable; nor do they bear the 
same significance, emerging out of histories both shared and distinct. 
Baudelaire’s obsession with the here and now was integral to the sec-
ular as a new phenomenon, and to secularism as a European socio-
political doctrine. Panahi’s obsession with urban time may gesture to 
the secular; but it is located in a public space that is clearly different 
from that occupied by Euro-secularism. It is thus that we find expres-
sions of the civil which make for plural modernities.
Anyone for authenticity?
Social imaginaries in the Muslim world, for all their differences, par-
take of the Modern. True, strident Western narratives have spurred an 
industry in counter-assertions of identity, of difference as essential. The 
talk of authenticity figures much in the postmodern critique, in reply 
to the overdetermination of identity by hegemons, real or perceived. 
In Muslim contexts, it finds expression in the insistence of a “return,” 
usually to a pristine original—text, historical period, practice—cast as 
authentic. This is mirrored by Western commentators for whom the dis-
tinctiveness of Islam is expedient. In both cases, this othering serves 
political ends, if it is not exoticization for its own sake. 
Aziz al-Azmeh pits historicity against the rhetoric of authenticity to 
avoid exceptionalising Islam, though he does not directly link this to 
the nature or making of plural modernities.1 Mohammed Arkoun, in 
contrast, explicitly links the historical role of the imaginaire in manag-
ing “symbolic capital” to claims of authenticity.2 However, it is the reli-
gious imaginary of Islam and the Judeo-Christian traditions that con-
cern Arkoun, rather than the broader social imaginary that occupies 
us here.
Historicism of a special sort—sacralization—feeds the talk of authen-
ticity in Salafi revivalist trends. Tradition is placed in binary opposition 
to Modernity, as is often done in Western accounts. Yet it is on a con-
tinuum between old and new, past and present, that individuals and 
communities locate themselves in practice. Needless to say, the every-
day expressions of Muslim identity and citizenship, piety and protest, 
music and modes of dress more reliably yield a picture of the secular 
than do its ideological markers. 
Let us recall how diverse even “core” religious traditions are among 
Muslims, down to their interpretations of the Quran and Sharia. The 
more evident this becomes in a globalized world, the more fiercely it 
is denounced by defenders of a univocal Tradition—outside of which 
all is profane, whether professed by Muslims or non-Muslims. Yet sa-
cred and secular motifs happily accompany each other in the epics, 
folk-tales, music, and architecture of Islam. Such components are of 
formative importance in the identity and ethos of individuals, com-
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Muslim life worlds both differ from and 
overlap with Western modernities. Everyday 
expressions of Muslim identity and citizenship 
can give a more reliable picture of existing 
multiple modernities than doctrines or 
ideologies do. Drawing on examples from 
cinema, literature, and architecture, this article 
argues that social visions in the Muslim world 
are part of modernity. 
The narrowing of 
tolerance has more 
to do with modern 
secular nationalism 
and colonial 
legacies than with a 
jealous religiosity. 
I S I M  R E V I E W  2 1  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 8  2 9
Thoughts & Perceptions
munities, nations, and civilizations. At 
times penetrating more deeply than 
any formal doctrine or ideologies, The 
Thousand and One Nights, the songs of 
Umm Kalthoum, and the Alhambra do 
not merely captivate, they also shape 
how Muslims and non-Muslims see the 
world and themselves. In the richly il-
lustrated Hamzanama (Adventures of 
Hamza), a collection of heroic narratives 
about the Prophet Muhammad’s uncle, 
imaginative courage serves virtue: na-
ture is celebrated, political power is 
mocked, females are empowered, and 
saints are playful. Such themes edu-
cate, socialize, and refresh devotion as 
they are indigenized and Islamized in 
the reinvention of tradition.
Cosmopolitanism
The narratives and markers that have 
plied the circuits of the Silk Road, the 
Mediterranean, the Sahel, and be-
yond remind us of the vintage—and 
vantage—of a pluralist ethos. Yes, it 
was fed by what sociologists call “the 
economy of desire”—the driving con-
sumerism of material culture—but there is more to it. For Ibn al-‘Arabi 
(1165-1240), coming out of Andalusia’s melting pot, overlapping faith 
traditions across cultures spoke to an underlying unity; and they did so 
without a relativism according to which anything goes.3 For the Fatim-
ids in Egypt (969-1171), the Mughals under Akbar (r.1556-1605), and 
often under the Ottomans, the cultivation of a modus vivendi among 
diverse subjects gave rise to a pluralist ethic that was enshrined in law. 
The narrowing of tolerance has more to do with modern secular na-
tionalism and colonial legacies than with a jealous religiosity.
In our post-9/11 world, the conceits of secularist hegemony come at 
a high cost. A serious engagement with religion occurs mainly when it 
meets security objectives. Otherwise, notes Kevin McDonald, liberalism 
prefers to flaunt a style of cosmopolitanism (complete with an abstract 
view of agency) grounded in the ideal of autonomy—which thrives on 
its opposite, fundamentalism.4 The liberal cosmopolitan is everywhere 
at home, welcoming the unknown; the fundamentalist is confined by 
tradition. The former is curious and open to change; the latter fears and 
opposes it through tribal anti-modernism. 
What this posture fails to grasp are religious grammars outside the 
secularized personal Christianity of Europe, though such grammars 
were vital in the West as “sources of the self” that ushered in new public 
cultures.5 Today, older movements (like the Muslim Brotherhood) must 
contend with globalized forms of religiosity linked to mobility and di-
aspora. Some religious movements are violent, others are peaceful; but 
there is more to either than identity politics or resistance to globalism. 
Post-secular understandings of agency, ethics, and responsibility are 
needed to deal with new questions confronting the civil. The Haber-
masian secular public sphere of mainstream liberalism no longer cuts 
the kebab, if it ever did.
Reimagining the civil
In 2005 Cairo became host to Al-Azhar Park, a seventy four-acre green 
space that has come to embody historic, ecological and social renewal 
amid urban overcrowding and decay.6 It was the culmination of over 
twenty years of consultative planning, excavation, rehabilitation, home 
upgrading, and urban design. A site whose harshly saline soil served as 
a repository for debris and fill was refreshed and endowed with water 
reservoirs and tens of thousands of trees—in the midst of Egypt’s 1,000 
year old capital packed with seventeen million people. Residents of the 
Darb al-Ahmar neighbourhood with its appalling housing conditions 
and massive unemployment were engaged in a renewal of housing, 
health, work, and credit resources. They were also integral to an archae-
ological initiative to recover key historic landmarks.
Led by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture in conjunction with domestic 
and international partners, the Al-Azhar Park project aspires to provide 
an alternative to the usual approaches to development in declining 
historic locales.7 These have tended to privilege monuments at the 
expense of neighbourhoods where residents are commonly displaced, 
often by force; commercial development follows along laissez-faire 
lines. The critique of neoliberal modernization ideology has much to 
do with such schemes, where corporate and technocratic priorities 
hold sway. In the Al-Azhar Park project attempts have been made at 
making Darb Al-Ahmar’s residents active stakeholders from the plan-
ning stage on.
The Park site is integrated with the adjacent Urban Plaza that com-
prises the new Museum of Historic Cairo. The 
project aimed to mould a wider cultural memory 
and sense of civic belonging, of continuity rather 
than rupture.8 It also invokes the particular place 
of public gardens in Muslim settings from Cordo-
ba, Marrakesh, and Damascus to Isfahan, Lahore, 
and Delhi. As such, the Park sits congruently with 
the civic visions of two of the most influential 
designers of modern public space, Frederick Law 
Olmsted (1822-1923) and Hassan Fathy (1900-
1989).9 For Olmsted, landscapes that framed park 
spaces were key to urban civility; his work inclu-
ded New York’s Central Park. Fathy insisted on 
socially responsible buildings alive to the needs 
of less privileged rural and urban citizens; his 
“architecture for the poor” across Egypt won glo-
bal acclaim. The Olmsted-Fathy conjunction also 
subverts the Orientalist “segregated Islamic city” 
of Tradition that is contrasted with Modernity’s 
integrated city. In embodying the ideals of Fathy 
and Olmsted, Al-Azhar Park flags a modernity that 
is also Muslim. It reimagines the civil in ways that 
may set fresh standards for vernaculars, Western 
and otherwise—rather like the innovative Iranian 
cinema of Panahi, Kiarostami, and Makhmalbaf. 
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cultural and regional, as well as signifi-
cant doctrinal differences, which have 
led to divergent schools of thought. A 
number of writers have offered typolo-
gies of contemporary feminist thought 
and, broadly speaking, they can be di-
vided into two main groups: first, those 
who see the “inequality” of the sexes in 
Islam as divinely ordained; and second, 
those who have engaged in progres-
sive readings of the Quran and the Ha-
dith to unearth the authentic configu-
ration of women’s rights in Islam.
Diversity of opinion
For Safia Iqbal, who belongs to the former group, the literal inter-
pretation of the Quran sanctions a differentiation between the sexes. 
This is based upon a delineation between the public and the private in 
which men and women inhabit different domains under the “separate 
but equal” rubric. Women and men have different roles, and occupy 
different spheres of life, and it is this definition of equality which chal-
lenges conservative representations of women as spiritually inferior to 
men. The second approach includes writers such as Wadud, Barlas, and 
Riffat Hassan, who are developing readings of scripture that often de-
part radically from classical interpretations. 
The heterogeneity of this second feminist approach ranges from the 
creation of new interpretive methodologies in scriptural exegesis, to 
more critical analyses of the viability of locating gender equality within 
Islam. Someone who is highly critical of the Islamic feminist project is 
Haideh Moghissi, who asserts that Islam and feminism are fundamen-
tally incompatible because Islamic scripture contains a highly devel-
oped gender hierarchy. Consequently, Moghissi doubts the possibility 
of developing a programme of social and legal rights for women within 
Islamic parameters—as these, for her, are inherently antithetical to the 
notion of gender equality.3 
Nevertheless, what is abundantly clear is that most feminists are striv-
ing for a renewal of gender equality within the parameters of a discur-
sive framework which is deemed to be faithful to an ethically correct 
Islamic impulse. This approach is predicated upon the view that such 
gender equality was an integral part of Islam at its very inception, and 
that feminists are reviving what has been lost or marginalized through-
out the centuries of Islamic history. As a result, the feminist movement 
embodies both a trenchant critique of conservative Islamic thought as 
well as opening a new phase in the politics of gender, and of reformist 
theorization in Islamic thought. 
Consequently, there is much to approve of in the advances being 
made by Islamic feminism and it is a force that is clearly gathering mo-
mentum. In the recent past, one can see the changes made to family 
laws in Iran, and the revisions made to the Moroccan Family Code, the 
Mudawwana, in 2004, as the result of feminist revisionist thinking. How-
ever, at this juncture of its development, it is worth raising a number of 
concerns about the theoretical advances in this intellectual movement 
and to be more realistic about its potential to transform gender rela-
tions in the Muslim world.
A critique of employing authenticity
One of the most striking consequences of the contemporary rise 
of political Islam (Islamism) is that it has provided a space in which 
Muslim women have begun to question established versions of their 
faith in their struggle for gender equality. The Islamist agenda of in-
stituting ultra-conservative interpretations of Islam under the ban-
ner of “a return to the past and an original Sharia” has galvanized 
The ethical project of Islamic feminism 
shares the central ideals and values of 
Islam itself—of justice, egalitarianism, 
equity, compassion, and tolerance. By 
opening up the question of who has 
the authority to interpret scripture, 
and by challenging the power of tra-
ditional interpretive communities and 
the producers of religious knowledge, 
Islamic feminists are at the forefront 
of the contemporary reformist move-
ment. Writers such as Amina Wadud 
and Asma Barlas are conferring upon 
themselves the authority to challenge 
the monopoly of traditional interpreters of the Quran, whilst scholars 
such as Fatima Mernissi are engaged in contesting received notions 
of Hadith literature. All such scholars are engaged in revisiting Islamic 
sources and actively furthering what has been succinctly termed the 
“democratization of ijtihad.”1 Working within Islamic jurisprudence, 
this entails the use of an interpretive methodology, ijtihad (to strive 
for) to dynamically re-interpret foundational Quranic principles in 
order to bring about equal rights for women.
Feminists look to the time of Islam’s origin and assert that women, 
who had played a significant role as the creators of oral texts, became 
invisible after the inception of Islam, both as originators and interpret-
ers of such texts. Scriptural literature was then produced by men who 
incorporated their own restrictive assumptions 
and understanding of gender relations. Legal 
texts were also created in this way and a mascu-
line bent was inscribed into the legal literature of 
that time, resulting in the atrophying of the egali-
tarian ethos of Islam.2 Thus, the feminist project is 
based squarely upon an Islamic framework within 
which an ethically correct gender paradigm and 
resulting legal rights for women may be config-
ured. 
The reform of Islamic law is seen as one of the 
principal means by which the discrimination 
women have suffered under certain interpreta-
tions of Islam can be addressed. In pursuance 
of this, feminists are advancing new interpreta-
tions of the sources of Islamic law, and theoriz-
ing a “liberatory praxis” with a “Quranic herme-
neutics of liberation” at the vanguard of this en-
deavour. This means that writers such as Wadud 
and Barlas are utilizing the notion of ijtihad to 
establish interpretations of the Quran which 
bring to light the gender egalitarian impulse 
of the Quran. These new interpretations then form the basis for an 
emancipatory agenda for the establishment of equality. Therefore, 
this project encapsulates the vision of a post-patriarchal Islam which 
guarantees women legal and social rights, equal with men. This will 
only be possible, feminists argue, by liberating Islamic orthodox 
scripture from the stranglehold of male-centred interpretations that 
have become entrenched in the Islamic canon. Thus, by challeng-
ing traditional notions of authority, and deconstructing gendered 
Islamic discourses, Islamic feminists are producing interpretations 
of scripture that can be utilized for the radical re-configuration of 
gendered legal rights.
However, despite this uniformity of aim, Islamic feminism is also char-
acterized by great diversity of opinion. Therefore, it may be more ap-
propriate to talk of Islamic feminisms which can be differentiated by 
Islamic Feminism & 
Gender Equality
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discriminatory 
interpretations of 
their rights
Islamic feminists are reinterpreting Islamic 
sources in order to achieve equal rights for 
women within an Islamic framework. They 
have challenged traditional interpretations of 
scripture and received notions of interpretive 
authority, both in Muslim majority societies 
as well as in the diasporic Islamic world. With 
their new interpretations they have contributed 
to the transformation of the legal, political 
and social rights of Muslim women. There 
are, however, also limitations to the feminist 
interpretations of scripture and their potential 
to deliver gender equality.
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women to challenge discriminatory 
interpretations of their rights. What 
has been less remarked upon is the 
remarkable convergence, in method-
ological terms, between this Islamist 
discourse of authenticity and the de-
ployment of authenticity by contem-
porary Islamic feminists.
This is demonstrated by Islamism 
and feminism possessing a number 
of common characteristics: both are 
anchored in the central texts of the 
Quran and the Hadith literature; both 
represent their own interpretation as 
the expression of authentic or “true” 
Islam; and both discourses have ap-
propriated the notion of the ideal 
past of Islam as the foundation of law. 
Of course, the difference between 
the two discourses lies in how they 
each conceptualize that ideal(ized) 
past and, in turn, how that past is 
used to implement a contemporary 
legal, political and social order. Thus, 
the idea of a cultural revival, an au-
thenticity and a “purity of origin” 
which can be re-created through the 
mechanism of law is pivotal in both discourses.4 Allied to this is 
the important question of temporality for feminists carving out a 
new scriptural hermeneutics: what is the relationship between the 
past and the present in Islam? A central tension that needs to be 
addressed is that the Quran is a historical response to a historical 
problem; simultaneously, it is also a transcendental text which is 
normative and atemporal. How do we reconcile these two ways of 
reading the Quran, and is it strategic for feminists to deploy a dis-
course of authenticity? 
A critique of methodology
There is also the need to realize the limitations of effecting last-
ing change purely through the medium of new scriptural inter-
pretations. This is based upon an emerging critique of reformist 
methodologies, particularly those interpretive techniques which 
make distinctions between Quranic verses by imbuing some with 
a normative quality and others with specific, limited application. 
Criticisms are made of the artificial manner in which a distinction 
is made between Quranic verses revealed in the earlier Meccan pe-
riod, which point to gender equality, and are thus viewed as nor-
mative, and the later Medinan verses which appear to discriminate 
against women. This latter type of verse is categorized by feminist 
theorists as having limited and restricted application. 
The critique centres first around the fact that it is not always pos-
sible to differentiate clearly between verses revealed in Mecca and 
those revealed in Medina. Second, many Medinan verses encap-
sulate principles that are at the very core of the Islamic approach 
to justice (which incorporates the notion of gender equality) and 
should, therefore, be viewed as of normative, rather than of lim-
ited application. A further critique is that a great deal of emphasis 
is placed upon a few Quranic verses pointing to a specific type of 
equality and, from this, feminists conclude that the Quran advo-
cates egalitarianism as a norm. This is counter to evidence to the 
contrary: that the Quran is a clearly patriarchal text, because this is 
the historical condition in which it was revealed.5 
Critics contend that it is incorrect for feminists to avow that Islam 
is the only model within which to frame reformist agendas for wom-
en’s rights. In emphasizing scriptural interpretation, feminists fail 
to take into account the social, political, economic, and cultural 
factors which may have an equal or even greater power in deter-
mining women’s unequal status and legal rights in Islamic societies 
and communities. In the Egyptian context, Abu-Odeh argues cor-
rectly that the feminist sacrifice of secular space for reforms that 
are couched purely in religious terms, may be problematic—even 
though those reforms are liberal in nature—as they may prove hard 
to critique after a while.6
A critique of “equality” 
We must also be clearer about the 
concept of equality that is deployed 
in Islamic feminism. Two important 
points need to be made about the idea 
that gender equality can be achieved 
within an explicitly Islamic frame-
work. First, the concept of equality is 
one that is assumed, with little or no 
theoretical discussion of the implica-
tions of basing it on the concept of 
sexual difference, or sameness, with 
men. The feminist rejoinder to con-
servative interpretations of the Quran 
has been to emphasize how sexual 
difference has been deployed to jus-
tify the establishment of lesser rights 
for women. However, feminist writers 
have not addressed the question of 
when, and to what extent, the idea of 
sexual difference is acceptable within 
scripture. Second, by basing demands 
for gender equality in purely scrip-
tural terms, feminists are limited to 
the depiction of women in scripture 
itself, of wives and mothers, thus fail-
ing to recognize the heterogeneity of 
Muslim women and further marginalizing those who fall outside the 
traditional paradigms of women depicted within scriptural texts. 
The need to put forward a systematic feminist position located with-
in an Islamic framework may be necessary from a strategic perspective, 
particularly as it is the more conservative of feminist thinkers who have 
had the most political success in their work being translated into legal 
and political gains. The more radical proposals offered by Islamic femi-
nists remain outside the mainstream of legal thought and peripheral 
to the centres of power. The question for scholars and activists is how 
are we to influence those in power—the ulama, mosque leaders, poli-
ticians, and the whole gamut of religious and political authority—so 
that theoretical improvements are implemented into legal and po-
litical rights that effect real change in the material reality of women’s 
lives. Additionally, feminists may also feel that it 
is necessary to advance a more uniform idea of 
the “Muslim woman”—which denies difference 
amongst women—in order to exercise political 
power which effects real change. 
The radical nature of many of the concep-
tual advances made by contemporary feminist 
interpreters of scripture is undeniable, and a 
development that is gaining more supporters. 
The potential for utilizing these new interpreta-
tions to transform the legal, political, and social 
rights of Muslim women is enormous. In broader 
reformist terms, the feminist challenge to the 
traditional notion of interpretive authority, both 
in Muslim majority societies as well as in the di-
asporic Islamic world, is also a significant and 
worthy phenomenon. However, there are both 
substantive and methodological limitations to 
feminist interpretations of scripture, and thus to 
its potential to deliver equality for all women. By 
recognizing both the restrictions as well as the 
possibilities of such theorizing, feminists can 
offer a more nuanced and responsive under-
standing of Muslim women’s calls for equality. 
Thoughts & Perceptions
Girls read the 
Quran together, 
Afghanistan.
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Queer-Friendly Islamic 
Hermeneutics
Many contemporary Muslims believe 
that a queer-friendly Islamic herme-
neutics is impossible—or at least that 
this queer-friendly interpretation is 
false. And in many ways, it can be seen 
that queer-friendly Islamic herme-
neutics is really a very desperate at-
tempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
Scott Kugle, however, contests this as-
sumption arguing that the words gay 
and Muslim “belong together because 
they form the basic identity of actual 
people in Muslim communities throughout the world.”1
In addition, analyzing how Islam and homosexuality can be recon-
ciled ideologically is a matter that has not been seriously explored in 
recent times. Even when it is explored, this is not usually done by aca-
demics but by lesbian/gay/queer/trans/bi and intersex Muslim activists 
themselves, to whom this is personally very important. As such, there 
is little knowledge in the academy about what a queer-friendly Islam 
looks like or whether it is even possible in the first place. 
The status of homosexuality in the Quran is actually more ambiguous 
and flexible than Sharia-abiding Islamic states, and the majority of their 
populace, tend to believe. In fact, the Sharia-endorsed punishment 
for homosexuality that is carried out in places like Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
or Nigeria, owes itself to a hadith related about Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the 
Prophet’s cousin and Aisha’s adversary in the Battle of the Camel, which 
followed shortly after the Prophet’s death. After the Prophet’s death, 
two men caught in a homosexual act were brought to Ali Ibn Abi Talib. 
It soon became apparent that none of the Prophet’s companions were 
able to produce or remember a hadith in which the Prophet had set 
punishment for homosexual activity. A young gay, Muslim man inter-
viewed for a documentary relates this very story and thus demonstra-
tes that there is an awareness among gay Muslims that the punishment 
for homosexuality within Islamic countries can be questioned. Ibn Abi 
Talib, however, ordered the two men to 
be thrown from a rooftop and to be fol-
lowed by a hailstorm of rocks.2
This event marked the first offi-
cial stance that a Muslim leader took 
against homosexual relations and as 
such this incident appears to be the 
roots of modern Islamic attitudes to-
ward homosexual relationships. The 
incident also alerted the early fiqh 
scholars to the fact that not enough 
had been said about banning or pun-
ishing homosexuality either in the Quran or the authentic hadiths as 
collected and extracted by al-Bukhari. In addition, these early fiqh 
scholars ensured that an active and negative discourse would emerge. 
They cited questionable hadiths, that is hadiths without a proper sup-
porting chain of transmission that can be traced back to the Prophet 
and his companions, relating that the Prophet saw male and female 
homosexual activities as sinful and equivalent to zina,3 and that severe 
punishment befalls the active and the passive partner.
Modern mainstream Muslim attitudes to homosexuality, as repre-
sented by the widely known Shayk Yusuf al-Qaradawi,4 for example, 
have inherited a way of interpreting the religious texts that lead to the 
same negative and damning conclusions about homosexuality. These 
ways of interpretation can be found within the writings of fiqh scholars 
such as al-Zuhri, al-Thahabi, al-Suyuti, al-Mashtoolee, or al-Hindi,5 who 
frequently relied on ahadith maqtu‘a (ahadith whose chain of transmis-
sion could not be traced back to a reliable source) to substantiate argu-
ments regarding the prohibition of homosexuality.
The story of Lut
These prohibitive attitudes towards homosexuality, however, are not 
shared by all Muslims. In fact there is also a counter-culture of Mus-
lim queerness that demonstrates that not all Islamic societies or fiqh 
scholars were necessarily against ho-
mosexuality. There were a number of 
fiqh scholars, such as Ibn Hazm, Hasan 
al-Basri, and Yahya Bin Aktham who did 
not see that homosexuality was equiv-
ocal to fornication or that it as pun-
ishable under Islamic law. In his book, 
Al-Muhalla, Ibn Hazm explicitly rejects 
the hadith that claims that lesbianism 
is “women fornicating with each other” 
as an inauthentic hadith, or a hadith 
without isnad.6 Al-Hasan al-Basri and 
Ibn al-Hazm were both exposed to ho-
mosexual persons and often referred to 
them quite ordinarily in their writings.
Yahya Bin Aktham, Qadi al-Muslimin 
in Baghdad at the time of al-Caliph al-
Ma’mun, was known for his authoriza-
tion of and involvement in homosexual 
relations; while Ibn Hazm states clearly 
that some Muslim communities of his 
time banned and punished homosexu-
ality while others accepted and author-
ized it.7 Ibn Hazm also alerts us to the 
fact that the story of Lut’s people, as 
related in the Quran, was not always 
considered to be a story warning spe-
cifically and exclusively against homo-
Throughout the world, Muslims explore ways 
to be gay and still be part of the Muslim 
community. Although prohibitive Islamic 
attitudes towards homosexuality may seem 
to make this difficult, these are not shared by 
all Muslims. There is also a counter-culture 
of Muslim queerness that demonstrates that 
not all religious scholars were necessarily 
against homosexuality. This article discusses 
understandings of Islam that accommodate 
homosexual relationships. 
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sexuality. Ibn Hazm argues that the story serves as a warning to those 
who would reject a true prophet, such as Lut in this story. Ibn Hazm 
stresses that it was Lut’s people’s insubordination and unwillingness 
to accept him as a true prophet that led to their 
destruction and not simply the fact that they en-
gaged in homosexual acts.8
Furthermore, in Surat al-A‘raaf: 80-84, Lut re-
proaches his people for abandoning women and 
engaging in seemingly exclusive homosexual be-
haviour, but, Ibn Hazm argues, this is certainly not 
the pinnacle cause of their demise since Lut is ad-
ditionally disgraced by their attempts to rape his 
visitor (who also happens to be an angel sent by 
God to guide Lut out of Sodom, see Surat Hud: 78-
81). If Lut’s people are, after all, homosexuals, the 
story stresses this as one of their questionable at-
tributes, but their destruction does indeed seem to be caused by their 
rejection of Lut and their attempts to rape his visitor, rather than being 
caused strictly by their sexual behaviours with each other. Contempo-
rary fiqh scholars tend to generalize the story of Lut’s people and see it 
as a story including and characterizing all homosexuals and for all time, 
rather than choosing to interpret this story as a specific “historical” in-
cident or a story relating to specific individuals. But for the purposes 
of a queer-friendly Islamic hermeneutics, the question that becomes 
immediately apparent is: what are Muslims to do with homosexuals 
who do not resemble Lut’s people in that they are not rapists or even 
non-believers? And this is precisely the question implicitly raised by 
Ibn Hazm in the eleventh century.
Outlawing fahsha
Finally, the Quranic verse in Surat al-Nisa’: 20-21, has often been seen 
by contemporary Muslim scholars to be outlawing homosexuality. The 
verse tells the believers that if a woman is caught committing fahsha 
(this will be explained in a moment) she should be placed under house-
arrest indefinitely or until God works out a way for her. The same verse 
tells the believers that the two men involved in the fahsha should be 
punished and if they repent they should be released. If by the word 
“fahsha” “homosexuality” was intended, as the contemporary religious 
figures often claim, then the punishment proscribed here certainly un-
dermines the punitive decision undertaken by Ali Ibn Abi Talib (that 
is, to throw homosexuals to their death). Nevertheless, even though 
many modern scholars read “fahsha” here as “homosexuality,” the word 
does not specifically mean homosexuality and in fact it could mean 
any unspecified variety of non-marital sexual activity. Fahsha is a word 
that means obscene sexual behaviour and could refer to bestiality, de-
bauchery, orgy-like behaviours, or possibly, but certainly not exclusive-
ly, homosexual activity. It is actually very difficult to substantiate the 
claim that this verse is related to homosexual activity at all, since the 
verse seems to be referring to sexual activity between one “theoretical” 
woman and two “theoretical” men, where the woman is placed under 
house arrest and the men are punished and released if they repent.
A queer-friendly Islamic hermeneutics
A queer-friendly Islamic hermeneutics begins by, firstly, rejecting the 
unauthenticated (or severed) hadiths which discuss homosexuality that 
early, and also later, fiqh scholars relied on. Secondly, the queer-friendly 
hermeneutics moves to de-programme the belief that the story of Lut 
in the Quran is a story about homosexuals or worse yet, a story about 
all homosexuals that ever were or were ever to be. Of the authentic 
hadiths that remain, however, two are significant, which are authenti-
cated in Sahih al-Bukhari. The one to be mentioned here relates a story 
about a “mukhanath.” In this historical period, the word “mukhanath” 
can mean a castrato, or an effeminate (usually homosexual) man or a 
person of indeterminate gender (usually an intersex person). In this ha-
dith, the mukhanath was at Um Salma’s house (the Prophet’s wife) and 
he was banned by the Prophet from being alone with the women (as he 
was previously authorized to do) after he provided a sexual description 
of a woman to one of the Prophet’s soldiers.9 If by “mukhanath” an ef-
feminate, homosexual man was intended (as some modern translators 
of the hadith see it), we would need to take into account that he was in 
the presence of the Prophet and that he was banned from entering the 
women’s quarters because he was able to describe them as sexual ob-
jects, that is, for his heterosexuality, whereas his presumed homosexu-
ality had allowed him access to the women’s quarters and the company 
of the Prophet in a previously uncontested way. If the Prophet did not 
object to the presence of a “mukhanath” then we can easily see why 
there were no authentic ahadith relating him ban-
ning or punishing homosexuality. 
Thus, from a Zahiri perspective, Islam and ho-
mosexuality can be reconciled. This interpreta-
tional style was followed by Ibn Hazm and others 
and reduces the number of religious texts which 
can be relied on to the holy Quran and the au-
thenticated hadith collections of al-Bukhari or al-
Muslim. The fact that homosexuality was not pun-
ished in the formative years of Islam, during the 
Prophet’s lifetime; that the ahadith condemning 
homosexuality do not have a proper isnad, and 
that the Quranic story of Lut is unnecessarily seen 
as a story about all homosexuals rather than a story about a specific 
group of people at a specific point in time, all these matters demon-
strate that a queer-friendly Islamic hermeneutics is at least theoreti-
cally possible.
In-born or not?
Many Muslim scholars who are against homosexuality also argue that 
it cannot be in-born or fitra, despite the fact that many homosexual 
Muslims state the contrary. This rejection of innateness is due to the 
premise that God does not make mistakes and 
creates humans in perfection. It is believed that 
homosexuals choose to sin by acting on their de-
sires and that homosexual desires in themselves 
are not sinful, but the activity itself is.10 These 
conservative parameters suggest a way for ho-
mosexual couplings. Since the desire is not sinful 
but the act is, Muslim homosexuals can enter into 
romantic relationships without feeling guilty as 
long as they avoid certain sexual acts. Or, a more 
radical way of thinking that is currently being 
adopted by homosexual Muslims, suggests that 
homosexuality, in many cases, is indeed fitra and 
in-born and that it is precisely part of the Creator’s 
intention.11 
The latter line of argumentation would of course 
be supported by the indisputable fitra of an inter-
sexed person. It cannot be argued that intersexed 
individuals choose to be intersexed since they are 
literally born this way, and yet they are not rep-
resented in the ahadith or the holy Quran. There-
fore, God does create individuals who are neither 
women nor men even though these individuals 
are not accounted for Islamically.12 Therefore, the 
argument continues, just as God creates individu-
als who are neither women nor men, he also cre-
ates individuals who cannot fit into the exclusive 
heteronormative gender binary that is promoted 
by many Islamic communities. This view reflects 
a rationalist approach to Islamic interpretation 
which is not at odds with scientific methodology 
and evidence-based theory, but it goes without 
saying that this rationalist Islamic mode is not the 
most popular or currently the most dominant. 
Nevertheless, the fact that these arguments are 
being brought forward shows that queer-friend-
ly interpretations of Islam are not only possible 
in theory, but offer ways to devout homosexual 
Muslims to reconcile themselves to their faith.
Samar Habib is Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the University of Western Sydney and author of 
Female Homosexuality in the Middle East.
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In the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, Javanese society—
once evidently united in its religious 
identity—came to be polarized along 
lines of religious identity. These con-
testing identities became politicized, 
which in the end led to major social 
violence. We may usefully ask wheth-
er anything similar is at risk of occur-
ring in today’s Indonesia.
In 2006 and 2007, I published the 
first two of a series of three books 
on the history of the Islamization of 
Javanese society from the earliest stages (fourteenth century) to the 
present. The first book argues that—after various vicissitudes and 
challenges—by the later eighteenth century Islam was, the domi-
nant religious aspect of Javanese identity.1 It took a form which I de-
scribe as the Javanese “mystic synthesis,” a form of Sufism with three 
distinctive characteristics: (1) a strong sense of Islamic identity, evi-
dently found across Javanese society, (2) widespread observation of 
the five pillars of Islamic ritual life—the confession of faith, five daily 
prayers, fasting in Ramadan, giving of alms, and pilgrimage for those 
who could afford it—but also (3) recognition of indigenous spiritual 
forces as real, including such major supernatural figures as the God-
dess of the Southern Ocean and Sunan Lawu. In the course of the 
nineteenth century, each of these elements faced challenges until, 
eventually, Javanese society came to be polarized by contending re-
ligious identities, as I have argued in a second volume of the series.2
Reform movements
The initiative for change came, in large measure, from Islamic 
revival and reform movements which began in Java around the 
middle of the nineteenth century, and which criticized many local 
traditional beliefs and practices. By then, a Javanese middle class 
was emerging. The government monopolies inherent in the co-
lonial Cultuurstelsel (cultivation system) still left spaces for local 
entrepreneurs to exploit. These entrepreneurs—in transport, fish-
ing, ship-building, entertainment, smithing, bricklaying, and such-
like—often had connections with 
Arab traders in Java’s cities and, most 
importantly, had become wealthy 
enough to afford the hajj to Mecca. 
In both ways, connections with the 
heartlands of Islam were strength-
ened and the dynamism of the nine-
teenth-century Middle East was more 
readily transmitted to Java.
Figures for the hajj traffic from Java 
are dramatic. Colonial statistics from 
the nineteenth century are hardly 
reliable in detail and some Javanese 
undertook the hajj through places in Sumatra, such as Aceh (not 
yet controlled by the Dutch) or through Singapore, thereby escap-
ing Dutch statistics. It is nevertheless clear that there was a dra-
matic explosion in the numbers travelling from Javanese-speaking 
areas to Mecca. In 1850, the colonial regime recorded forty-eight 
such departures and in 1851 only twenty-three. By 1858, however, 
the figure was 2,283. Similar numbers were found throughout the 
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with particularly 
high figures in some years: 5,322 were reported in 1898, 4,530 in 
1908, 7,614 in 1911 and 15,036 in 1921(in the last case including 
pilgrims from Madura).
The mystic synthesis carried on. Indeed, some of its most classic 
expressions are to be found in nineteenth-century Javanese litera-
ture, in mystical poems called suluks and in such works as Prince 
Mangkunagara IV’s Wedhatama. The latter includes passages such 
as the following:
Many are the young people who boast of their theological knowledge.
Though not yet qualified,
they are in a hurry to show off.
The way they interpret Arabic texts
is like a Sayyid from Egypt.
Every time they belittle the abilities of others.
Such persons can be reckoned as frauds:
where is their common sense?
Oddly enough they deny their Javaneseness
and at all costs bend their steps to Mecca in search of knowledge ….3
But out of the vast increase in numbers of Javanese hajjis was born 
a reform movement that rejected this mystic synthesis. The reformers 
had their own superstitions, of course, but they did not include non-Is-
lamic supernatural figures, such as the Goddess of the Southern Ocean 
or Sunan Lawu.
Crucially, religious schools increased dramatically in the nineteenth 
century. Again, colonial statistics are not to be relied upon in detail, but 
the trend is clear. In 1863 the statistics recorded nearly 94,000 students 
at Islamic pesantrens in Java; in 1872 the figure was over 162,000. In 
1893 the figure for Java and Madura was reported as over 272,000.4 
Many of these schools taught little more than reading the Quran by 
rote, while others promoted the Javanese mystic synthesis. But many, 
particularly on the north coast, were vehicles for the reform move-
ment.
Reactions
Not everyone welcomed reformist ideas. Most Javanese villagers evi-
dently found Islam in a more demanding style, with burdensome de-
mands for piety and orthopraxy, unappealing. So for the first time—as 
far as can be known from the surviving evidence—a group emerged in 
Javanese society who began to distance themselves from their Islam-
M E R L E  C .  R I C K L E F S
Religious Reform & 
Polarization in Java
Pressures for religious reform—in any 
society or religious tradition—may lead to 
greater orthodoxy and orthopraxy, but can 
also invite opposition, social polarization, 
conflict, and violence. In this context the 
history of the Islamization of the Javanese 
is particularly interesting and significant. 
That history reveals periods of conflict and 
periods of reconciliation, so it may tell us 
something about what circumstances make 
religion a source for social harmony and what 
circumstances make it a cause of conflict.
Children study 
the Quran in 
Java, circa 1910.
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ic identity and adherence to the five pillars. These were the abangan 
(literally, the brown ones). This was a derisory term invented by pious 
Muslims (who called themselves putihan, the white ones) for their less 
observant neighbours. These abangan undoubtedly formed the major-
ity of Javanese. Carel Poensen, a missionary who spent thirty years in 
Kediri, converted very few Javanese but wrote valuable—and tediously 
voluminous—reports back to the Netherlands, observed in the 1880s 
that many villagers found this reformed Islam “too burdensome, too 
bookish, and that in a foreign language!” He observed that, “Basically, 
people are beginning to become less religious and pious.”5
The emergence of the abangan was not the only negative reaction. 
More remarkable was the growth of Javanese Christian communities 
for the first time. In the early nineteenth century, European Protestant 
missionaries began to be allowed to proselytize among Javanese, but 
they won few converts. The missionaries found it difficult to bridge the 
cultural and linguistic gap between themselves and Javanese. More 
successful were pious Christians of mixed European-Javanese ancestry 
and a few charismatic Javanese. The most remarkable exemplar of the 
former was C.L. Coolen, born to a Javanese mother and a Russian father 
c. 1773. He had a European wife and family in Surabaya, but moved to 
the interior of East Java where he had at least one Javanese wife and 
more children. At Ngara he created the first Javanese Christian commu-
nity, beginning in the 1830s. He presented Christianity in a profoundly 
Javanese garb, including a dubiously orthodox version of the Christian 
creed, sung like a Sufi dhikr: I believe in Allah the one / There is no God but 
God / Jesus Christ is the Spirit of God / who excels in his power.6
Among the Javanese charismatic preachers, Kyai Sadrach was the 
most successful. He, too, presented Christianity in a Javanese style, 
while Islamic reformers were—in Mangkunagara IV’s words—denying 
their Javaneseness. He challenged Islamic kyais to debate and, thereby, 
converted them and their followers. Between 1870 and 1873 he is said 
to have converted almost 2500 Javanese. His relations with the Europe-
an missionaries, however, were chequered. They regarded people like 
Sadrach and Coolen as near-heretics, if not actually heretical. Neither 
of them was quite as remarkable as Kyai Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung, who 
was tall with long hair and wispy beard, spoke in riddles, said he had 
been converted to Christianity by magical means and claimed his own 
magical powers. The converts of people such as Sadrach and Tunggul 
Wulung were locally called Kristen Jawa (Javanese Christians), as op-
posed to the smaller numbers converted by European missionaries, 
who were called Kristen Londo (Dutch Christians). By 1900, there were 
probably around 20,000 Javanese Christians. This was a tiny proportion 
of the 20 million or so Javanese, but it denied the equivalence between 
being Javanese and being Muslim.
Yet even this was not the most extreme reaction to the reformed 
Islam. In the Kediri area—and perhaps elsewhere, though we have no 
surviving evidence—an anti-Islamic intellectual movement emerged. 
This is encapsulated in three remarkable books that depict the conver-
sion of the Javanese to Islam as a civilizational mistake, brought about 
by perfidious conduct on the part of the original bringers of Islam 
to Java (the walis) and the first Sultan of Demak. Babad Kedhiri, Suluk 
Gatholoco and Serat Dermagandhul were written in the 1870s, within 
a couple of decades of the first signs of the Islamic revival in Java. The 
denunciation of Islam and its leading figures—from the Prophet him-
self to local divines—was comical, crude, and sometimes obscene. 
The writers of these books regarded the true Javanese religion as the 
agama buda—the pre-Islamic “Buddhist” religion—to which the Java-
nese should return. In Dermagandhul, but not in the other two, it is said 
that this restoration of the true Javanese faith would be achieved by 
conversion to Christianity. When these books were brought out in print 
in the earlier years of the twentieth century, they produced consider-
able political uproar. 
Meanwhile, the priyayi (the elite of Javanese society), upon whom 
Dutch rule depended for its day-to-day administration, were enthusi-
astically embracing the modernity brought by the European presence, 
the other major new force in Java. The Javanese newspaper Bramartani 
began to be published in Surakarta in 1855. Its pages contain articles, 
advertisements, and correspondence showing how priyayi, along with 
Chinese and European readers of the paper, were adopting lifestyles 
and ideas far removed from those of either Islamic reformers or aban-
gan villagers. The faith of the former found almost no place in the paper 
and the superstitions of the latter were ridiculed. News from across Java 
and the Indonesian archipelago and further afield—elsewhere in Asia, 
the Americas, and Europe—filled its pages. The technological advanc-
es of the nineteenth century were admired. The contribution of the 
Dutch regime to educational modernization won much praise. Priyayi 
emulated Europeans in setting up reading clubs, attending European-
style social occasions, wearing European clothing, and decorating their 
houses in Dutch style, and wrote to Bramartani about it.
Polarization 
Thus, by the late nineteenth century, Javanese society was polarized 
along religious and social lines in ways which do not appear to have 
existed before. Islamic (both Sufi and more Sharia-oriented) reform-
ers who sought reconstruction of Javanese religious and social life, 
adherents of the old mystic synthesis, the majority abangan villagers, 
the first few Christians, writers who thought that conversion to Islam in 
the first place had been a mistake, and priyayi elites who thought the 
modernity of Europe preferable to Islamic reform (many of them still 
adherents of the mystic synthesis), represented contending forms of 
Javanese identity. Until the late nineteenth century, there is little evi-
dence of real conflict, barring the burning of some early churches by 
Muslim neighbours. But conflict was soon to develop. 
In the opening decades of the twentieth century, these contending 
Javanese identities became institutionalized in modern and particular-
ly political organizations. Thereafter they became more rigid and con-
flictual. Thus was born the so-called aliran (streams) political system of 
Indonesia, where political, religious, social, and cultural identities were 
defined by vertical aliran, more than by social class. The earliest organi-
zation was Budi Utomo, led by priyayi who were unconvinced that Islam 
had been a good idea for the Javanese. For the abangan there were the 
Communist (PKI) and Nationalist (PNI) parties, the latter being particu-
larly a priyayi party. For devout Muslims there were both religious or-
ganizations (Muhammadiyah for Modernists, Nahdlatul Ulama/NU for 
Orthodox followers of the Shafi‘i school) and political parties (Sarekat 
Islam, Masyumi, etc.). 
By the time of the Revolution and throughout the first twenty years of 
Indonesian independence, political competition increasingly pitted more 
devout Muslim adherents of NU and Masyumi against abangan follow-
ers of PKI and PNI. Propaganda from each ridiculed and demonized the 
other. From 1963, direct land reform action by PKI followers in Central 
and East Java produced violent responses particularly from their bitter 
enemies in NU circles: political and class interests between the landless 
and landowners were thus intensified by conflicts over religious identity. 
In the horrific killings of 1965-6, aliran differences 
largely determined allegiances that cost the lives of 
hundreds of thousands in Central and East Java.
Ongoing research in Java, which I am conduct-
ing in collaboration with colleagues there, raises 
the question of whether a similar process of po-
larization is now at work. It is too early to judge; 
but there are similarities with (as well as differenc-
es from) what happened in the period 1830-1930. 
In particular, active—at times aggressive—pros-
elytizing by devout Muslims who aim to change 
their society has produced opposition. In some 
places, there is a dialectical relationship between 
assertive Islamic “hard line” movements and con-
version to Christianity. 
Attempts by political parties to build aliran-
defined political constituencies, however, have 
failed. Indeed, aliran seems to play little role in 
Javanese socio-political-religious life today, as the 
society becomes generally more devoutly Islamic. 
Today, it is important also that the vast majority of 
Javanese are literate and thus able to access and 
judge information for themselves in ways that 
were not available to their illiterate predecessors. 
So the dynamism of Javanese society carries on, 
and with it the inherent interest of the history of 
Islam in Java.
Notes
1. Merle C. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: 
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working papers 4 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), 
with minor departures.
4. This does not mean that literacy was high 
in Java. The 272,000 students reported in 
pesantrens represented barely one per cent 
of the total population.
5. C. Poensen, “Iets over den Javaan als 
mensch,” Kediri, July 1884, in Archief Raad 
voor de Zending 261, held in the Utrecht city 
archives (het Utrechts Archief ).
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Nigerian Echoes of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
I never thought I would travel to Tel Aviv 
by motorcycle, but somehow I found my-
self on the back of a bike on my way to 
an interview there—not in Israel, but in 
Nigeria. I was in Kaduna, once the capital 
of the Northern region. Famously known 
as the “liberal city” and one of the few 
cities in the North where Muslims and 
Christians could live side by side, after 
the 2000 and 2002 riots Kaduna became 
increasingly ethnically and religiously 
segregated. More surprising than the spatial expression of these ten-
sions are the imported terms, maps, and metaphors deployed to ar-
ticulate them.1
One mostly Christian neighbourhood, previously called “Television” 
now sometimes bears the nickname “Tel Aviv,” and Kaduna South, 
(also mostly Christian) “New Jerusalem.” Correspondingly, the Mus-
lim neighbourhood of Rigasa is now sometimes called “Palestine.” But 
these parallel terms for neighbourhoods do not just represent the well-
known Nigerian flair for humorous renaming. While the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict is not a significant factor in internal Nigerian politics, Chris-
tian and Muslim activists do sometimes articulate local politics in the 
borrowed lexicon of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Regional foreign orientations
Yet, religious divisions in Nigeria—and their linkages to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict—have a long history dating to the early days of 
independence in the 1960’s when the country was divided into three 
autonomous regions: North, East, and West. These regions roughly cor-
responded to the three main ethnic groups of the country: the largely 
Muslim Hausa/Fulani in the North, the mostly 
Catholic Ibo in the East, and mixed Muslim and 
Christian Yoruba in the West. From independence 
in 1960 until the creation of states in 1967, each 
region had a large degree of autonomy including 
international affairs.
A particular bone of contention was Nigeria’s 
relationship with the Muslim World and Israel. 
During the First Republic, Ahmadu Bello, Pre-
mier of the Northern Region had a close personal 
friendship with King Faisal, and became the Vice 
President of the World Muslim League in 1963. As 
an outgrowth of this role, Premier Bello also op-
posed economic agreements between Nigeria 
and Israel in 1961-1962. Yet, by 1964, this stance 
softened, with the Premier meeting the Israeli Ambassador. In contrast, 
the predominately Ibo region of the East had consistently extremely 
strong economic ties with Israel, with many companies operating in 
both manufacturing and agriculture.
The strong Ibo-Israeli ties have also been explained by referring to 
the locally popular idea that the Ibo are descended from the Israelites.2 
Given Israeli investment in the East and theories of the Judean origin 
of the Ibos, there have long been rumours of official Israeli support to 
the secessionist movement of Biafra, particularly during the civil war 
(1967-1970). Although General Ojukwu, Biafra’s leader, flatly dismissed 
reports of Israeli governmental support, he explained that a small 
number of Israeli individuals with business interests in the Eastern 
region acted as intermediaries for arms acquisition and humanitarian 
aid.3
Unsurprisingly, Ojukwu placed this in a context of a “natural affinity.” 
Ojukwu also maintained that the Ibo were likewise an “oppressed peo-
ple that suffered genocide.” Many of the tropes deployed in the Biafran 
propaganda war echoed those de-
ployed by Israel’s international cam-
paign during the 1967 war, includ-
ing the David and Goliath metaphor 
coupled with heavy use of references 
to “jihad.” Ojukwu explained his de-
liberate and repeated use of the term 
“pogrom” in Biafran propaganda stat-
ing “one thing that will wake up Euro-
peans is to see the type of massacre 
that happened to the Jews.”
This balancing act between contending foreign policy orientations 
remained even after the regions were abolished. In October 1973, Ni-
geria cut diplomatic relations with Israel in response to OAU (Organi-
zation of African Unity) positions on the issue and the October 1973 
war. A decade later, Gen. Babangida made Nigeria a member in the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1985. This surprise move 
caused tremendous controversy and is often cited as a cause of a rise in 
Muslim-Christian tensions in the late 1980’s. In what is commonly por-
trayed as a compromise between the two communities in advance of 
the 1993 elections, Babangida reinitiated diplomatic relations with Is-
rael in 1992. Although the actual motives behind these decisions taken 
under military rule may never be clear, what is well-understood is that 
both communities view recognition of Israel as a Christian counter-
point to OIC membership. But why would Israel be seen as a Christian 
country? When I asked this question to Christians, I was told repeatedly 
that Israel is a Christian country. Samuel Salifu, Secretary General of 
the Christian Association of Nigeria, explained it this way, “The average 
Christian does not understand the details. Israel is the country from 
which Christ sprang…The way Christians feel about Israel is the way 
Muslims feel about Mecca.”
Politics of pilgrimage
And this statement is not surprising. The Nigerian government pro-
vides a degree of public support for individual pilgrimages—not only 
to Mecca, but also to Jerusalem. Even though there is no Christian re-
ligious duty of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, it has become an established 
state-sponsored Christian activity in Nigeria as a response to state 
support for the Hajj. The practice has become so institutionalized that 
Christians who have gone on pilgrimage are given actual “JP certifi-
cates” which gives them the ability to claim the honorific title “Jerusa-
lem Pilgrim” as do Muslims “Hajji.”
Christian Pilgrims’ Welfare Boards in all states administer governmen-
tal sponsorship of pilgrims to Christian Holy Lands. In doing so, they co-
ordinate their activities with the Israeli government and hire Israeli tour 
companies, who then map the ideological and physical boundaries of 
the “Holy Land” for Nigerian pilgrims. The packages include overnight 
stays on kibbutzes and “Bible quizzes” in which Israeli-Nigerian flag-
pins are the prize. While pilgrims visit the Western Wall in order to write 
their prayers and insert them so that they will be answered, al-Aqsa and 
the Dome of the Rock are not included.
Not only do these itineraries draw lines inclusively with Israeli culture 
and exclusively of Muslim heritage, but the Green Line itself is often 
distorted on pilgrimages as well. One itinerary boasts of boat trips from 
the Sea of Galilee to Kibbutzes in the Golan Heights, portrayed as if 
located in Israel. The next day, from the Golan the group “drive(s) south-
wards through the Jordan Valley to Jericho, the most ancient city in the 
world” after which pilgrims also take in some shopping at the AHAVA 
plant on the shores of the Dead Sea on their way back to Eilat.4 Men-
tion of border crossings comes only during the Mt. Sinai portion of the 
excursion, when pilgrims “commit ourselves into the hands of our Lord 
before setting out for the Egyptian border at Taba.” After this overnight 
Although resonances of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict are unexpected in Nigeria, in various 
ways political actors in Nigeria borrow tropes 
from the remote conflict to articulate local 
politics. Relatively autonomous foreign policies 
of the regions in the early independence period 
set the stage for contending orientations 
toward the Middle East, but imported concepts 
have more recently been deployed in Muslim 
and Christian politics.  
Jerusalem comes to 
… Nigeria through 
the form of al-Quds 
day … 
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sojourn in Arab lands, “we set off again 
and drive back to the ‘Promised Land.’”
One critic of Christian support for 
Israel, Joseph Hayap, Secretary of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria, Ka-
duna State, challenges this perspec-
tive and attributes his alternative 
view to increased exposure to areas 
outside of Israeli control. Of Palestin-
ians, he states: “They have even more 
Christians in Bethlehem than Muslims. 
A good number of churches are there 
and they actually worship. I have been 
there many times, five or six times.” And 
this has shaped his view: “We have lost 
so many churches…so many pastors 
have been killed just because Israel 
starts bombing…I say no. The problem 
with Israel is not a religious problem…
The issue between Israel and Palestine 
is purely a political issue.” When asked 
why Christians from various commu-
nities in Nigeria view it as a religious 
issue, he replied: “They think that way 
because they know that Muslims think 
that way too. Any day Israel strikes 
Palestine, assume it’s a Christian war 
against Islam.”5
Al-Quds in Kano
As for the Christians, Jerusalem is also a focal point for Muslim mo-
bilization on the conflict. Christian Nigerians go to Jerusalem, but Je-
rusalem comes to Muslims in Nigeria through the form of al-Quds day 
(the Arabic name for Jerusalem). Although Muslim (and non-Muslim)6 
solidarity with the plight of the Palestinian people is neither uncom-
mon nor particularly noteworthy in and of itself, the observance of al-
Quds day is a unique practice, most prevalent in Shia areas such as Iran 
and Lebanon. Because Nigeria’s Muslim population is largely Sunni, the 
observance of al-Quds day in Kano and other cities of the north is quite 
unexpected. One of the Nigerian Muslim activists most popularly as-
sociated with this phenomenon is Ibraheem Zakzaky. 
Then a student at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria and Vice Presi-
dent (International) of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN), 
Zakzaky travelled to Iran on the one-year anniversary celebration of 
the Iranian Revolution. Like the rest of the Muslim population of Ni-
geria, Zakzaky was Sunni but deeply impressed with the political and 
social transformation in Shia Iran. Upon his return he delivered a series 
of lectures. During one key lecture Zakzaky spoke about the revolution, 
recounting his meeting with Imam Khomeini. Students poured into the 
streets and demonstrated in Zaria painting graffiti saying “Islam only.” 
As Zakzaky’s support grew, he left the MSSN and began a movement, 
called the Ikhwan, inspired by the success of Iranian students.
Because of its association with Iran, the movement has been called 
“Shia” a designation to be understood in the context of tensions be-
tween sects in Northern Nigeria. Zakzaky himself offers the name 
“Ikhwan” and hesitates to use the term Shia at all despite observing 
Ashura and other Shia rituals, saying “Here people give Shia different 
meanings, so we try to avoid it…since we all understand that we are 
Muslims.” Although this statement is clearly tied to Nigerian politics 
which have seen extensive intra-Muslim divisions, it can also be read 
as a caution against growing Sunni-Shia sectarian strife in the Muslim 
World, about which Zakzaky has written and spoken extensively.
Although small in number and based primarily in Zaria with a scat-
tered presence elsewhere in the North, the observances of the Ikhwan 
are a good example of transplanted practices. Since the early 1980’s, 
Zakzaky as well as many of his followers have studied in Qom and he 
himself has travelled several times to Lebanon for conferences. Through 
Zakzaky, the route from al-Quds to Kano thus goes through Qom. The 
mission statement of al-Quds day on the Ikhwan website states: “Today 
being 25th of Ramadan is the last Friday of the holy month, and as des-
ignated by Imam Khomaini of bless [sic] memory, is the International 
Quds Day in which we come out en masse commemorating the flight 
of Muslims in Palestine and the oppressed globally…It is a day set aside 
for reminding the world the significance of the holy Al-Aqsa mosque in 
Jerusalem and it’s desecration perpetrated by the Zionists usurpers for 
decades, by staging peaceful marches, making speeches and distribut-
ing releases.” 
Keenly aware of the sometimes less than benign interest in global 
activist networks, Zakzaky is quick to place the role of travel and ed-
ucation in perspective. In doing so, he quotes the Hausa expression 
“tafiyya mabudin ilimi” or “travel is the key to knowledge.” And it is clear 
that while exposure to the perspectives of Shia Muslims shaped the 
expression and particular practice of solidarity, solidarity itself does not 
emerge from it. Zakzaky states: “Times without number, our ideas did 
not change because of travels…We thought these things in the late 
1970’s…we are just as you knew us in the late 1970’s, even before the 
Iranian Revolution.”
In Nigeria, the metaphors have been transport-
ed and transformed from the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Ibo activists who believe they are a lost 
tribe of Israel invoked the language of “pogrom” 
to garner international support. Aspiring “Jeru-
salem Pilgrims” travel to the “Holy Land” whose 
physical and ideational boundaries are carefully 
mapped by Israeli travel agents. Likewise, while 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause is not uncom-
mon among movements around the world, the 
Shia inspired Ikhwan movement has introduced a 
unique form of practice in pro-Palestinian solidar-
ity. Yet, these transnational transactions are nei-
ther provisions of material support nor tentacles 
through which Israel and Iran influence Nigerian 
politics through Christian-Muslim competition. 
However, these metaphorical borrowings by Ni-
gerian Christian and Muslim actors have shaped 
some of the discursive terrain of intra-group rela-
tions and group identity in Nigeria.
Notes
1. The author would like to thank Dr John 
Paden and Dr Brian Larkin for their 
comments on previous drafts. 
2. N. T. Ogbukagu, The Ibo and the Riddles of 
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2001); Chief Eric C. N. Okam, The Ibo as 
Descendents of Jacob (Enugu: Snaap, 2004); 
and Uchechukwu Ikanyibe, Biblical Evidences: 
Confirming the Hebrew Origin of the Igbo 
People (Benin: Peculiar Heritage, 1999).
3. Interview, General C. Odemdgwu Ojukwu, 
29 September 2006, Enugu. 
4. “Day-by-day itinerary” 05-15 March 2006, 
obtained from the office of one of the 
Christian Pilgrim’s Welfare Board in a state in 
northern Nigeria. 
5. Interview, Joseph Hayap, 17 July 2006, 
Kaduna.
6. During a trip to Belfast during Summer 2002, 
it was difficult not to notice that Catholic-
Protestant competition had taken on a new 
dimension: Republican areas were plastered 
with Palestinian flags; likewise, Unionist 
neighbourhoods were sporting Israeli flags.
Nigerian 
Christians 
engage in 
government 
funded 
pilgrimage to 
Israel.
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In front of the train station in Menemen 
the municipality band was dissonantly 
playing old nationalist marches while 
the people behind waived Turkish flags 
of all sizes. The march began when the 
mayor arrived and led the crowd to 
the ceremony area on the top of the 
nearby hill, which is protected by the 
army as a military zone. This isolation 
of the monument from the town is 
a spatial reflection of the gap between the national history imposed 
from above and local memories which are often unheard or unwritten. 
Hence, this monument deserves a special focus as a “realm of memo-
ry,”2 a space where memory is contested. The history of the monument 
and the commemorations show first of all how the icon of Kubilay has 
been used in the secularist discourse as a symbol of struggle against 
religious fanaticism. Secondly, the local reception of this monument 
reveals that the memory of Kubilay has been highly contested both on 
a national and a local scale.
Official memory
After the Menemen Incident, the Kemalist elite were determined to 
keep the memory of Kubilay alive. In 1931, the daily newspaper Cum-
huriyet initiated a campaign for the building of a Kubilay Monument 
in Menemen. According to the originator of this idea, Nadir Nadi, the 
son of the owner of Cumhuriyet, such a campaign would strengthen 
people’s emotional attachment to the Revolution; and thanks to the 
monument Kubilay would be remembered as a legendary figure in the 
national history.3
The monument dedicated to the memory of Kubilay and the two vil-
lage guards who were martyred during the incident was erected on a 
hill outside Menemen in 1934 making them the only people, besides 
Atatürk himself, in whose name a monumental statue 
was erected. The monument depicts a castle—symbol of 
the Republic—protected by a figure holding a spear. En-
graved on it is: “They believed, fought, and died; we are 
the guardians of the trust they left behind.” During the 
official opening of the monument, emotional ceremonies 
were held while 20,000 people gathered in Menemen and 
listened to the speech made by the General Secretary of 
the CHP (Republican People’s Party, the single-party rul-
ing the country between 1923 and 1950).4 
Between oblivion and remembering 
However, Kubilay has not always been remembered 
during the course of the Republican period. A clear pat-
tern can be observed by tracing the coverage of the 
“Kubilay, the Martyr Day” from the 1930s onwards, in the 
daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, which had played a crucial 
role in the institutionalization of the commemorations.
In the late 1930s and 1940s, Kubilay was almost forgot-
ten, since the press did not report about the commemo-
rations held annually in Menemen. The revival of Kubilay, 
the martyr, coincided with the transformation of the sec-
ularist discourse in the 1950s when the CHP lost power 
and the government was no longer identified with Ke-
malist secularism. In the new context of multi-party poli-
tics, Islam became a useful tool of populist politics, while 
secularism, the founding ideology of the Republic, was 
transformed into a weapon of the opposition. Thus, Kubi-
lay became an ideal icon for this secularism in opposition 
which has gradually developed a victim psychology.
Memorializing 
Atatürk and 
Kubilay at 
the Menemen 
monument, 
Izmir
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Kubilay
Icon of Secularism
Early in the morning of 23 December 
2007, four municipality buses were 
lined in front of the town hall of Izmir 
to take the members of the Kemal-
ist Thought Society to Menemen, an 
inland district of Izmir. However, only 
one bus turned out to be sufficient for 
the whole group composed of Kemal-
ist activists of all ages. The Society had 
organized the trip in order to partici-
pate in a ceremony, which has been held every winter for the past 76 
years.
The ceremony commemorates Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, a schoolteacher 
and reserve officer killed in the so-called Menemen Incident, a local rebel-
lion against the secular regime on 23 December 1930.1 The young officer 
was beheaded by a self-proclaimed Mahdi and his companions who want-
ed to restore the Islamic law and the Caliphate. The state’s reaction was a 
violent restoration of its authority by announcing martial law; arresting 
2,200 persons; trying 600 of them; and sentencing 37 suspects to capital 
punishment on the charges of high treason. Among those sentenced to 
death were Shaykh Esad (1848-1931), a famous Naqshbandi shaykh, and 
his son, as well as several other shaykhs, villagers, and townspeople who 
had allegedly collaborated with the rebels.
The rebellion has been depicted by the state as a conspiracy of 
the Naqshbandi order, which had been outlawed in 1925, and irticai 
hareket (a major reactionary movement) against the secular republic. 
Moreover, Kubilay acquired a central position in the iconography of the 
Republic as “the martyr of Revolution.” Since 1997, the icon of Kubilay 
has been revived by Kemalist associations, the army, and the main-
stream media as a way to express and restore citizens’ dedication to 
the secularist regime. The people travelling to Menemen in December 
2007 had the same intent. 
Located on a hilltop in Menemen, Izmir, 
the monument to Turkey’s “first martyr of 
secularism,” Kubilay, has recently become a 
major site for the defenders of secularism 
against the AKP government. Isolated from 
the town below and surrounded by competing 
sacred sites, this monument reflects the gap 
between national history and alternative 
local histories.
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The first time Kubilay appeared on the front page of the newspaper 
was in 1952 after the so-called Malatya Incident, an assassination at-
tempt against Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1972), a famous liberal jour-
nalist. Yalman had been portrayed by conservative nationalist intel-
lectuals as an enemy of Islam because of his alleged membership to 
the Freemason Society, his role in organizing beauty contests, and 
his defence of secularism vis-à-vis the increasing public visibility of 
Islamic religiosity. Invoking the memory of the Menemen Incident, 
Cumhuriyet editors warned the public and the Democratic Party gov-
ernment, which had replaced the CHP in the general elections of 
1950, against the anti-secular reactionary forces which could “abuse 
democracy” by propagating anti-secularist ideas and even use brutal 
violence to reach their aims.
In the mid-1960s, the socialist movement appropriated Kubilay as the 
symbol of their struggle against conservative nationalists, seen as new 
reactionaries. Reaction, in the left-wing secularist discourse, gained the 
wider meaning of economic and cultural regression, while the Kemalist 
revolution was reinterpreted as the beginning of the anti-imperialist 
struggle and an uncompleted enlightenment movement. In the follow-
ing decades, Kubilay was remembered as a martyr, especially during 
social and ideological tensions which resulted in violent social clashes, 
such as those in 1969 and 1978.
On the event of Bloody Sunday on 16 January 1969, left-wing stu-
dents demonstrating against American imperialism in Taksim, Istanbul, 
were attacked (and two murdered) by right-wing groups who accused 
them of communism and infidelity. In the following days, Cumhuriyet 
columnists referred to Kubilay as the revolutionary forerunner of the 
murdered leftist students and as a symbol of anti-imperialism and 
revolution.
In 1978, however, the victim of right-wing ultra-nationalist conserva-
tive movement was the Alevis, the non-Sunni population, of the city of 
Kahramanmaraş. Historically, the Alevis have been demeaned by the 
Sunni centre as a heretic and irreligious group and recently were as-
sociated with the leftist movement. In December 1978, the quarters 
inhabited by Alevis in Kahramanmaraş were ruined by right-wing Sunni 
gangs, and 111 persons were killed while hundreds were injured. The 
attackers used the slogan “Muslim Turkey” and targeted also the build-
ings of the RPP and all left-wing institutions and organizations. The vio-
lence of the event again invoked the memory of Kubilay. Those who 
massacred the Alevis were depicted by Cumhuriyet writers as the suc-
cessors of the reactionaries of the 1930s who had beheaded Kubilay.
In short, the victims of all these events have been seen as new Kubi-
lays martyred by a timeless, abstract enemy referred to as “dark forces” 
or “reaction.” The theme of martyrdom was stressed especially in the 
1980s and 1990s following the assassinations of the secularist profes-
sors and journalists Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu, and 
Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, who were all seen as “martyrs of secularism” like 
Kubilay.
The last discovery of Kubilay as a symbol of secularism, however, 
occurred in the 1990s when the army designated Islamism the major 
threat to national security. From 1997 onwards, after the Islamist politi-
cal party began receiving wider popular support, the army invoked the 
memory of Kubilay, with the motive of protecting the secularist regime 
even at the expense of democracy. Since the AKP government took 
power in November 2002, commemoration ceremonies in Menemen 
became platforms for the army as well as the opposition parties and 
Kemalist associations to protest the government’s allegedly hidden Is-
lamist agenda. The 2007 commemorations were the last of these.
Official memory contested
Although the crowd which gathered this year was much smaller and 
less agitated than in 2006, the programme of the commemoration was 
the same as before. Besides members of the Kemalist Thought Society, 
the ceremony was also attended by the city governor of Izmir, local 
state officials, high commanders of the army, local politicians, and stu-
dents. Routine state rituals were performed in front the monument. 
These were followed by poems and formulaic speeches of students 
and soldiers chosen by their teachers or commanders for their talent 
in emotive oratory. The ceremony was interrupted by applauds of the 
audience and their shouting of the slogan “Turkey is secular and will 
remain secular!” All speakers paid their respect to Kubilay’s memory 
and promised to follow his path if necessary for protecting the secular 
republic.
Except for a few teachers, students, local politicians, and local Kemal-
ist activists, hardly anybody from Menemen attended the commem-
oration ceremony. It was understandable: Since 1930, the Menemen 
population has found itself in an awkward situation as their town has 
become notorious as the embodiment of religious reaction. The of-
ficial memory about the Menemen Incident has resulted in the stig-
matization of the townspeople as religious fanatics. Every male person 
in Menemen recalls the moment during his military service when his 
commander shouted at him and accused him of being “the murderer 
of Kubilay.” Townspeople have been extremely disturbed by this stig-
matization and as a backlash, they have boycotted commemoration 
ceremonies at the monument site. Many express their sorrow for being 
blemished by such commemorations; some even express the need to 
demolish the monument in order to erase this unjust association of the 
town with religious fanaticism.
To resist such associations, townspeople feel also obliged to assert 
themselves as true secularists. They blame a neighbour town (Manisa) 
for the incident, because the group of rebels had in fact come to Mene-
men from there. The monument and the annual ceremonies, according 
to locals, reinforce a shameful episode of history of which they were not 
responsible and which they want to forget. They all sadly know about 
Atatürk’s unrealized wish to depopulate the town as a punishment for 
their alleged collaboration with the rebels. Similarly, they remember 
not only Kubilay’s martyrdom, but also the horrifying scenes of 28 per-
sons who were hanged at gallows set in the streets of Menemen in Feb-
ruary 1931. In other words, if the local people’s memory does not con-
sciously challenge the national memory embodied by the monument, 
it certainly resists it by attempting to insert their own realities.
This is also shown by the existence of different but more popular holy 
ziyaret (visit) centres at the foot of the hill. One of them is a mosque, 
which hides in its basement the tombs of Shaykh Esad and his son, 
the alleged leaders of the rebellion of 1930. This mosque is today a pil-
grimage place for the Naqshbandi successors of 
Shaykh Esad. Here, instead of Kubilay, this Shaykh 
is accepted as the real victim of the Menemen 
Incident, while the latter is seen as a fake event 
staged by the Kemalist state.5 Further up between 
this mosque and the monument is another tomb 
which is said to be hosting Hızır, a pre-Islamic cult 
of spring and new life. This tomb is the favour-
ite sacred site for those desiring special boons 
such as getting married or giving birth to a child, 
etc. Thousands of people visit here every year in 
spring, pray and then wait for their wish to be re-
alized. In other words, the sacred space of secular-
ism is circumscribed by other and more popular 
sacred sites.
The Monument of Kubilay in Menemen was 
erected by the political elite of the 1930s on top of 
a hill dominating the town. However, to be placed 
at a high location does not mean that its presence 
affects the everyday life of the people below. Peo-
ple resist the domination of the national memory 
in several ways: nationally, Naqshbandis defy the 
official history by stressing the martyrdom of 
their Shaykh instead of Kubilay, while the locals 
want to forget the event, ignore the commemo-
rations and attempt to revise the official account 
by playing down their involvement in the rebel-
lion by naming it as “Kubilay Incident” instead of 
“Menemen Incident.” In short, the national memo-
ry represented by the monument is far away from 
being hegemonic. Like the monument on the hill, 
it keeps its dominance, but not without the chal-
lenge of alternative and local memories.
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Islamist forces have moderated widely 
throughout the Middle East, but this 
has not been accompanied by parallel 
democratization. Turkey appears as an 
exception to this, as the transformation 
of Islamic actors and the secular Turkish 
state have been concurrent processes. 
As I have argued elsewhere, decades of 
unproductive confrontation within the 
confines of a democracy have taught 
both Islamic actors and the state the 
value and skills of “engagement,” a skill 
that most other social actors such as the secular left have failed to ac-
quire in Turkey. Engagement is an umbrella term referring to a long 
continuum of non-confrontational interaction with the state ranging 
from contestation and negotiation to cooperation and alliance be-
tween Islamic actors and various branches of state. Most importantly, 
engagements have contributed to democratization by transforming 
both Islamic actors and the authoritatively secular state.1
By Islamic actors, I refer to AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 
government as well as the large and internationally active Gülen move-
ment. They share a non-defiant positioning towards the authoritatively 
secular state. Unlike their forefathers Refah (Welfare) and the Nur 
movement, AKP and Gülen have successfully negotiated the bounda-
ries between religion and politics to make more space for faith-based 
lives under secular conditions. Importantly, these multi-dimensional 
negotiations led these Islamic actors to separate religion from other 
spheres of life, such as education and political authority. Put differently, 
Islamic actors in Turkey are no longer contesting over either Islamic or 
secular state, but mainly over ways of life that are religiously conserva-
tive or liberal. 
Although a large variety of actors negotiate the terms of democracy 
in Turkey, this has been obscured mainly by two misconceptions. First, 
Islamic actors have been mistakenly praised as “liberal democrats” as 
they have come to the forefront of political reform. Second, the symbi-
otic association of the Kemalist elite, the secularist followers of Ataturk, 
with the Turkish state must be revisited as the Turkish state is being 
transformed against the Kemalists’ will.
State transformation
Since AKP first came to power in 2002, it has developed constructive 
relations with several branches of the state, including even the military, 
the staunchest safeguard of laicism, the constitutional principle amount-
ing to state control of religion. The reform packages included the reduc-
tion of military control over politics through institutional changes in the 
National Council of Security (MGK). During the first years of its rule, AKP 
conducted both economic and political reforms, including the amend-
ment of the penal code, the expansion of rights of ethnic minorities and 
women, as well as decreasing inflation and increasing economic growth. 
Although the momentum of reforms has slowed down, the government 
is currently working on amending the constitution.
In addition to political reforms, AKP’s pro-free-market attitudes have 
precipitated the rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie. A considerable amount 
of wealth is accumulated in the hands of Islamic actors, who mostly 
own small and medium size businesses. Subsequently, the Islamic ac-
tors who were previously associated with lower socio-economic status 
became competitive with Turkey’s traditionally secular economic elite. 
The integration of Turkish Islamic actors into the domestic and global 
markets further empowered them vis-à-vis the state by facilitating their 
engagement with it without losing their autonomy. 
The transition is not finalized. In April 2007 the Turkish military gave a 
“warning” to AKP upon its nomination of Abdullah Gül, the former Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, for presidency. 
Terrified by the idea of the first devout 
president on the secular Turkish Repub-
lic, the collusion between the military 
and the constitutional court postponed 
the presidential elections. A secularist 
outburst followed expressing doubts 
about the limits and even the “neces-
sity” of democracy. These worries are 
rather unsubstantiated because these 
contestations between Islamic actors 
and secular state are strong indicators 
of the transition from authoritarian rule. As Sheri Berman reminds us, 
democratization has never been a smooth sail, but simply a bloody 
business.2 The most praised Western democracies emerged out of a 
long-term struggle among and between various social forces and au-
thoritarian regimes. 
Despite the collusion between the military and the constitutional 
court, AKP won the parliamentary elections for the second time in July 
2007 by forty seven percent vote—up from thirty three percent in 2002. 
The results of the election were particularly unwelcome for the military 
and the Kemalist elite and the secularist opposition party, Republican 
People’s Party (CHP). In the past, democrats from the secular left had 
found refuge under CHP’s roof. However, as the secularist politics of CHP 
have become increasingly anti-democratic and pro-military, and alien-
ated the democratic left, it has become a home for hardcore Kemalists 
only. 
The Kemalist-led backlash
The controversy surrounding the presidential nomination of Abdul-
lah Gül incited a vocal secularist backlash. Kemalists, mostly women, 
who played pioneer roles in Kemalist civil society organizations, led 
this backlash in the three largest cities, Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara.3 
Although exceptions apply, the Kemalist elite typically comes mostly 
from privileged family and socio-economic background, holds leader-
ship positions in state or society, and is above the age of sixty. Under 
the Kemalist leadership, hundreds of thousands of people (1.5 million 
estimated in Izmir only) poured to the streets opposing a wide variety 
of issues including the rapid rise of AKP’s popularity and power.
In my interviews, Kemalist leaders made radical statements express-
ing alienation from the idea of democracy, such as: “We do not want 
democracy anymore, as it is used and abused by the Islamists.” Today’s 
Kemalists, unlike their hero Ataturk, are more and more estranged 
from the West, as the EU largely supports AKP’s reform packages. One 
of the leaders of the protests stated: “The West and the EU do not un-
derstand the sacred meaning of the military for the Turkish society. In 
our country, there is no difference between an NGO and the military, 
each of which come to rescue us from political or natural disasters such 
as Sharia or earthquake.” A considerable majority of Kemalists supports 
the military’s domination in politics. Despite the vocal secularist back-
lash, not only did Gül become the president in a few months, but also 
the backlash faded immediately after the parliamentary elections. 
Why did the backlash lose its remarkable momentum? Typical of 
social outbursts, the secularist backlash exploded as an abrupt and 
emotionally charged response to events. This emotional energy is not 
enough to constitute a durable social movement that can engage 
with the state. More importantly, the symbiotic relationship between 
the Kemalist elite and the secular state has prevented the former from 
growing as a social group with agendas that are separate from the 
Republic. Differently put, the Kemalists’ claim of a monopoly of the 
Republic has undermined their own autonomy as independent so-
cial actors. Ironically, although Kemalists claimed to be the guardians 
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Between Islamists 
and Kemalists
In the political developments in Turkey over 
the last months all attention has gone to the 
Islamists and Kemalists. The struggle between 
those two seems to have overshadowed the 
concerns of many ordinary Turkish citizens. 
Nevertheless, people who sympathized with 
neither of the two sides were instrumental 
in putting up an opposition movement 
against the AKP government. It remains a 
question whether they can bring about further 
democratization in Turkey.
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of secular democracy, they lack the basic experience of citizenry to 
negotiate with the state and to push for their own agendas by using 
democratic channels. Whether they are state officials or members of 
civil society, Kemalists of the new millennium need to come to terms 
with the separate and autonomous sphere of the state and society. 
This is the first step toward the politics of engagement that the Is-
lamic actors in Turkey have mastered.
Ordinary citizens
If the Kemalists do not adjust themselves to the requirements of par-
ticipating in a more liberal democracy, they are likely to become an im-
pediment to shifting relations between the state and ordinary secular 
citizens. The majority of Turkish citizens do not associate with either 
Kemalist or Islamic actors. Hence, they do not mobilize or organize col-
lectively with any of these groups. Their refusal to base their lives on 
faith and religious conservatism separates them from Islamic actors. 
Although they are discontent with political Islam, they also do not ally 
with Kemalists and their authoritarian laicism. Both of these polarized 
groups fall short of satisfying different needs of secular Turkish citizens 
for individual freedoms.
The worst impact of the inefficient outbursts of the Kemalist elite is 
the fact that they overshadow the voice and presence of a diverse and 
popular secular resistance to political Islam. Unlike the Kemalist leader-
ship and spokespeople, secular crowds in the 2007 protests crosscut the 
lines of class, social status, gender, age, occupation, and even political 
orientation. The rich, the middle class, and the poor walked together to 
protest AKP. Unlike the old-school Kemalist elite, the participating secu-
lar people were from every age group, including the youth. Most impor-
tantly, this was the first public demonstration in which a large spectrum 
of the secular and the faithful—including some Muslims with head-
scarf—joined forces against political Islam. Considering the close ties 
between the pious president Gül and the AKP government, the secular 
masses expressed fear of losing the separation of powers between gov-
ernment, presidency, and parliament. Briefly, the protestors exercised 
“democracy in everyday life,” while the Kemalist leadership explicitly de-
nounced democratic reforms under an Islamic party’s leadership. 
Democratic outcomes require fair and genuine competition, but there 
seems to be none for AKP at the moment. In an informal dinner party 
in Istanbul, I had the chance to meet and chat with Abdullah Gül. I was 
very surprised to see how calm and confident he remained in the mid-
dle of the turbulence, which was mainly about his presidency. He told 
me: “The reform process has started. We will not be stopped.” Gul’s se-
renity was largely due to the inefficient opposition politics by Kemalists 
and CHP. 
AKP and liberal democrats
The successive victories of AKP have come with increasing religious 
conservatism in everyday life as a package deal. As many restaurants 
stopped serving alcohol, secular Turks from every walk of life stood up for 
their rights to consume alcohol wherever they wish. Not just the Kemal-
ists but secular groups at large express discomfort by the rise of religious 
conservatism in daily life. Especially at the neighbourhood level, the 
tensions between religious conservatism and the needs of the secular 
citizens increase rapidly. In certain neighbourhoods and cities, women 
who are dressed revealingly complain increasingly about judgmental 
looks. More and more people express discomfort about being refused 
to be served food during Ramadan and being judged by the pious when 
they eat in public. Pious leaders, such as Gül, do serve alcohol both in 
private and official events to display their cooperation and compromise. 
However, democratic ends cannot be trusted to the goodwill of political 
leaders.
The fact that Islamic actors in Turkey undertake political reform does 
not render them “liberal democrats.” The term must be strictly reserved 
for social actors who unconditionally defend the rights and freedom of 
others and not just themselves. Probably aware of this distinction, AKP 
recruited a considerable number of genuine democrats who were previ-
ously active in the secular left. It is also significant that the Socialist Inter-
national has approached AKP, but not CHP, for membership. The reason 
that democrats temporarily cooperate with AKP is that it is the only party 
that undertakes political reform in Turkey. But it would be a clear oddity 
to assign the role of a liberal democrat to Islamic actors, who tried to 
criminalize adultery, and who do not even claim to be liberal outside the 
economic realm.
In contrast to the liberal democrats, AKP yearns for democratization 
mainly because a more democratic state will emancipate and em-
power Islamic actors by tolerating their own faith-based life. Similar 
to the founding fathers’ reforms as part of their broader state-build-
ing project, AKP’s reforms are supplementary parts of their broader 
scheme of political reform. For example, AKP passes bills of reform for 
women and ethnic and religious minorities. But its attitudes in general 
contradict with these bills, as the party has undermined the Islamic 
feminism that had flourished under the previous Islamic party, Refah. 
Instead, AKP recruited conservative women into the party, who do not 
account to the women’s movement but to the Prime Minister Erdoğan. 
This paradox has also been evident in AKP’s ambiguous relations with 
religious minorities, such as the alienated Alevis or AKP’s absence in the 
mourning of Hrant Dink, the Armenian democrat assassinated due to 
his liberal politics. 
While liberal democrats support AKP for respect of individual and 
religious freedoms, Islamic actors have conservative takes on ways of 
life, sex, homosexuality, and gender relations. A strong opposition to 
the highly skilled AKP mobilization has to be assertive about individu-
al freedoms. The lift of the headscarf ban from the universities in 2008 
can serve as the first step for a liberal democracy only if the freedoms of 
others, such as religious minorities are institutionally protected. Rather 
than attacking the pious and their faith-based life, an efficient secular 
opposition needs to recognize, respect, and contest with Islamic actors 
over individual freedoms by using democratic channels. However, un-
like Islamic actors, ordinary secular citizens have not yet articulated their 
future agendas, discontents, needs and interests. The lack of a political 
language of ordinary citizens explains why some vote for AKP, and others 
borrow selectively from Kemalist laicism. Yet, this is simply an act of lazi-
ness on their part. One thing is clear. Neither CHP nor the Kemalist elite 
can lead or shelter a lasting and proactive (as opposed to reactionary) 
secular resistance movement. The secular crowds need to come up with 
new recipes if they wish to surpass the old-style Kemalist menu that is 
losing its appeal along with democratization in Turkey.
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The Fracturing of Pakistan
Benazir Bhutto’s tragic death in late De-
cember, 2007 reopened long festering 
fissures in Pakistani society. Over the 
last several years, Pakistan has been 
represented as a place where increas-
ingly belligerent Islamist radicals are 
pitched against an entrenched military 
ruler who seeks to make the country 
into a moderate Muslim state. Yet the ri-
oting and looting in places like Karachi, 
the commercial heart of the country, 
and the adjoining Sindh province demonstrate other deep fractures in 
Pakistani social life. The city and the province were littered with burnt-
out cars, trucks, and trailers. Private universities, schools, factories, go-
vernment buildings, banks, petrol pumps, and “posh” food outlets, were 
all attacked.
The targets were clearly symbols of institutions “where the poor can-
not afford to study; businesses where they cannot get jobs; government 
offices where they have to pay bribes and where they are insulted and 
abused.”1 The extent of damage to private and public property clearly 
shows that, in addition to an outpouring of anger and grief, this reac-
tion was also indicative of frustration at rising poverty levels. This is not 
surprising; the percentage of Pakistan’s population falling at or below 
the poverty line increased from 17% in 1991 to close to 38% in 2002.2 
Since then, unemployment levels have also increased and there is an 
increasingly widespread sense of deprivation that has set in among the 
populace after eight years of military rule.
In recent years, public and political questioning of its military rule 
has raised important questions about the Pakistani state’s legitimacy. 
One key point is the state’s identification with certain ethnic groups, 
most notably the Punjabis. Sixty years after independence, and more 
than thirty years after the creation of Bangladesh, the state has not suc-
cessfully integrated its many cultures and diverse linguistic groups. The 
spate of suicide bombings in the last two years, the (alleged) influence 
of the Taliban and other radical groups in areas bordering Afghani-
stan, and the ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan continue to remind 
us of other cracks in Pakistan’s social fabric. Under General Musharaf, 
the military attempted to portray itself as a stable political institution 
protecting Pakistan from radical Islamists and inept civilian representa-
tives. Yet, although the General always spoke of providing “security” to 
the country, his tenure was marked by numerous “army operations,” as 
these were euphemistically termed, in Baluchistan and Sarhad (North 
West Frontier Province).
While there may be little doubt about the ideological orientation of 
the Islamist radicals in the region, there are also elements of Pashtun 
(the dominant ethnic group in Sarhad) nationalism and self-assertion 
intermingled with the religious idiom. How Pakistan’s North West Fron-
tier Province, the area bordering Afghanistan with a majority Pashtun 
population, went from being a hub of nationalist and leftist politics to 
being identified with radical Islamic movements remains an unwritten 
part of Pakistani history. When it is written, the narrative of this trans-
formation must, of course, include a major section on the roles played 
by Pakistan’s security services and state structures in addition to those 
of the US and other international players during and after the war in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In addition, the state has also pushed against Baluch and Sindhi po-
litical aspirations targeting ethnic nationalists and various groups who 
resist the building of army cantonments and high tech ports on their 
lands, or have stood against the export of natural resources without 
compensation to local communities. During such engagements, the 
military strategies have included aerial carpet bombing, the use of 
heavy artillery or incursions with tanks; needless to say, such tactics do 
not distinguish between terrorists and innocent civilians. The inappro-
priateness of such manoeuvres has never been lost on the local peo-
ple who have increasingly resented and resisted the army’s presence in 
their midst. This was quite evident in the public support for the recently 
dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry.
The judiciary 
The Chief Justice, previously hand-
picked by the General, was summar-
ily dismissed by General Musharaf in 
March 2007 for agreeing to accept 
habeas corpus petitions from families 
of disappeared persons who many sus-
pect have been handed over to foreign 
intelligence agencies as part of Gen-
eral Musharaf’s “services” in the “War 
on Terror.” As the Chief Justice publicly 
resisted his dismissal, the public support he received went, perhaps, 
beyond his own expectations. In one case, due to the crowds gathered 
alongside the road, his convoy took 28 hours to travel from Islamabad 
to Lahore for a journey that normally lasts four to five hours. The law-
yers’ movement built around the Chief Justice was clearly a resistance 
to the wider implications of General Musharaf’s regime.
Chaudry’s case seemingly united many factions within Pakistani so-
ciety. However, over time the movement became increasingly the do-
main of middle class activists. Whereas protest had previously tended 
to focus on unemployment and poverty, after Chaudry’s dismissal, the 
perimeters of effective protest have shifted to include visible markers 
of democracy, such as the freedom of the judiciary and the media. It is 
clear that the two sets of concerns are not mutually exclusive. Yet for 
many perhaps it was the Chief Justice’s defiance to the military rule that 
provided inspiration, and not a general call for upholding the rights of 
the judiciary. Indeed, the judiciary in Pakistan, in its abstract form, has 
historically—linked as court cases are to high lawyer fees, bribery to 
various officers of the courts, and intimidation by more powerful par-
ties—seldom provided free and fair justice to the common person. 
Through his government’s handling of the Chaudry matter, General 
Musharaf faced severe pressure regarding the legitimacy of his rule. 
The most sophisticated political group in Pakistan, the military, eventu-
ally managed the crisis and temporarily pacified matters by reinstating 
the Chief Justice in July 2007. At the same time, under intense pressure 
from the US to demonstrate its anti-Islamist credentials (and perhaps 
also to divert attention from rising anti-Musharaf sentiment), the state 
also used excessive force against the radicals in the Red Mosque (Lal 
Masjid) in Islamabad. As students and teachers barricaded themselves 
in the Lal Masjid complex, the army laid siege and eventually raided the 
compound. In the process, scores of men, women, and children were 
killed or wounded.
The political parties 
During this period, there can be little doubt that mainstream po-
litical parties did not provide effective support for the lawyers’ move-
ment. Indeed, at the peak of the movement’s popularity, Benazir 
Bhutto entered into a deal with Musharaf that allowed her to return 
to Pakistan without the threat of pending corruption cases against 
her. Musharaf delivered on this promise by passing the infamous NRO 
(National Reconciliation Ordinance), effectively wiping out all corrup-
tion charges against politicians made prior to 1999. With its mass base, 
Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party could have bridged the gap 
between the lawyers’ movement and the larger public. Yet, by enter-
ing into this deal, Bhutto effectively betrayed the lawyer’s movement 
by leaving no viable political route for its demands of judicial freedom 
and civil liberties to be met. With one of the key opposition parties 
now thus hamstrung, the lawyer’s movement could hope to make no 
further significant changes at the political level. 
When in October Bhutto finally returned to Pakistan after eight years 
in exile, her welcome procession in Karachi was rocked by a bomb ex-
plosion that killed close to 150 people and injured many others. Soon 
after this, the government escalated its military operations in the 
Swat valley, a part of the Sarhad Province that was hitherto peace-
ful. In this case, the government’s operations were directed towards a 
group of supporters of proselytizing leader Maulvi Fazlulallah (previ-
ously in league with the state’s own security agencies). However, yet 
Pakistan’s democratic and civilian groups 
face various problems: Issues of national 
integrity, reduction of violence, the creation 
of a governing consensus among different 
provinces and ethnic groups; all of these will 
have to be tackled by the new parliament. 
But just as important as the restoration of 
democracy and the end of military involvement 
in politics are problems of poverty and 
economic deprivation.
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again these operations involved the aerial bombing of villages and 
road blockades—an approach which led to food and medical short-
ages. There is ongoing speculation that the incidences at Lal Masjid 
and in Swat valley were conveniently timed by the regime. For, not 
only were they useful in diverting public attention from various press-
ing economic and social crises, such instances also allowed Musharaf 
to present himself as the voice of secularism and religious freedom to 
a Western audience.3
Military rule
Fearing a high court ruling that his presidency was now unconsti-
tutional, on 3 November 2007 Musharaf imposed emergency rule. To 
tackle what he perceived as the worsening security situation, Mus-
haraf dismissed the superior judiciary and held the constitution in 
abeyance. The state enforced new regulatory rules on the media and 
imprisoned thousands of people. Hand picked Supreme Court judges 
ruled in favor of the General and he was elected president for the next 
five years by the Election Commission of Pakistan.
Continued local and international disenchantment led Musharaf to 
renounce his army role and become a “civilian” president.4 Moreover, 
a date for elections in January (postponed to 18 February following 
Bhutto’s death) was announced. Riding on the platform of a burgeon-
ing pro-democracy movement of lawyers, students, and civil society 
actors, a coalition of political parties, including the Islamist party 
Jama‘at-e-Islami, announced that they would boycott the elections 
unless the judiciary was restored and emergency rule lifted by 28 No-
vember 2007. Participation in the polls by political parties was seen 
as an acceptance of the political process as laid out under the Provisi-
onal Constitutional Order (PCO) promulgated by Musharraf. It would 
implicitly endorse all the constitutionally illegal acts committed by 
the regime and, thus, would be contrary to the demands of civil so-
ciety groups demonstrating daily in Pakistan. Indeed, a boycott by 
major parties of the electoral process would theoretically have dele-
gitimized the entire arrangement.
Yet, the two major parties, the People’s Party of Benazir Bhutto and 
the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, agreed to participate in 
the process and, thus, damaged the protest movement that had been 
counting on their support. Both leaders may have felt that, had they 
not participated in the elections, the already present corruption cases 
could be re-instituted against them. The military was aware of these 
weaknesses and also understood the traditional rivalry between the 
two leaders. By allowing Sharif back into the country, it created a fur-
ther challenge to Bhutto’s electoral ambitions. 
It was while she was campaigning for elections in Rawalpindi, the 
base for the army’s high command, that Bhutto was killed. Whether 
the killers were Islamists, as the government claims, remains to be 
seen. One thing, however, is certain: there is now widespread suspi-
cion regarding the government’s complicity in this event. Moreover, 
the assassination has also worsened ethnic tensions in a country that 
has never been free of such worries. Many in her home province of 
Sind felt that, once again, a Sindhi politician of national stature has 
been deprived of a share in the country’s power structures. For many 
of her supporters, Bhutto’s death was reminiscent of that of her father, 
the ex-Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who was hung by another 
military dictator who was seen as representing Punjabi interests, as 
does the present regime.
Despite its obvious ethnic dimension, Benazir Bhutto’s assassina-
tion had the strange quality of being expected and yet, until it hap-
pened, quite unimaginable. It has, however, further exposed both the 
illegitimate nature of Musharaf ’s regime, and the fundamental disen-
chantment of the Pakistani people with the state. The failure of this 
state to provide a modicum of hope for social mobility and economic 
stability to the majority of its citizens, along with the vanishing sense 
of personal security in rural and urban areas, has shattered the aura of 
invincibility once held by Musharaf. The fracturing of the state is not 
only recognizable by the insurgency in Baluchistan or by the Islamist 
radicals in Sarhad and Swat, but also by the potential of some of these 
groups to set up civic and judicial services outside the formal state 
structures. The illiberal character of some of these systems notwith-
standing, there is no doubting their popular appeal when contrasted 
with the increasingly violent state.
In the final analysis it is not about personalities like Musharaf, rather 
it is the institutional entrenchment of the Pakistani military that is 
at stake. As a political entity the military has been the key conduit 
of US interests in Pakistan. Currently, there is a growing awareness, 
within the military and its US supporters, of the military’s current lack 
of credibility among the Pakistani people. Musharaf ’s decision to re-
nounce his uniform—to become a civilian president—may be under-
stood, therefore, as an attempt by the military to untangle itself from 
the everyday processes of governance, though it continues to control 
the levers of power in Pakistan. Worryingly, the Pakistani military has 
only given up power to leave the country in turmoil: in 1971, Paki-
stan was divided into two parts after a brutal civil war; and in 1988, 
after the sudden death of Zia-ul-Haq, it suffered 
the after effects of the Afghan war—namely, in-
creased Islamic militancy, ethnic strife, and the 
proliferation of drugs and arms. The social and 
political costs of the last eight years of military 
rule are manifest in the very violence that led up 
to the elections on 18 February.
The challenges faced by Pakistan’s democratic 
and civilian groups are now multi-fold. As the 
election results show, when given a chance, the 
Pakistani people chose to vote against the re-
gime’s supporters. The issue of national integrity, 
the reduction of violence, and the creation of a 
governing consensus among different provinces 
and ethnic groups may be foremost in the minds 
of the new parliament. Yet, in Pakistan, the mere 
restoration of democratic forms of governance 
is not enough. Rather, a much deeper sensitivity 
to the problems of poverty and economic dep-
rivation is needed for democratic interventions 
to be meaningful. Democratic struggle in the 
twenty first century should not only be against 
tyranny, but against misery and injustice for it to 
provide a future of hope.5 
Notes
 1. See Arif Hasan, Dawn (Karachi), 3 January 
2008.
2. World Bank, Poverty in Pakistan: 
Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps and Rural 
Dynamics, October 2002.
3. This Western audience is pivotal for a 
domestically beleaguered Musharaf. 
In a recent interview Musharaf seems 
increasingly paranoid: “The media have let 
me down...The NGOs are against me. I don’t 
know why. I think I have been the strongest 
proponent of human rights...” According 
to Musharaf, the only people who are not 
against him are the Western leaders which 
he describes as “absolutely supportive” and 
as expressing “total solidarity.” Jemima Khan, 
“An Extraordinary Encounter with Musharaf,” 
Independent, 2 February 2008.
4. His replacement, General Kiyani, has been 
thoroughly vetted and primed by the USA 
to continue the kind of access General 
Musharaf had promised.
5. See Arjun Appadurai, “Hope and Democracy,” 
Public Culture 19, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 29-34.
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Society & the State
O M N I A  E L  S H A K R Y
Peasants, Crime, 
and Tea in Interwar Egypt
Egypt’s Law 96 of 1992—which reversed 
the ability of agricultural tenants to se-
cure fixed rents and inherit tenancies in 
perpetuity—arguably represents one of 
the most significant reversals of Nasserist 
land reform, or what Ray Bush refers to as 
“counter-revolution in Egypt’s country-
side.”1 Social scientists have demonstrat-
ed the ways in which the 1992 tenancy 
law was propagated by the press, politi-
cal parties, and parliament who backed 
the power of landlords against tenant 
farmers.2 Perhaps unsurprisingly, repre-
sentations of the peasantry continue to focus on stereotypes of wayward 
peasants, killing time in cafes and enjoying the profits derived from their 
low rents. The political debate surrounding the implementation of Law 
96, which focused almost entirely on the perspectives of landowners and 
their rights, demonstrates a remarkably durable facet of the relationship 
between Egypt’s political authorities and its rural population.
The debate returns us to the social scientific discourses of the inter-
war period. These discourses depicted the Egyptian peasant both as 
culturally authentic, and as profoundly backward. Egypt’s peasants 
were to be reformed in order to become modern subjects of the na-
tion-state. Such attitudes resulted in the idea of a unique peasant cul-
tural mentalité, a stereotype including a propensity for revenge killings 
and the excessive drinking of black tea. Conven-
iently obscuring the social and political processes 
at work, this mentalité provided a catchall expla-
nation for Egypt’s rural poverty.3
The “peasant question”
In 1932 two men from the village of Badari in 
Asyut province in Upper Egypt, Ahmad Ja‘idi and 
Hasan Abu Ashur, were charged with the murder 
of a rural superintendent. The convicted men lev-
ied impassioned accusations of torture, which 
included multiple humiliations, privations, and 
brutalities that ranged from being bound, beat-
en, and dragged, to sodomy. As a legal case, the 
incident highlighted the cruel oppression of the 
peasantry by provincial notables. Yet, it also un-
derscored the peasants’ propensity for “revenge”; 
and the vulnerability of the state apparatus and 
kibar al-mullak (landed elite) to the consequences 
of this. Indeed, the outbreak of World War II in 
1939 was cause for such alarm that the state ordered all firearms re-
moved from peasant households.4
The incident at Badari highlights the larger social context for the 
emergence of the “peasant question” as a discourse of social welfare 
and the reproduction of power relations in twentieth century Egypt. 
Beginning in the middle of the 1930s, a core group of Egyptian reform-
ers began to formulate agendas that took the peasantry as their prin-
cipal object of study and reform. The question of the educatibility of 
the peasantry emerged as the call for al-nahda al-qurawiyya, al-nahda 
al-rifiyya (a rural renaissance) and reached its apex in the middle to 
late 1930s. Egyptian public intellectuals often evoked graphic images 
of rural decay and criminality in order to suggest the immediate need 
for social reform projects. Such projects were intended to guide the 
peasantry towards the adoption of “reformed” norms of behavior and 
social and cultural practices deemed more in line with the modern 
world. Representations of uncivilized peasants served to rationalize 
the expertise of social scientists and reformers and to underscore the 
civility of the urban effendiyya (Egypt’s 
emergent middle class).
In Egypt, the social uplift of the peas-
antry was understood to depend on a 
complex of social and cultural values to 
be inculcated. Among these values, al-
tarbiya wa 'l-ta‘lim (education), tamadun 
(civility and refinement), umran (cul-
ture), raqa (progress), and adab would 
lead, it was thought, to the elimination 
of vice, wretchedness, and moral de-
cline. One of the key elements in this 
transformation was the modification of 
what had become known as the “peasant character.” The peasantry had 
long been associated with pernicious habits—see, for instance Muham-
mad ‘Umar’s turn-of-the-century work, The Present State of the Egyptians 
or the Secret of their Retrogression (Hadir al-misriyyin aw sirr ta’khuruhim), 
for the author’s portrayal of the peasant as drug addict and thief. Yet, 
the 1930s and 1940s marked the beginnings of a discourse prioritizing 
the production of statistical and substantive knowledge about peasant 
crime. In this context, the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau began to 
collect data on the use of addictive substances, such as hashish, opium, 
and black tea among peasants, and to link this use to criminality and 
other social ills. The collection of statistics on rural crime, and violent 
crime in particular, helped cultivate a discourse on peasant character 
that emphasized the fellah’s lack of cultural and moral sense.
Criminology
In the late 1930s Egyptian social scientists began to compile statisti-
cal and descriptive studies on the rate, prevalence, and types of crimes 
being committed. Two key texts published during World War II were 
Muhammad Mustafa Al-Qolali’s Essai sur les causes de la criminalité en 
Egypte and Muhammad al-Babli’s exhaustive study al-Ijram fi misr (Crime 
in Egypt).5 Al-Qolali was a noted criminal lawyer who received his doc-
torate from the Sorbonne and taught criminal law at Cairo University. 
Muhammad al-Babli’s study was the canonical work on criminology at 
the time. In addition to analyzing the various theories about the factors 
predisposing to criminality, the author reviewed the methodological 
approaches to the study of crime. Al-Babli focused in particular on the 
use of statistical data. At the time of writing, al-Babli was the director of 
the School of Police, though he had been trained as a lawyer originally. 
Al-Babli and al-Qolali were good friends and were to cooperate exten-
sively.
A hallmark of criminological studies in Egypt was the classification 
of criminality as either urban or rural. Each of these types, in turn, was 
held to possess a different etiology and morphology. On the whole, 
writers argued that urban crime was materially motivated; while rural 
crime was of a violent and affective nature—a nature most transpar-
ent in crimes of revenge and passion. Social reformers, such as al-Babli, 
argued that a peasant mentalité of ignorance was a predisposing factor 
in rural crime. The peasant’s naturally patient and submissive yet labile 
character could, because of his attachment to customs such as the ven-
detta, suddenly, become vengeful. It was noted that, in comparison to 
the West, crimes of passion (and not cupidity) were more common in 
Egypt. This tendency was more marked still in the countryside, where 
“revenge” crimes (blood murder, assault, arson, destruction, or poison-
ing of crops or livestock) were far more common than crimes for mate-
rial gain. In a 1940 article on rural crime, Mustafa Al-Qolali characterized 
urban crimes as materially motivated, as accounting for the majority of 
convictions in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, and as propagated solely by 
the urban criminal. Rural crime on the other hand, was characterized by 
al-qaswa (cruelty).
Contemporary discussions of the Egyptian 
peasantry, for example relating to the recent 
tenancy law, centre on stereotypes of backward 
peasants. Such discourses, which paint 
peasants as apolitical creatures and bearers of 
a backward mentality, can be traced at least 
as far back as the interwar era. But by using 
the peasant “mentality” as an all-explanatory 
device for understanding rural poverty, these 
discourses ignore the social and political 
processes that produced rural poverty in 
the first place.
Authorities 
marvelled at the 
proportion of 
income spent on 
tea by the average 
household.
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What, then, were the motives behind rural crime? “Revenge 
is the blood wound in the social life of the countryside,” al-
Qolali noted. Most rural crime, even against property, was 
shown to be motivated by revenge or for the preservation 
of honor. As such, the custom of tha’r (vendetta), the retribu-
tion required for a breach of familial or personal honour, was 
frequently discussed. For al-Qolali, tha’r was especially per-
nicious as it generalized individual feuds to a familial level. 
Factionalism, itself, was another aspect of rural life that exac-
erbated criminality allowing individual disputes to escalate 
out into society. Other authors emphasized the triviality of 
the motives behind rural crime. Peasant crimes, they noted, 
were often caused by petty disputes, or minor thefts, usually 
concerning land, water, crops, or livestock.
Black tea
Peasant habits, too, were implicated in rural crime. In par-
ticular, the culture of the coffee house, with its attendant 
social evils, was thought to play a major role in the moral 
decadence of the peasantry. The peasantry was thought to 
have a strong propensity toward addiction to narcotics such 
as hashish, opium, and black tea. Coffee houses were places 
for peasants to “kill time,” and gamble and where they were 
exposed to various narcotics and criminal elements. Yet, 
the presence of most narcotics—hashish, opium, alcohol, 
morphine, heroin, and cocaine—was thought to be limited 
to certain small pockets of the rural community. The more 
prevalent and destructive rural addiction, served in vast 
quantities in coffee houses, was black tea. This was a potent 
brew, usually unregulated, adulterated, and equally likely to 
be drunk by children and adults. Black tea was the term used 
to refer to the product obtained from boiling tea in a kettle, adding 
water and re-boiling the mixture: “During the next twenty-four hours 
the kettle is never cleaned out but more tea leaves and more water are 
added with the result that all the so-called tea leaves are boiled six or 
seven times over producing a black, bitter liquid to which large quanti-
ties of sugar must be added.”6
The concern over boiled tea, as well as its commercial adulteration, 
was so serious that, in 1938, the Ministry of Public Health commis-
sioned a scientific study on tea bought, prepared, and consumed by 
the fellahin. The study concluded that, although the amount of caffeine 
and tannin were proportional to the amount of tea used and not de-
pendent on the length of boiling, the sheer daily quantities of caffeine 
consumed by the Egyptian peasant were bound to be, given the local 
physical environment and influences such as the presence of endemic 
diseases, the lack of nutrition, and excessive labour, deleterious to his 
health.
Tea itself came to be viewed as a narcotic substance, its effects mim-
icking those of any other addictive substance. These effects included 
nervous and physical stimulation (not dissimilar to those associated 
with cocaine use, i.e. the shivering of hands, insomnia, and even heart 
failure); psychological and physical dependence; decreased produc-
tivity; and, tellingly, a propensity to criminal activity. Seen as a lower 
class phenomenon, authorities marvelled at the proportion of income 
spent on tea by the average household—income, they reasoned, that 
could have been spent on foodstuffs. According to one estimate, the 
efficiency of the worker was reduced by twenty-five percent, “based on 
the time lost and the fact that the tea-drinker is not as able a workman 
as the non-drinker.”7
Criminality and peasant “character”
Both al-Babli and Al-Qolali resorted continuously to discussions of 
the peasant mentalité to explain rural crime. Social and economic fac-
tors rarely feature in their analysis despite the statistical correlation 
which al-Babli noted between crimes committed and agricultural sea-
sons. Namely, he showed that there was an increase in crimes during 
harvesting and storage season, or, as Tawfiq al-Hakim phrased it in 
Yawmiyyat Na’ib fil Aryaf: “every crop has its crime.” Nor did reformers 
view the peasants’ unwillingness to cooperate with the authorities in 
prosecuting criminals as a political act. According to Al-Qolali there 
was a fifty percent or greater chance for criminals to escape justice al-
together. Likewise, though disturbed by it, social researchers did not 
link the peasants’ use of al-ashqiya’ (brigands or bandits) to social or 
economic struggles. Rather than viewing the 
peasants’ refusal to cooperate with the authori-
ties (an attitude in keeping with older concep-
tions of crime and justice) as a deliberate strategy, 
these reformers attributed it to ignorance; and 
rather than treating crimes against the persons 
and properties of landowners or their agents (es-
pecially the so-called “agrarian crimes” of arson, 
destruction, or poisoning of crops or livestock) 
as masking social struggles, they treated them as 
the remnants of an archaic tradition of revenge. 
In fact, al-Babli went so far as to dismiss the po-
tential effects of revolutionary Soviet communist 
propaganda, since, in his opinion Egyptians were 
not naturally amenable to it.
Contemporary views of the Egyptian peas-
ant tend to attribute the causes of rural poverty 
to a uniform “peasant culture” that purportedly 
privileges child bearing over small households, 
extremism over secularism, and irrational folk 
traditions over national culture. Such views hark 
directly back to the theories of the interwar social 
reformers mentioned here. In sum, these reform-
ers posited peasant ignorance as the cause of 
peasant poverty; and moral and social education 
as the solution to the problem.8 Accordingly, the 
debates on Law 96 repeat, almost verbatim, inter-
war allegations of lazy tenants squandering their 
income. They thus represent the displacement of 
political and economic explanations onto the do-
main of culture.
Omnia El Shakry is Assistant Professor of History at the University 
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L I D W I E N  K A P T E I J N S
Ramadan in Djibouti
Daily Life & Popular Religion
One of the joys of spending some 
time in a city not one’s own is to pick 
up some of its rhythms and to share 
the daily routines of the people one 
comes to know. I spent Ramadan 
2007 in Djibouti, the capital of the 
small Republic of the same name on 
the flat and torrid coast of the Red 
Sea. Climate is a dominant factor of 
life in Djibouti and only the small mi-
nority with money can temper its debilitating impact. Even in Sep-
tember, when the worst heat and humidity of the summer months 
is over, the heat is overwhelming. No wonder that, in the summer 
season, those who have an opportunity and resources to leave the 
city do so at this time, so much so that xagaa-bax1 or “leaving for the 
summer” is a respectable institution with a long history.
As it happened, I came to share work- and living space in the city 
centre or guudka (uptown), the heart of the old colonial town. The 
ten or so city blocks that make up this quarter include picturesque 
squares (still known to locals by their old colonial names such as 
Place Menelik and Place LaGarde), graced by trees and surrounded 
by the multi-storey stone buildings with the large windows, arches, 
and porticos of the French colonial style. Uptown is separated on 
the landside by the central market place, still called Place Rimbaud 
in popular speech, and Suuq Duqsileh (the “Market with the Flies”), 
now a crowded warren of small shops, from the residential areas of 
the common people, the quartiers. During the colonial period, up-
town was largely out of bounds for the local people. Now it is largely 
a business district, which forms a buffer between the rich and the 
poor: the quartiers on the one side and the really fancy neighbour-
hoods nestled in the peninsula on the other. Here the sea is never 
far away, either on the side of the port in the west or on the side of 
the beachfront hotels and residences to the north and east.
During the morning hours the city centre is very busy, as many 
people have business at the banks, stores, and offices that are lo-
cated here, but from about 1:00 to 4:30 PM, the sun-baked streets 
empty out. The radios that blast from the three or so tourist stores 
that open onto the sidewalks and never seem to close their doors 
are almost invariably tuned to the 
local RTD (Radio and Television Dji-
bouti) and so determine the mood of 
this part of town during these siesta 
hours: the serious mood of tafsiir and 
Quran recitation, the light airs of love 
songs, the staccato of the news pro-
grammes in Arabic, Somali, Afar, and 
French, and so forth.
Popular devotion
Ramadan in Djibouti is a total experience, a month-long special event, 
or better, special timetable that rules practically everything and every-
one. Many government offices and big business establishments open 
later than usual and close early (shortly after noon), often not to open 
up again. From about mid-day until just before affur (the breaking of the 
fast) the streets are empty, while in kitchens everywhere women are pre-
paring the labour intensive traditional fried dough and sambusis. And, at 
least when the electricity does not fail, everybody everywhere, it seems, 
is listening to the nabi ammaan—praise songs for the Prophet—on the 
radio. These joyful, often didactic, songs—many specially adapted from 
older versions for this year’s Ramadan by Djibouti’s artists—mark the 
time before and after the breaking of the fast. They remind the believers 
of the reward or punishment they will receive on the Day of Reckoning, 
congratulate them with successfully accomplishing their religious duty 
that day and encourage them to now thank God and indulge: Affuraay, af-
furaay, affuraay, ummadda Muslimaay affuraay! (Eat now, Muslim people, 
and break the fast!).
Sufi devotional practices have always been popular in Djbouti’s 
quartiers, but in 1989, when I had attended sittaat sessions at which older 
Somali women sang praise songs to the women who had been central to 
the life of the Prophet, younger people had looked upon this kind of Sufi 
religious devotion as something of the past and the more fundamentalist-
inclined had actively discouraged me from attending what they regarded 
as superfluous and perhaps even superstitious practices. Now the gov-
ernment, through the national radio and television and by supporting the 
artists who produced modernized versions of such Sufi poems and songs, 
actively encouraged this form of religious devotion in the mother tongue. 
“A nation that does not protect its mother tongue cannot 
make progress,” is one of the slogans of Djibouti’s president, 
Ismail Omar Geelle. However, there is another reason for the 
government’s support, for the inclusive and ecstatic Sufi Islam 
of the nabi ammaan also competes with the more sober and 
narrower approaches of the fundamentalists, who, through 
small madrasas run with the help of powerful patrons in richer 
neighbouring countries, also reach out to the poor. 
Sunset in Djibouti is always a magical moment, but in Ra-
madan this moment is even more special and marked by a 
hushed flurry of activities. One is supposed to break the fast 
exactly when the muezzin calls for the sunset prayer, first with 
dates, then with water, juice, and other affur food. If you are 
the woman in charge, you cannot fry the sambusis too early 
as they may get cold or soggy; you should not be late with the 
charcoal for the incense to be burned, at least in our house, 
exactly at the moment of affur. You must get the “breakfast” 
for the doorkeepers and the poor gathering at the mosque 
ready to be picked up. All preparations must come to their 
fruitful end exactly at sunset. As every household tries to share 
its Ramadan breakfast food with those who are worse off, the 
movement of food on plates during Ramadan makes the gap 
between rich and poor even more visible, even as it temporar-
ily tempers it. 
All over the world Muslims observe and 
celebrate Ramadan, but how they do so 
varies greatly. This article describes everyday 
life in Djibouti during the recent month of 
Ramadan and brings into focus the differences 
between rich and poor, men and women, local 
Muslims and foreign soldiers, as well as the 
government’s support for Sufi Islam to counter 
the influence of fundamentalist Islam. 
Qaat vendors in 
Djibouti
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Those who do not have families with whom to break the fast, seat 
themselves well in advance on the plastic chairs of the small, street-
side diners, expecting to be served exactly on time! And of course, be-
cause this is Djibouti, the big question that is on everyone’s mind at 
affur time is whether the qaat2 has yet “come in” and, if not, when it 
will. Ramadan does rule the time when qaat becomes available in the 
city streets—around affur time, not lunch time as is usual—but qaat 
will be chewed in Djibouti, whether it is Ramadan or not. Not every-
body chews, of course, but chewing qaat is a dominant feature of life 
in Djibouti. In my uptown neighbourhood, you can see people chew at 
street corners, next to their taxis or the wares they sell, on the thresh-
olds of, or inside stores, and so forth. In the quartiers, people chew both 
in their houses, especially in the relatively cool of a court yard or ve-
randah, and in public qaat-cafés or mabrazes, where one finds pillows 
on the ground and everything that goes with chewing qaat: the water, 
the soft drinks, and weak, sugary tea that compensate for the bitter-
ness of the qaat, cigarettes, perhaps perfume, cologne, and incense, 
and always a radio to listen to the BBC Somali service, which broadcasts 
three times a day.
The same scene plays itself out in the lavishly appointed diwans or 
reception rooms of ministers and other well-off citizens, except that 
here the qaat stalks are longer, their leaves more tender, the pillows 
thicker and of better quality, and the sound systems more elaborate, 
while generators kick in to keep the air-conditioning going when the 
electricity fails. For those who can afford to sleep during the day or 
decide to drastically cut down on their sleep, Ramadan only means 
chewing more qaat for longer hours than at other times of the year. 
After hurrying through affur, the sunset prayer, and dinner without a 
pause, the most inveterate chewers sit down to chew until just before 
the muezzin calls for the morning prayer. After a quick suxuur—the 
special Ramadan meal people eat before sunrise—they go to work at 
best for a few hours and then sleep until late in the afternoon when 
affur time is near and fresh qaat becomes available. Thus, while qaat, 
on the one hand, appears to be Djibouti’s great equalizer, how, where 
and when it is chewed becomes, at the same time, also an emphatic 
marker of class.
Foreign soldiers
During Ramadan, Djibouti hardly goes to sleep. In the early evening, 
Djiboutians of all ages and both sexes fill the many mosques of the city 
for the taraawiix or extra Ramadan prayers, which last from about 7:30 
to 9:30 PM. During the last ten days of Ramadan, many people also re-
turn to the mosque for the salaat al-layl (night prayer) from about 11:30 
PM to 1:30 AM. This is common practice almost everywhere where 
there are Muslim communities. What is exceptional in Djibouti is that, 
during Ramadan, the mosque goers walk the evening streets together 
with those who frequent the many discos and night clubs, especially 
the French and American soldiers stationed in Djibouti’s outskirts.
If you mostly visit the city centre during the day, you will hardly recog-
nize it during the evening, when loud and cheery neon signs mark the 
locations of the many night clubs and night “restaurants”—a euphe-
mism in this context—that were invisible during the day. The Shams 
Restaurant, the Scotch Club, the Oasis—there are dozens of night clubs 
like these, frequented by French and American soldiers. If the Ameri-
can soldiers—out of uniform—are recognizable mostly because they 
move in groups, the French soldiers of the Foreign Legion, who are not 
allowed to shed their super-short shorts and colonial képis, stick out 
like sore fingers. They come to drink and “close-dance” with available 
women and, even though religious objections have been (and are) con-
tinuously made, the Djibouti government is dependent on French and 
American military and economic support, while the local middle class 
needs the soldiers’ hard currency. The fate of Djibouti’s nightclubs is a 
good barometer for Western influence over its government. Whether 
they will survive the increasing economic presence and financial influ-
ence of Dubai will be interesting to watch.
Normally, after ten in the evening, the nightclub goers really own 
the uptown streets, which are now specially patrolled by the motor-
ized, French military police. However, during Ramadan, the disco- and 
mosque-goers cross paths and the sound of people praying mingles 
with the relentless and all-penetrating base of French and American 
rap and disco. This cacophony barely dies down, when the call for the 
morning prayer and Dijbouti’s noisy and omnipresent crows mark the 
beginning of a new day.
Ciid
Everywhere in the Islamic world, it is always a guess when Ramadan 
will end, as the new moon must be sighted by the relevant religious 
authorities. On Thursday evening, October 11, all ears were tuned in to 
radio or TV to find out whether it would be Ciid 
the next day or the day after. When the announce-
ment came that the fast had ended, both via radio 
and TV and from cars with loudspeakers, the city 
exploded into frantic activity, not unlike the last 
evening before Christmas at American malls. 
Housewives rushed to the market to get the miss-
ing ingredients for special foods and sweets; fa-
thers and mothers who had not yet bought new 
clothes for their children or still needed to get a 
new and fancy macaawiis (a man’s sarong) for the 
communal Ciid prayer next day poured into Suuq 
Duqsileh. Those who had not yet paid the zakaat 
tax to the poor—a duty that must performed before the formal prayer, 
now made last-minute arrangements. And everywhere women cooked 
and cleaned and prepared for the holiday. It seemed as if no one slept 
that night.
On the first day of the Feast of Fast breaking, Djiboutians pray the Ciid 
prayer in three large open spaces in different parts of the city. The ritual 
of endlessly repeated Allahu akbars (God is Great), which precede this 
special Ciid prayer, cannot be heard in uptown but many people spoke 
of this special ritual with awe. Apart from the formal Ciid prayer and 
the President’s public “state of the nation” speech, this holiday is a fam-
ily occasion, with relatives and friends sharing time and food in each 
other’s houses. Children get sweets, toys, and new clothes and go from 
house to house to receive Ciid gifts from relatives and family friends. 
Radio and TV broadcast special Ramadan programs, with live reports 
on the Ciid celebrations in Mecca and Medina and rebroadcasts of fa-
mous Somali singers in concert. Moreover, on the evenings of the first 
and second days of this particular Ciid, there was a life performance as 
well: a concert by Djibouti’s most famous diva, Nimco Jaamac, in the 
open-air theater called Les Salines, just out of the city center.
The second day of the Ciid is a very special day, for it is one of the very 
few days of the year that its many domestic servants have off. These girls 
are mostly young and unmarried, often work twelve or fourteen-hour 
days (or even sleep over), and do most of the cooking and cleaning in 
all quarters of the town. Aware that they are stuck in dead-end jobs, 
many of them attempt, sooner or later, by legal or illegal means, to ob-
tain work in the Gulf States, where wages are higher, or refugee status 
in Europe and the USA, to their minds beacons of endless possibility. 
Or, like the friend of the domestic who worked in my host family, they 
take even bigger risks by opting for tahrib or being smuggled to Yemen 
in open boats, as the many news stories of Somali bodies washing up 
on Yemen shores testify. However, this holiday was their moment of 
glory: their day to dress up, to visit friends and relatives, and, as I found 
out when I showed up in Les Salines, to attend a concert. The open-air 
theatre, with stadium-like seating, is one of the most affordable venues 
for such events and, although there were some young men present as 
well, that evening, they filled it to the brim. They knew by heart and 
moved their lips along with every song sung that evening. Whether 
dressed in the typical colourful and often gold and silver-spangled 
Djiboutian diric3 and garbasaar (shoulder wrap), or in a combination 
of modest but fashionable head scarf and provocatively tight jeans 
and shirts, they were here to celebrate and to be 
seen. They took turns in flocking onto the small 
stage to kiss the singers, empty bags of colorfully 
wrapped sweets out over their heads, and dance 
around them for a while. There was nothing plain 
or understated about them that evening! Ciid in 
Djibouti could not have ended more festively.
Notes
1. Note that in the Somali orthography long 
vowels are doubled, the “x” stands for the 
aspirated “h” and the “c” for the Arabic letter 
‘ayn. For example, ‘Id (as in feast or holiday) 
in Somali orthography becomes Ciid.
2. The leaf stimulant called Catha edulis.
3. The diric is a loose, straight-cut, extra long 
dress of fine, transparent cotton voile.
All preparations 
must come to their 
fruitful end exactly 
at sunset. 
Lidwien Kapteijns is Kendall-Hodder Professor of African and Middle Eastern History at 
Wellesley College.
Email: lkapteij@wellesley.edu
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Mosques in Stuttgart
Struggling for Space
Space & Architecture
P E T R A  K U P P I N G E R The easiest way to reach the Al-Nour 
Mosque1 from the local train station and 
avoid the extra walk around an entire 
city block is to take a short cut through 
a small dead-end street and an adjacent 
parking lot. For months I had used this 
route to reach the mosque which is one 
of the sites in my research about Islam in 
Stuttgart. In September 2007 I received 
an email from Andrea, one of the mem-
bers of the women’s Quran study group that I regularly attended at the 
Al-Nour Mosque which read “I just want to briefly inform you that the en-
trance of the mosque by way of the parking lot is no longer open. The 
neighbours had a gate installed. We are already in touch with a lawyer.” 
That evening I took the long way around to attend the study group. Since 
then there has been ongoing controversy about the gate. The new own-
ers of the neighbouring building want to prevent traffic from the pas-
sage which is legally theirs, but has for a long time been shared, onto 
the shared parking lot. The mosque and its visitors clearly account for the 
largest share in this traffic and are the targets of the gate affair. However, 
with a few exceptions the new gate remained open 
throughout the fall. 
The gate incident at the Al-Nour Mosque could 
be done away with as an ordinary right of access 
controversy between neighbours. But because the 
conflict involves a mosque, it is about more than 
mere rights of use and access. Instead the seem-
ingly insignificant conflict illustrates elements of a 
much larger encounter between Islam and domi-
nant society. Concrete mosque facilities and loca-
tions of mosques in the cityscape illustrate the 
current multi-layered social, political, and cultural 
position and struggles of Muslim communities in 
Stuttgart and beyond. Moreover, they illustrate the 
relative invisibility of Islam and Muslims in Stuttgart 
and indeed their absence from the city’s dominant self-image. As the city 
struggles hard to situate itself on the map of global cities, the dominant 
self-image of the high-tech, economic and cultural metropolis allows lit-
tle room for migrants, mosques, and ethnic enclaves.
Stuttgart is the capital of the state of Baden-Württemberg. Home to the 
global giants Mercedes, Porsche, and Bosch, this region has over the past 
half century attracted hundreds of thousands of migrants and students 
from all over the world. Today almost forty percent of the city’s residents 
have “backgrounds of migration” (Migrationshintergrund) which means 
that at least one of their parents was/is not of German descent. This is the 
highest such figure in Germany. Approximately 40,000 to 50,000 Stuttgar-
ters are Muslims (about eight percent of the total population). Over the 
past few decades, Muslim Stuttgarters of different ethnic backgrounds 
have founded religious associations and mosques. Some combine reli-
gious and social or cultural elements, others only have a room for prayer. 
Regardless of these differences, there is a core of about twenty five asso-
ciations that are relatively permanent, have premises (rented or owned), 
and offer space for prayer and other activities. Among these associations 
there is a core of about a dozen very well established communities with 
larger premises and an array of services, activities, and programmes for 
members and non-members.
Dynamic marginal spaces
Most large Stuttgart mosques are vibrant and dynamic spaces. They 
bustle with activities and visitors, in particular, for the Friday prayer, and 
on weekends when most offer religious instruction for children. Many 
communities are located in less than perfect premises. Some increase 
their space piecemeal if possible, oth-
ers renovate or improve their locations, 
yet others are in search for better spac-
es. Yet these processes are frequently 
marked by considerable obstacles. 
Some mosques have to move because 
of problems with landlords and neigh-
bours. An official from the Al-Medina 
Mosque related how his association oc-
cupied five different locations between 
the 1970s and the early 1990s. Finding appropriate spaces for mosque 
associations is difficult. There is the almost instantaneous opposition of 
neighbours when the news spread that a building will be turned into a 
mosque. In early December 2007, the Al-Medina Mosque which operates 
under the umbrella of Milli Görus,2 was denied access to an empty factory 
that it wanted to buy. The city decided to rewrite the zoning of the area in 
a larger planning effort that officials stated was unrelated to the mosque 
project. Mosque officials, however, were not surprised to see such re-
zoning, indeed they noted that this was a well-established game in the 
city.3 The association’s current facilities which the community has long 
outgrown are located in an industrial zone between two urban quarters. 
Adjacent to a power plant, produce wholesale market, a small gambling 
place, and a huge car show room, the mosque is part of a larger industrial 
and commercial complex. This mosque is one of the few remaining larger 
communities that do not own their premises. For years they have been 
searching for better premises. “We have looked at every single available 
facility in the larger Stuttgart area, but nobody sells to us in the end,” an 
official told me.4
Most mosques are default spaces and represent spatial compromises in 
a situation where only a few options are available and mosques are seen 
as bad neighbours at best and serious trouble at worst. Looking at only a 
few mosques, it becomes apparent how every single one occupies incon-
venient, inhospitable, and certainly not very aesthetic or representative 
spaces. The Al-Nour Mosque, for instance, occupies three separate suites 
in a non-descript, if not to say ugly, 1970s office building. For community 
events and high holidays this means that the staircase turns into a human 
highway where, especially, children move between the first floor men’s 
and fourth floor women’s quarters. On the third floor the community oc-
cupies yet another smaller suite that serves for “in between” communal 
activities and more public events. This spatiality is highly inconvenient. 
But at least this community has a fairly central location within its urban 
quarter, something few mosques have.
Similarly out of the way is Stuttgart’s largest mosque complex, the DITIB 
Mosque in Feuerbach which is located in the heart of a large industrial 
area.5 Once a metal factory, this sizeable complex includes a series of con-
nected buildings and oddly shaped extensions. It accommodates a large 
men’s and a women’s prayer space, community facilities, and commercial 
spaces. A very lively and dynamic space, this mosque complex attracts 
Muslims and some non-Muslim shoppers in particular on the weekends. 
“Up to 4000 people come to pray here for the high holidays,” one of the 
members of the board of directors proudly noted. The complex remains 
largely hidden from dominant urban society. Even the most liberal and 
culturally interested of non-Muslim Stuttgarters do not know where this 
place is, let alone have ever set foot there.
The Stuttgart crescent
Stuttgart does not have any larger or representative mosques, like 
other German or European cities. None of the local mosques were built as 
such or have any of the appearance of a mosque (e.g. minarets). There is 
no central mosque that brings together Muslims of different ethnic or na-
tional origins and serves as a symbol of the community in the city. Instead 
there is a diverse and dynamic landscape of mosques. Marking the twen-
Examining mosques, their spatial contexts, and 
the struggles to create, negotiate and improve 
their spaces in Stuttgart reveals the complex 
and controversial nature of spatial articulation 
for Muslim communities in this German 
city. These processes symbolize the broader 
struggles of Muslims and Muslim communities 
for recognition and participation in German 
cities and society at large. 
 [M]osques are seen 
as bad neighbours 
at best and serious 
trouble at worst.
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just how marginal they are with regard to urban 
politics and power. Hidden away from public view, 
Stuttgart’s mosques are easily glossed over as 
urban actors and participants. It is not surprising 
then, that, for instance, a recently published book8 
about Bad-Cannstatt (46.1% of its population have 
backgrounds of migration) dedicated a mere one 
and a half pages (of 242 pages) to “foreign fellow 
residents.” Remembering that Bad-Cannstatt with 
its eight mosques forms the heart of the Stuttgart 
crescent, it is even more amazing that the book re-
fers in precisely two sentences to Muslim communi-
ties. This void is not conscious exclusion, but much 
more the result of the forced invisibility of mosques 
and the chosen blindness with regard to Muslim 
affairs in the city’s dominant self-image. This mar-
ginalization stands in stark contrast to the very dy-
namic and vibrant inner lives of these communities, 
as they build and rebuild their spatialities and their 
religious, social, cultural, and political position, and 
increasingly also grassroots participation in the city. 
Stuttgart’s mosques still have to overcome many 
obstacles to escape their spatial and political mar-
ginality. 
By mid-December 2007, just before the Eid, the 
gate at the back entrance of the Al-Nour Mosque 
was locked again on several occasions.
Not available online
ty five established mosques on the map,6 I found the not very surprising 
pattern that these spaces, with only one exception, are all located on the 
vague crescent of older industrial, now turned lower class and migrant 
quarters. Bad Cannstatt constitutes the centre of Muslim Stuttgart with 
eight mosques. Only the Afghan mosque, situated in a more upscale sec-
tion of Stuttgart-West, defeats the crescent pattern. A look at Stuttgart’s 
social and economic statistics shows that mosques are almost exclusively 
situated in poorer and migrant quarters. While poverty in Stuttgart is not 
(yet) dramatic, social differences are real and visible. Of the six quarters 
with the highest purchasing power, five do not have mosques. Of the 
eight quarters with the lowest purchasing power, six have mosques.7 
Seven of the eight quarters with the highest rates of unemployment have 
mosques; the eight quarters with the lowest rates of unemployment do 
not have mosques.
This list could be continued, but clearly the quarters with mosques are 
socially and economically more disadvantaged. To be sure, it is not the 
mosques that produce this social disadvantage. Instead, their presence 
in these quarters illustrates the status of mosques as lower class spaces 
and very clearly also as unwanted spaces. The Stuttgart mosque crescent 
curves around downtown with its upscale shopping, commercial, enter-
tainment, and political spaces. The wealthier residential quarters lie inside 
the crescent or to its south. Many mosques serve specific ethnic commu-
nities, which are not tied to one district. Instead of an expression of the 
community’s residential context, mosques tend to be spatial compromis-
es that illustrate an intersection between a community’s financial means 
and, more importantly, the willingness of a district and its population 
to tolerate and accommodate a mosque. The struggle of the Al-Medina 
mosque mentioned above demonstrates this. A few years ago another 
association bought an old factory and subsequently had to fight a long 
political, administrational, and legal battle over this site. In the end the 
city bought the site from them and the mosque project had to be folded. 
It appears that if a proposed mosque does not fit the images for the par-
ticular spatiality, as held by dominant actors, those in charge are prone 
to find reasons and administrational tools to undermine the project. This 
decreases the possible locations for mosques considerably. What remains 
are lower class/migrant neighbourhoods with less political influence or 
locations in industrial or commercial zones. Thus the emergence of the 
Stuttgart mosque crescent is the result of powerful urban images, eco-
nomic necessities, and the less influential position of lower class/migrant 
districts.
Mosques are relegated to leftover or marginal locations. They often re-
cycle otherwise unwanted spaces, in particular, defunct industrial sites. 
First tucked away in small backyards locations, many mosques eventually 
upgraded to smaller or larger industrial facilities. In search of adequate 
and more respectable facilities, communities often moved several times 
until they finally bought premises. Pushed into marginal and unwanted 
locations, it is not surprising that mosques share facilities or are neigh-
bours to other “unwanted” groups and activities. In one case, a Hindu 
Temple is located in the same building as a mosque. One community is 
located in the vicinity of Stuttgart’s red light district.
Struggling for space and recognition
From the perspective of dominant society, there are the occasional loud 
disputes over sites for mosques. Issues of noise, lack of parking spaces, and 
the supposed oppression of women in Islam, in general, and mosques, 
in particular, dominate these controversies. In Stuttgart, they seem few 
and far between. When seen, however, from the perspective of Muslim 
communities, this scenery looks very different. In particular until the mid-
1990s when many larger associations started buying premises, mosque 
associations were frequently on the move. This game of moving around 
escaped the view of much of dominant society. I repeatedly heard stories 
that ended with something like “and then there were problems with the 
neighbours and we had to move.” These ongoing problems necessitated, 
and for some continue to necessitate, a tedious constant search for fa-
cilities. The willingness to sell and political interference into sales, such as 
re-zoning play an important role. Located in out of the way spaces many 
facilities are the discarded spaces of Stuttgart’s economic transformations 
of the last decades, the city’s rust-belt. Spaces that have lost their previ-
ous function and cannot otherwise be re-inserted into Stuttgart’s glittery 
twenty first century cityscape then become available for mosques. Many 
mosques occupy the lowest end of the Stuttgart real estate universe.
The spatiality of Stuttgart’s mosques is a reflection of the political, cul-
tural, and social position of Muslim communities in the city indicating 
Protests in 
Cologne reveal 
that hostility 
towards 
mosques is 
not limited to 
Stuttgart.
Notes
1. Names of mosques are pseudonyms.
2. Milli Görüs is generally thought to be 
the European arm of the larger Erbakan 
movement in Turkey.
3. N. Höfle and J. Brand, “Stadt verhindert 
Moschee in Wangen,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, 6 
December 2007. The title of the article “City 
prevents mosque in Wangen” speaks for 
itself.
4. This case is not unusual. The fact that Milli 
Görüs is under observation by state security 
may play a role here, but associations that 
are not on the watch list make very similar 
experiences.
5. DITIB is the German association of the 
Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. 
Associated with the Turkish Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, it represents official Turkish 
Islam.
6. There is no comprehensive list of Stuttgart 
mosques. I assembled my list from my 
various research sites and Internet sources 
e.g. www.islam.de, www.orientbasar.de, and 
www.meinestadt.de.
7. All Stuttgart statistics are from: 
Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, Datenkompass 
Stadtbezirke Stuttgart (Stuttgart: Statistisches 
Amt, 2006).
8. J. Hagel, Cannstatt und seine Geschichte 
(Tübingen: Silberburg Verlag, 2002).
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Petra Kuppinger is Associate Professor of Anthropology at 
Monmouth College and editor of the journal City & Society.
Email: petra@monm.edu
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E R I C  R O O S E
Mosque Design
in the Netherlands
Concurrent with intense public discus-
sion regarding the ideal manner of so-
cial integration of Muslisms into Dutch 
society is a heated architectural debate 
about mosque design. Muslims in the 
Netherlands are recognized as members 
of individual ethnic or culture groups, 
with Surinamese, Moluccan, Turkish, and 
Moroccan Muslims represented by their 
own architectural style while sharing a 
basic Islamic belief system and liturgy. 
When municipalities are confronted with mosque plans, some see the 
conspicuous use of building elements from the Muslim countries of 
origin as an unwanted and unnecessary intrusion on Dutch culture by 
nostalgic commissioners suffering from too much homesickness. In-
stead, Dutch Muslims are supposed to come up with designs that on 
the outside will appear as Dutch community centres and not as Ara-
bian Nights palaces. On the other hand, other municipalities find that 
although mosques are indeed thought of as mere practical places of 
Islamic liturgy, the introduction of building elements from the Muslim 
countries of origin will be a way for Dutch Muslim immigrants to feel 
at home in Dutch society by remaining proud of their cultural heritage, 
enriching Dutch culture along the way. Whatever the commissioner’s 
architectural choices, the measure and content of his preferred layer of 
“cultural” building elements that go beyond the basic religious neces-
sities has come to be seen by the Dutch public as an expression of his 
opinion on the ideal manner of social inclusion of Muslims in a non-
Muslim environment.
Religious oppositions
However, contrary to the general assumption, an in-depth study of 
Dutch mosque design processes shows that religion plays a far greater 
role in the architectural preferences of Muslim commissioners than 
merely prescribing “a place to prostrate oneself before God in the direc-
tion of Mecca.” Especially the three most recent and controversial Dutch 
mosque projects, the Amsterdam Taibah Mosque and Westermosque 
and the Rotterdam Essalaam Mosque, show some unexpected twists. 
The architects generally looked towards the designs as expressions of 
progress within a grander scheme of Islamic architectural evolution 
from the “traditional” to the “modern.” The commissioners, however, 
looked towards their future mosque 
as an opportunity to represent their 
vision of Islam in opposition to other 
visions. Whether they insisted that 
certain “cultural” building elements be 
used or not did not depend on their 
mother countries’ Hindustani, Turkish, 
or Moroccan style characteristics at 
all. This preference had to do with the 
ways that certain building elements 
had been used by other Muslim com-
missioners who, in their minds, held false Islamic beliefs. By selecting 
specific building elements from the world’s Islamic architectural his-
tory that in their contemporary associations carried a certain meaning 
to them, the commissioners literally aimed to “construct” the ultimate 
Islam. Notably, they saw opposing commissioners and beliefs mainly 
within their own culture group. As a result of this, the mosque designs 
within one ethnic group show some surprising stylistic inconsistencies. 
Indeed, it appears that it is not in how they are alike but in how they 
differ from each other that we can find their meaning to the commis-
sioners themselves.
Saintly brilliance
In the case of the Taibah Mosque, the Surinamese commissioner, Mo-
hammed Junus Gaffar, effectively searched for a representation of his be-
loved Brelwi Islam. The latter had been created in 19th-century northern 
British-India in opposition to the Deobandi (consistently called “Wahhabi” 
by Gaffar) and Ahmadiyya versions embraced by other Hindustani Mus-
lims in the region. Whereas the Deobandi school attempted to reform 
Islam by denying the role of the locally much-revered Sufi holy men—and 
their tombs—as successors to Muhammad and intermediaries between 
believers and God, the Ahmadiyya even had their own prophet. The 
Brelwi school, essentially meant as a counter-reformation, reinforced Sufi 
holy men, their tombs and Muhammad as the ultimate saint and Seal of 
Prophets. His light, or Nur of Muhammad, was seen as ever-existing and 
all-pervading, imagined as radiating from the Prophet’s mausoleum and 
from his Sufi successors’ tombs in Hindustan. Consequently, Gaffar com-
bined a Hindustani-Sufi shrine, consisting of a central dome, an arched 
substructure, and four corner turrets as he identified them in the Taj Mahal 
mausoleum, with Muhammad’s tomb, in his eyes consisting of the oldest 
minaret and dome within the Medina complex. He explicitly shunned the 
Saudi—since “Wahhabi”—extension around the latter. He then added 
his own creations of interior lighting, consisting of omnipresent lamps in 
the prayer hall and dozens of lights on the inside of the dome. He also 
aimed for exterior transparency by bringing in conspicuously large glass 
windows and doors in the form of the Prophet’s dome. All were meant as 
representations of the central notion in the Brelwi conviction, the Holy 
Prophet’s light as it was, and still is, passed on by later saints. At the time 
of writing, the Taibah Mosque was already in use but still remained to be 
officially opened.
Sacrality in the public sphere
The Turkish commissioner of the Westermosque in Amsterdam, Üzeyir 
Kabaktepe, effectively searched for a representation of the Islam as em-
braced by the Dutch Milli Görüs movement that he led. The movement 
had originated in Turkey in the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP), the political 
party that strove for a larger role for religion in Turkish politics in the 
1970s. It aimed to counter-act the Ministry of Religious Affairs or Diya-
net Işleri Başkanliği in Ankara, founded in 1924 by Atatürk to prevent 
mosque organizations from becoming too politically active, threaten-
ing his secular-republican ideal. In Kabaktepe’s account, mosque com-
munities of the Dutch branch of Diyanet had stylized and modernized 
With the growth of the Muslim population 
in the Netherlands more and more mosques 
are being designed by Dutch architects. But 
while architects approach mosque design 
as a display of either traditional or modern 
values, for commissioners religion plays a 
crucial, if unspoken, role in the design. Through 
the design of their mosque commissioners 
aim to express their own vision of Islam and 
distinguish it from other visions.
Taibah Mosque
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the Ottoman architectural legacy in such despicable ways that the 
sacral values he (and many other religious leaders in Turkey) associ-
ated with it had been corrupted beyond recognition. Consequently, re-
quiring the recognizably authentic Ottoman building elements that to 
him would represent a much greater role of Islam in the public sphere, 
he first steered his architect towards incorporating elements from the 
Blue Mosque. However, after having taken his designer to Istanbul to 
visit Ottoman architecture and to meet with a contemporary builder 
of classic-looking Ottoman mosques, he requested his architect to use 
the much-admired Selimiye Mosque in Edirne, by the hand of the great 
Sinan, as an even more sublime example of Ottoman grandeur. He even 
had the mentioned Turkish builder come over to assist in designing a 
whole new, “genuinely” Ottoman mosque instead of the one that he 
had already submitted to the municipality and the public, a turn that 
his architect eventually managed to prevent. Due to a breach of trust 
between the project developer and the municipality on the one side 
and the Milli Görüs movement on the other, the construction of the 
Westermosque is now in jeopardy.
Pan-Islamic splendour
In the case of the Rotterdam Essalaam Mosque, the Moroccan com-
missioner, Ahmed Ajdid, effectively searched for a representation of 
an encompassing Islam, one that would surpass all national versions. 
In this, he particularly disliked the official Moroccan vision, revolving 
around the king as the successor to Muhammad and aiming to ban any 
opposing convictions. Neither was he much attracted to the Salafist al-
ternative as upheld among some other anti-royalist Moroccan commu-
nity leaders in the Netherlands. The purist and inconspicuously Islamic 
building elements that they had chosen would not, in his account, do 
justice to the dignity and splendour of a truly global Islam. Going for 
the translation of pan-Islamic values into a design within the param-
eters set by the municipality, he initially rejected anything Moroccan 
as “old-fashioned.” At the same time he discarded anything Dutch as 
“too modern” and avalanched his designer with an—also truly global—
multitude of mosque references. The public assumes that he copied a 
mosque from the home region of his Dubai sponsor since “who pays 
the piper calls the tune.” Ajdid however gradually worked his way to-
wards incorporating the major building elements from the extension 
around the Prophet’s mosque in Medina. In his eyes, the latter formed a 
global culmination of all Muslim architectures at once, with all Muslim 
nationalities presumably having worked on it and all Muslim cultural 
styles presumably having been included in it. At the time of writing, the 
Essalaam Mosque had not yet been completed.
The ultimate Islam
Meanwhile, whereas the municipalities and architects were reasonably 
straightforward in their particular ideas on the translation into design of 
social integration and architectural progress, the commissioners were 
much less direct about the religious content of their own design prefer-
ences. None of them started out by saying, “I am a Muslim who follows the 
such-and-such path of Islam and I need to recognize it in my mosque de-
sign.” Instead commissioners began with a list of practicalities and a state-
ment like, “we are Muslims and therefore our design should be Islamic” 
and with some seemingly general and vague images. Only in the course 
of a relatively long design process they proved to have some very specific 
design requirements indeed. When publicly asked, however, they justi-
fied their insistence on certain building elements by using the publicly 
much-valued notions of social integration and architectural progress.
Gaffar, for instance, at one time called his glass arches and windows 
a sign of social transparency, having “nothing to hide,” even though 
he had admittedly meant them to represent the Prophet’s light. At his 
turn, Kabaktepe successfully claimed his design to have purposefully 
made use of the “Amsterdam School style,” even though the architect 
as well as the design process easily shows that it did not. And finally, 
Ajdid stated his mosque to be a functional design, using European 
forms that, without dome and minaret, would look “a little bit like the 
Rotterdam city hall,” even though in every single reaction to his archi-
tect’s proposals he admittedly had had the Medina Mosque’s extension 
in mind. Upholding the claim to represent the ultimate Islam and not a 
mere contested version, their ultimate Islamic buildings could only be 
publicly explained as diverging from others for non-religious reasons.
Towards a Dutch mosque?
Architectural critiques in newspapers, magazines, exhibitions, and 
televised documentaries in the Netherlands have tended to compare 
only the most superficial and judgemental interpretations of these 
mosques with a growing number of “progressive” design alternatives 
created by a range of engaged architectural students. Besides having 
led to municipal expectations and ever so many municipal disappoint-
ments, these critiques have resulted in public accusations of social 
segregation whenever commissioners did not wish to use such pub-
licly acclaimed alternatives. However, notions of social integration and 
architectural progress appear to form much less of a factual issue to 
Muslim commissioners during the actual design process than does a 
specific vision of Islam. As a consequence, to automatically assume that 
the building elements they require represent notions of integration or 
segregation and then forcibly try to convince them to embrace a pre-
established modern-Dutch prayer hall might not be the best way to 
reach the terminus of a Dutch-Islamic style. Instead, municipalities as 
well as architects would first have to realize the existence of the multi-
tude of Islamic varieties within the Netherlands as much as within any 
Muslim home country. Then, they would have to find out the specific 
vision of Islam as upheld by the commissioner they have before them. 
Finally, they would have to reach a basic understanding of the partic-
ular architectural representation that the commissioner has in mind, 
even if he may not wish to disclose his religious considerations. Only 
once the basic motivation behind the “collage” of building elements, 
insisted on by the commissioner in his aim at creating the ultimate Is-
lamic prayer hall, is understood and accepted, a more efficient discus-
sion on how it could be materialized by other means could be started. 
Although the Prophet’s tomb, the Selimiye Mosque and the Medina 
complex can hardly be made to look otherwise, the religious notions 
underlying their introduction into the Netherlands just might.
Eric Roose is Affiliate Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM.
Email: eric.roose@worldmail.nl
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H A S A N - U D D I N  K H A N
Contemporary Mosque 
Architecture
Architecture can be regarded as an ex-
pression of culture, giving clues as to 
who we are and embodying our con-
cerns. For example, religious buildings 
may be seen as reflections of spiritual 
and social concerns and skyscrapers as 
symbols of corporate power. The mosque 
is Islam’s most emblematic building. My 
focus here is on the architecture of the 
mosque expressing identity.1
How identity is expressed in mosques 
in the different areas of the world depends not only on cultural factors 
but also on regional building mores and tradition of designs, architecture, 
and construction. A few examples illustrate this well.
A tendency in contemporary mosque design is historicism, that is refer-
ring back to historically important models. An interesting example is the 
Washington, D.C. Islamic Center. It was commissioned in the 1950s with 
donations from different Islamic countries on the instigation of twelve 
Muslim ambassadors in the city who felt that Muslims did not have a 
place to pray collectively or perform the rituals for the dead. The question 
it raised then as it raises now was this: what should be the image for the 
building? It seems to come down to who funds and who designs it. In 
this case, it was the architect Mario Rossi, 
an Italian who worked for the Ministry of 
Awqaf in Egypt, who used the precedent 
of Mameluk architecture with which he 
was familiar. An interesting aspect of the 
history of this mosque is that it became 
contested space in the 1980s when it 
turned into a centre for strife between 
the Shia and Sunni Muslims in Wash-
ington. Part of it was burned (and later 
restored) because Muslims themselves 
disagreed as to who should control the mosque, how it was going to be 
used, and who was to be the imam. This took about two years to resolve. 
This history reveals that social politics play a part in the use of mosques.
Another major historicist mosque is the imposing Hassan II Mosque of 
1993, in Casablanca. It uses the traditional vocabulary of twelfth century 
Moroccan architecture, thus visually tying the current regime back into 
the legitimacy of the past.
Symbolic shapes
Mosque design spans time, crosses boundaries, and expresses cultures. 
The Afro-Brazilian mosques in Western Africa illustrate this. They are 
known as such because of the slaves that were taken to Brazil and be-
came the builders of churches there. In the late nineteenth century they 
became political troublemakers and were shipped back to Africa, where 
they produced buildings that one would not think are very mosque-like. 
Still, the locals regard them as very much part of their tradition of Islamic 
building.
Perhaps what is recognized as a mosque, and what is not, depends on 
who one is and where one has been—that is to say that it is a cultural 
manifestation as much as one based on a regional building tradition or a 
certain interpretation of religion.
The need to express such physical signs of religion is not new. Remem-
ber, for example, the insertion in the fifteenth century of a Catholic church 
into the Great Mosque of Cordoba in Spain, expressing the domination of 
Christianity in a country which had been ruled peacefully for four centu-
ries by Muslims. Physical forms seem to transmit symbolic messages.
The most recognizable of such forms are the minaret and the dome. The 
Ottoman influence of the tall pencil-thin minaret has been widely adopt-
ed because it actually fits well into modern construction technology and 
it is a pure modern geometric form, as can be seen in the Islamic Centre 
in Zagreb, which is one of the largest in Europe. The minaret relates to the 
past (because that part of the world was Ottoman at one point) and there 
was a desire to associate oneself with Islam within what was then socialist 
Yugoslavia. The central dome has a modernist image and reflects the aspi-
rations of the inhabitants portraying themselves as “modern Muslims.”
In much of the Islamic world, there was a break with the visual and 
symbolic past between the late 1940s and 1960s, when most countries in 
Asia and Africa gained independence. There appeared to be the need to 
establish a new state and a new look forward. Newly independent Muslim 
majority countries needed representative buildings that symbolized their 
states. For example parliament buildings expressed notions of democ-
racy, and state mosques proclaimed the importance placed on religion, 
as in Islamabad, Pakistan, where the main mosque was conceived as the 
national mosque. It is now named the Shah Faisal Masjid or King Faisal 
Mosque, in recognition of Saudi Arabian funding. The Turkish architect 
Vedat Dalokay designed it in 1970, so it is not surprising that it uses the 
Ottoman model with its grand open central space and the tall thin mina-
rets. The mosque breaks with the past in expressing a modernity and an 
identity that proclaims it to belong to the late twentieth century.
Fifty years after Turkey became a secular republic with a majority Mus-
lim population, a mosque was built in Ankara, in 1989, within the Parlia-
The mosque is Islam’s most emblematic 
building, as well as an expression of collective 
identity. By exploring the built form of mosques 
around the world and prevalent architectural 
trends in mosque building, this article 
considers what makes mosques identifiable 
to Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as the 
ways architecture represents the identity of a 
community and also shifts in accordance with 
changing social and cultural contexts. 
Islamic Center, 
Washington DC
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ment buildings complex. The mosque fits unobtrusively into 
this landscape. It declares that there is a place for prayer within 
government, but does not proclaim Islam as the country’s rai-
son d’etre.
The use of the mosque complex, especially in the West and in 
non-majority Islamic societies, is changing, which may in turn 
affect the design of mosques. The situation of women in rela-
tion to mosques is becoming of greater concern in some socie-
ties. Women in many countries go to the mosque to pray, and 
also for educational and social functions. In Europe and the 
United States women and children are increasingly frequent-
ing mosques. Since 2003 some Muslim women in the United 
States have been vocal in their demand for equal treatment 
in the mosque. One may recall incidents in the past few years 
when women demanded to pray in the main hall rather than in 
a different space, and when in March 2005 a woman led mixed 
male-female Friday prayers in New York. This led to protests by 
community members, but also received support. Also, for the 
first time in the USA, women have risen to positions of prominence in 
Muslim organizations; for instance the President of the Islamic Society of 
North America is Ingrid Mattson.
One of the interesting issues and design features in contemporary 
mosques is the space of prayer for women. Typically around 15 percent 
of the prayer space is given over to women who are usually housed in 
a balcony above or to the sides, separated from the men. I know of only 
one contemporary mosque that places women in a central location: it is 
in Kingston, Ontario Canada. Perhaps this is due to the fact that women 
were on the mosque building committee—itself a rare occurrence—and 
that it serves a mainly university, that is liberal, population. Before its 
construction, the physical position for women in a mosque was debated 
with some hundred letters written to imams all over the world to solicit 
their opinion. There was no consensus and the community had to make 
its own decision.
Familiar forms
This brings us back to the question of identity, and its pluralistic ex-
pressions. As noted, mosques are a reflection of who we are and how we 
represent ourselves, not only to ourselves but to society at large. 
The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) Center in Plainfield, Indiana, 
by the Canadian-Pakistani architect Gulzar Haider speaks of a contem-
porary Islamic architecture without obvious and explicit traditional ele-
ments. Is it apparent as a mosque? For some it is not. Some fifteen years 
after its completion the architect met with the clients and users of the 
project who said that they wished the mosque had had a minaret and 
dome so that it could be “perceived” to be a mosque.
Here is an architectural question: Can one recognize a building as a 
mosque without domes or without minarets? The easy use of the famil-
iar—the domes and the minarets—is more usual, as it is in many mosques 
the world over, from Indonesia to North America. This notion also applies 
as to how one recognizes other religious buildings, be they churches, 
synagogues, or temples. 
Indeed the dome of a mosque built in the year 2000 in Shanghai, China, 
is used as a sign of the presence of Islam. It has no relationship whatso-
ever to the buildings’ interior spaces or structure—it merely sits atop the 
flat roof. The community was conscious that it needed to proclaim the 
presence of Islam in a recently more tolerant atmosphere.
In Indonesia, ready-made tin domes sold along the sides of roads are 
now replacing the indigenous pyramidal roof. Because there is a norma-
tive aspect in Islam, that everyone belongs to the ummah, and that eve-
ryone is equal in the eyes of Allah, one attitude is that all Muslims should 
come back to some expression of unity. And it is the dome and the mina-
ret, which in this case do not belong to the culture and which have little 
to do with the building traditions of the place or the climate, that have 
become the desirable symbols for the mosque.
Largely due to the current influence of the Arab Middle East, especially 
of Saudi Arabia and of Iran, such elements become the “legitimate” ex-
pression of an Islam that tries to be universal. It can also be interpreted 
that those whose architecture expressed their own regional identities 
and their beliefs are not quite sure as to their place in the new globalized 
world.
In conclusion, I would stress that the importance of the architecture of 
the mosque lies not only in the forms or architectural language but also 
in the collective meanings it transmits to us over time—from its humble 
beginnings as the house of the Prophet to the pluralistic manifestations 
we find the world over. It is its symbolism that conveys what the mosque 
is about, and it expresses who we are to ourselves and to the community 
at large.
To understand the mosque is to understand the 
architecture of the region and place, and even more 
significantly, the sociology and the culture to which 
it belongs. For in the end, architecture is not about 
buildings, it is about people.
Hasan-Uddin Khan is Distinguished Professor of Architecture and Historic Preservation at 
Roger Williams University.
Email: hkhan@rwu.edu
Note
1. Suggested reading: Renata Holod and 
Hasan-Uddin Khan, The Mosque and the 
Modern World (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1997).
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V A L É R I E  A M I R A U X  
Europe’s Muslim 
Communities
Questions about the impact of 9/11 on Muslim communities in the Euro-
pean Union in terms of social interaction and conceptualizations of Mus-
lim identity led to the comparative project “Europe’s Muslim communi-
ties: Security and Integration post 9/11” from 2003 to 2007. The project 
was initiated by Ethnobarometer, the International Research Network 
on Interethnic Politics and Migration, and directed by Alessandro Silj. It 
involved national research teams in six EU countries (Italy, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands).1 ISIM was the 
Dutch partner of the project.
The initial frame of the project highlighted the causal tie between 
terrorist attacks against the USA and the growing feeling of hostility to-
wards Muslim populations and focused on public discourses and poli-
cies. By the time of our first meeting, in 2003, it was obvious, however, 
that public opinion had already been furnished with plenty of empiri-
cal and statistical evidence of these dynamics.2 In order to better grasp 
the dynamic of inter-ethnic relations, we therefore reoriented our pro-
ject towards a new methodological setting.
As matters were dictated by nationality, we wished to nuance our ap-
proach by mapping the differences among EU member states trying to 
come to terms with Muslim populations after 9/11. This meant assessing 
the level of anti-discriminatory provisions; the legacy of colonial experi-
ences; the strength of extreme right movements and political parties in 
the national elections; and the kinds of integration policies existing. All 
such elements influence national political cultures and both public dis-
courses on, and social treatments of, Muslim populations. 
The most innovative aspect of our approach was to implement a pro-
tocol different from the classical qualitative approach of the religiosity of 
Muslims through semi-directive interviews. This involved the reproduc-
tion, within laboratory settings, of conditions for conflict to occur. This 
ethnographic innovation grew from a desire to deal with situations and 
interactions, rather than discourses and institutions. Thus our method 
aimed at providing us with a way to observe the multiple meanings of 
“being Muslim” in the course of interaction between individuals, some 
Muslims, some non-Muslims. 
The seven countries involved have all entertained passionate public 
discussions in relation to resident Muslims. Further, the idea that relation-
ships between Muslims and non-Muslims automatically conflict in secu-
lar contexts appeared to be the common denominator. Method should 
incorporate the conflict dimension as an avenue of analysis. We aspired 
to a method that would artificially recreate situations involving “ordinary 
citizens” that had been in touch with arenas where real conflicts have 
taken place. This would provide a purer ethnographic approach to reli-
gious belonging, based on a sociology of culture perspective rather than 
a neo-Islamic studies or sociology of religion reading. We thus worked 
with group discussions, implementing situations of debate for invited 
Muslim and non-Muslim participants. About twenty groups met over a 
period of two years, each group meeting at least two times.
The settings created space and opportunities for people to express 
themselves with their own words. Each group focused on a pre-defined 
non-consensual topic. Such a method keeps peo-
ple centered on a topic that, in the course of the 
discussion, creates linkages and forms of intimacy 
between them. Trust and mistrust appear as cen-
tral concepts in distinguishing between success-
ful (and socially cohesive) and unsuccessful situ-
ations. The group discussions were opportunities 
to observe where dialogue stops, what is non-ne-
gotiable, at what point people feel too injured by 
a person‘s position to continue talking with them. 
In order not to reduce all conflicts to matters of 
ethnicity or religion, “focus groups” were formed to 
represent various ethnic groups, age groups, and 
different degrees of religious attachment. Though balanced in term of 
age, gender, and ethnicity, these group discussions consisted of people 
of diverse and contrasting positions. 
The precise format of the focus group discussions differed by country. 
Topics were chosen either on the basis of their local/national visibility in 
the public space, or on their ability to bind all participants together. In 
Italy, the impact of immigrants’ arrival on Italian society was central in 
discussing the perception of respective otherness between Italian citi-
zens and immigrant citizens after 9/11 (Rome), the links between secu-
rity and identity (Padova), or the cultural transformation of Italian society 
in a migratory context (Milan). In France, the groups were organized on 
the basis of a community of experience shared by the participants. Cit-
ies were selected and associated with one arena for conflict including 
religious signs in public schools (Creil-Bobigny), the place of religion in 
French universities (Bordeaux), the access of youngsters with a migration 
background to political participation (Melun), the daily experience of re-
ligious pluralism in public day-care during school holidays (Argenteuil). 
The German case was entirely based in Berlin and delved into school and 
media. The British case included Birmingham (the role of religion in the 
local socialization of youngsters) and London. The Dutch team chose 
Gouda as their city in which to host five focus groups, all dealing with the 
victimization of Muslims, the tension within the media, trust and distrust 
in politics, the impact of the public presence of Islam on non-Muslim’s 
perception of the faith, and Muslim access to Dutch schools. 
Despite their variety and scope, our results may be summarized in two 
observations: there is, on the one hand, a demand for greater recogni-
tion between individuals in European communities in which Muslims 
live, and, on the other, a need for more trust between all parties. Indeed, 
in plural social contexts where security and Islam have become closely 
associated in the public domain, the importance of mutual recognition 
was expressed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This topic emerged 
both in the discourses of individual participants, and in the course of in-
teractions during group discussions. Participants complained about the 
“rupture of trust” and growing tensions between Muslims and wider so-
ciety and expressed the idea of trust as the only avenue through which 
social cohesion may emerge. From a public policy perspective education 
is clearly of great general importance. Tensions between Muslim and 
non-Muslim students in schools have long been underestimated, both 
in their daily impact on the relationships between pupils, and between 
pupils, teachers, and parents. 
The material accumulated is quantitatively impressive and ethno-
graphically rich. The main challenge of interpretation has been relating 
these data to a comparative framework. Instead of solely looking at theo-
retical/methodological questions, comparative approaches are increas-
ingly problem oriented. This makes such approaches more receptive to 
interdisciplinary analysis. It also makes matters more difficult when it 
comes to the epistemological roots of our results. Beside the national re-
ports, the final result of the project will be an edited volume available in 
English next summer. Lastly, it should be emphasized that although the 
organization of the group discussions required a lot of time and energy, 
for both researchers and participants the project has been a success, 
suggesting the need for future work along collaborative and compara-
tive lines.
Notes
1. The names of all coordinators and research 
assistants can be found on the ISIM website 
under Projects.
2. For example, see the various reports on Anti-
Islamic reactions within the European Union 
after 9/11 by the EUMC in 2001 (http://eumc.
europa.eu/fra/index.php), the EUMAP 
initiatives (http://www.eumap.org/topics/
minority/reports/eumuslims), the reports by 
the International Helsinki Federation, not to 
mention academic publications.
Valérie Amiraux is Professor of Sociology at the University of Montreal and currently on leave 
from CNRS/CURAPP.
Email: Valerie.amiraux@umontreal.ca
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17 April 2008
Lecture by Mahmood Mamdani
Political Violence in Darfur and the 
War on Terror
Organizers: ISIM and Prince Claus Fund 
for Culture and Development
Venue: De Glazen Zaal, The Hague
17 April 2008
Ph.D. Defense by Martijn de Koning
Searching for a “Pure” Islam. 
Religious Beliefs and Identity 
Construction among Moroccan-Dutch 
Youth 
Venue: VU University, Amsterdam
26 May – 27 May 2008
Workshop 
City Debates 2008:  
“Spaces of Faith & Fun”
Organizers: American University of 
Beirut and ISIM 
Venue: American University of Beirut
9 June – 10 June 2008
Conference
Gestures- Religion qua Performance 
Organizers: NWO and ISIM, on behalf 
of the NWO programme “The Future of 
the Religious Past”
Convenors: Martin van Bruinessen 
(Utrecht University / ISIM) and Anne 
Marie Korte (University of Tilburg / 
Utrecht University)
Venue: Utrecht University
20 June – 23 June 2008
Transnational Relations and Muslim 
Diasporas
Panel at the conference on “Muslim 
Diasporas: Religious and National 
Identity, Gender, Cultural Resistance,” 
initiated by York University (Canada) 
and VU University
Organizer: ISIM
Venue: VU University, Amsterdam
7 July – 8 July 2008
Workshop 
Studying Islam in Southeast Asia: 
State of the Art and New Approaches
Organizers: Australia-Netherlands 
Research Collaboration (ANRC) in co-
operation with ISIM
Convenors: Greg Fealy (ANU) and 
Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM / Utrecht 
University)
Venue: Leiden
26 August – 30 August 2008
Workshop
What Makes Popular Piety Popular?
Organizers: European Association of 
Anthropologists (EASA) and ISIM
Convenors: Samuli Schielke (University 
of Joensuu / ISIM) and Liza Debevec 
(ZRC-SAZU)
Venue: 10th EASA Biennial Conference 
2008, Ljubljana
29 August – 30 August 2008
Conference
Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Governance of Islam. Continuities 
and Ruptures
Organizers: ISIM and IMISCOE/
University of Amsterdam
Venue: Leiden
18 September – 19 September 2008
Conference
The Post-Islamist Turn. Shifting 
Character of Islamism
Organizer: ISIM
Convenor: Asef Bayat
Venue: Leiden 
21 September – 28 September 2008
Summer Academy for Doctoral and 
Postdoctoral Researchers
Living Together: Plurality and 
Cosmopolitanism in the Ottoman 
Empire and Beyond 
Organizers: The Aga Khan University, 
Boğaziçi University, Berlin-
Brandenburg Academy of Sciences 
and Humanities, the Fritz Thyssen 
Foundation, Wissenschaftskolleg 
zu Berlin, German Orient-Institute 
Istanbul, Centre for Modern Oriental 
Studies Berlin and ISIM
Venue: Ottoman Bank Museum, 
Istanbul
26 September – 27 September 2008
Workshop 
Understanding Immanent Critique: 
Cultural Politics and Islamic Activism
Organizer: ISIM
Convenor: Irfan Ahmad (ISIM)
Venue: Leiden
June – December 2008
Lecture and Debate Series
Muslims in Europe: Representations, 
Women, Knowledge and Art
Organizers: De Nieuwe Horizon and 
ISIM
Venue: Rotterdam
I S I M  P H . D .  A N D  
S T A F F  S E M I N A R S  
Venue: Leiden University
– 22 April 2008
 Dress to Differ: Changing Meanings 
of Tesettür among Turkish Women 
in the Netherlands
 Lecture by Arzu Unal
– 6 May 2008 
 Between Orientalism and 
Occidentalism
 Lecture by Robbert Woltering
– 20 May 2008
 Forms and Elements of Religiosity 
among Muslim Women in the 
Netherlands
 Lecture by Nathal Dessing
– 3 June 2007
 Migration, War, and the Making 
of a Transnational Lebanese Shi’a 
Community in Senegal
 Lecture by Mara Leichtman
– 17 June 2008
 The Institutionalization of Islamic 
Reformism in South Thailand: 
Yala Islamic University
 Lecture by Ernesto Braam
For more information on these and 
other events please consult the ISIM 
website or contact the secretariat at 
info@isim.nl.
I S I M  E V E N T S
ISIM Evaluated 
as “Excellent”
ISIM’s work in the period 2002–2007 
has been evaluated by an international 
peer review committee. The commit-
tee, working according to the Dutch 
Standard Evaluation Protocol, found 
that ISIM’s research results and inter-
national reputation are excellent. For 
the complete evaluation report please 
consult the ISIM website.
New Project on 
Islam, Fashion, 
and Music
The NWO programme on Cultural Dy-
namics has granted almost 550.000 
euro to the ISIM/ASSR research pro-
gramme on “Islamic Cultural Practices 
and Performances: The Emergence of 
New Youth Cultures in Europe”. In the 
course of the last decades, the Muslim 
world has witnessed the emergence of 
forms of artistic and popular entertain-
ment and consumption that find their 
inspiration in Islam. The programme 
sets out to answer the question wheth-
er a similar turn towards Islamic en-
tertainment is taking place amongst 
Muslim youth in Europe. It focuses on 
developments in the fields of Islamic 
artistic performances, popular music 
entertainment, and Islamic fashions. 
Central questions are: How and to what 
extent has such a trend emerged? Who 
are its main protagonists and what 
are their main sources of inspiration? 
Which ranges of practices and perform-
ances are considered as Islamic—by 
those involved—and on what grounds 
are they legitimated? Who are able to 
claim a position of authority and on 
which grounds do they succeed? The 
programme also investigates whether 
the emergence of Islamic cultural prac-
tices and performances contributes to 
the development of a transnational 
Muslim public in Europe, while pay-
ing attention to how this public may 
be fractured by nationality, ethnicity, 
class, gender, generation, and religi-
osity. The programme will be directed 
by Annelies Moors, ISIM Chair at the 
University of Amsterdam, and will run 
from mid-2008 through 2011.
– Edip Asaf Bekaroglu (Visiting Fellow)
 Questioning Liberal Democracy: Multiculturalism and Muslims in the UK and 
the Netherlands
 1 February 2008 – 31 July 2008
– Hilman Latief (Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM, funded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
 Muslim-Christian Charity Activisms and Their Contribution to the Growth of 
Social Institutions in Indonesia 
 1 February 2008 – 31 December 2011
– Mara Leichtman (Visiting Fellow)
 Transnational and Local Trajectories of Shi’ite Islam in Africa: Lebanese Migrants 
and Senegalese Converts
 1 February 2008 – 31 July 2008
– Julie McBrien (NWO Rubicon Postdoctoral Fellow)
 Dreams and Disillusions of Young Muslim Women in Post-Soviet Central Asia
 From 1 July 2008 onwards
– Fatemeh Sadeghi Givi (Visiting Fellow, funded by Sephis)
 Gender Identity and Politics in Contemporary Iran: A Comparative Study of 
the Nationalist and Islamist Periods
 1 February 2008 – 31 July 2008
– Samuli Schielke (Visiting Fellow, funded by the Academy of Finland)
 Contradictions and Margins of the Islamic Revival in Egypt
 1 January 2008 – 31 December 2008
– Virtudes Téllez Delgado (Visiting Fellow)
 Young Muslims in Madrid: Re-negotiating Identities after 11 March 2004
 25 February 2008 – 25 July 2008
– Din Wahid (Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM, funded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
 Nurturing Wahhabi Ideology: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary 
Indonesia
 1 February 2008 – 31 December 2011
N E W  F E L L O W S
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ISIM/Workshop
A N N E L I E S  M O O R S  
“Muslim Women” in Asia
ISIM organized a workshop on “Transnational Circuits: ‘Muslim Women’ 
in Asia” as part of the conference on Inter-Asian Connections convened 
by the Social Science Research Council together with the Dubai School 
of Government in Dubai from 21-23 February. The conference aimed 
to launch new, transregional, and comparative research initiatives that 
go beyond more narrowly defined area-studies approaches and focus 
on the connections between different parts of Asia. The workshop ad-
dressed how women’s subjectivities were transformed in new transna-
tional circuits of labour and consumption. It focused on the involvement 
of Muslim women in Asia in these circuits, be it as mobile people or as 
producers, propagators, and consumers of things, ideas, and images on 
the move. We used the notion “Muslim women” as a heuristic device to 
move beyond an area studies approach. This focus on Islam and gender 
turned out to be fruitful in analyzing three major Inter-Asian circuits: mi-
grant domestic labour, transnational marriages, and fashionable styles 
of Muslim dress. 
Studies about migrant domestic labour have often focused on the na-
tionality of domestic workers. However, when focusing on how migrant 
domestic workers connect to their employers or their natal families, and 
on the sense of belonging they develop, religion is a highly relevant 
category, both for Muslim-born migrant domestic workers and for those 
who became Muslim during their migration trajectory. Bindulakshmi 
Pattadath did research with poor Muslim women from Kerala who work 
as domestics in the United Arab Emirates. This connection needs to be 
seen within the context of long-standing trade links between the Gulf 
and coastal Kerala, resulting in a sense of familiarity between Emiratis 
and Muslims from Kerala (including some knowledge of Arabic). Living 
for years in the Gulf did not mean that these domestics brought “Gulf 
Islam” back home. Many of them went to work in the Emirates to be 
able to better adhere to Keralese notions of propriety. For instance, they 
used their savings to provide their daughters with a substantial dowry, 
a practice common in South Asia, but not in the Gulf. 
Academic writing dealing with migrant domestics from the Philip-
pines has rarely acknowledged the presence of Muslims amongst them. 
Alicia Pingol focused on Muslim Filipinas migrants to Saudi Arabia work-
ing in the field of care, and on how their work experiences alongside 
other Muslims sustain or transform their religious beliefs, practices, and 
identities. Attiya Ahmad discussed the process of conversion of migrant 
domestic workers to Islam in Kuwait not as a sudden transformation but 
as a process of “becoming Muslim.” The domestic workers did not dis-
cuss their conversions in terms of inner motivations and identities, but 
of how it impacted on their relation with the families for whom they 
worked, other migrants in Kuwait, and their natal families. 
The papers on migrant domestic workers illustrated the link be-
tween labour migration and transnational marriages as they included 
examples of the numerous Inter-Asian marriages between men from 
the Middle East and women from South and Southeast Asia. Such tran-
snational marriages are closely intertwined with long-distance move-
ments for the sake of trade, pilgrimage, education, and employment, 
but have gained a new meaning with the emergence of nation-states, 
laws on nationality and residency, and discourses about national iden-
tity. Frances Hasso connected this to “transnational invasions,” a term 
expressing the cultural anxiety among citizens of the United Arab Emir-
ates and Egypt about increased flows of people, ideas, and products. 
As she argued, social and political tensions regarding gender relations, 
sexuality, and marriage were often inaccurately attributed solely to “ex-
ternal” influences, such as migration and the new media. Whereas dif-
ferent opinions about marriage and sexuality have always co-existed 
in lay practices and among Islamic jurists and scholars, this has been 
affected by the more stringent laws of modern states. 
Long-distance migration has also led to transformations in family rela-
tions in Kerala. Caroline Osella pointed out how in Kozhikode families 
are shifting from matrilineal large extended households into small in-
dividual household units with patrilineal emphasis, often in new neigh-
bourhoods. Other families choose to remain in the old Muslim area, 
building large properties and trying to re-constitute matrilineages, 
enabled by remittances from the Gulf. In these settings transnational 
migration, family relations and notions of the self contitute each other 
interchangeably. Rehana Sultana and K.C. Bindu zoned in on the phe-
nomenon of senior Arab citizens visiting Hyderabad to marry young 
local women. As they pointed out, marriages between an Indian woman 
and an Arab man in itself need not pose a problem and are part of a long 
history of connections with the Arab world. Yet, reported cases of hus-
bands abandoning wives immediately after a few days of married life 
point to the sexual exploitation these girls. However, analyzing the 1991 
Ameena case—an under-aged girl from Hyderabad rescued from a mar-
riage with an elderly Saudi man—they argued that newspapers used 
this case to blame the Muslim community, a minority already under 
threat, while the story of the young woman herself, who subsequently 
married a much older local man, was lost. 
With the turn of the Islamic revival movement towards a more cultural 
orientation and, especially since the 1990s, fashionable styles of Islamic 
dress have become a growth sector with materials, designs, and items 
of dress part of transnational circuits of consumption. Vivienne Angeles 
zoned in on fashionable styles of dress among Filipina and Malaysian 
Muslim women. Affected by the Islamic resurgence of the mid-1970s, 
Muslims in both countries have been increasingly manifesting their 
Muslim identity through the use of Islamic forms of dress. In the Philip-
pines the ethnic clothing worn by tribal communities in the south has 
been affected by the growing labour migration to Saudi Arabia, with 
migrants taking on the abaya and in some cases the face-veil. For the 
Malays, the Islamic revival has contributed to the growing popularity 
of a style of Islamic dress that is not imported from the Middle East but 
reflects the evolution of Malay dress to conform to new local interpreta-
tions of modesty. Also in Indonesia Islamic fashion emerged along with 
the Islamic revival movement. Eva Amrullah pointed out how the desire 
to wear fashionable styles of veiling was first linked to countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen, while more recently Indonesian design-
ers have developed their own styles of fashionable Muslim dress that 
have become an export item and gained a presence in cyberspace.
The discussions highlighted the importance of various forms of media-
zation through magazines, television, or the Internet. Shalina Mehta 
discussed the impact of the media on bodily appearances of Muslim 
women in a Delhi slum. She pointed to the development of cable televi-
sion networks targeting a “home bound women audience.” Muslim girls 
who were not allowed to go to college were influenced by a media-cre-
ated cosmopolitan popular culture with respect to dress styles, jewel-
lery, and accessories. 
The papers show not only the mobility of Muslim women, but also 
how different circuits of people, products and ideas are interconnected. 
Whereas previously men from the Gulf involved in trade married South 
and South-East Asian women, after the oil-boom women from these re-
gions started to work in the Gulf States as domestics, sometimes marrying 
local men. The same domestic workers brought new fashions back home 
which contributed to the development of fashionable styles of Muslim 
dress building on local traditions. Various media provided information 
about jobs available and propagated new fashions, but also produced a 
discourse of foreign invasions, moral panics, and families in crisis. Clearly, 
the discussions on mobile domestic labour, transnational marriages, and 
Muslim fashions point to the need to link global trends in the political 
economy with the micropolitics of family life and gendered subjectivities, 
for these fields are at once transnational and personal. Moreover, they 
exemplify how money and love, economics and emotions, and national 
politics and sexuality constitute each other in people’s everyday lives. 
Annelies Moors holds the ISIM Chair at Amsterdam University. 
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NOW AVAILABLE!
Encyclopaedia of Islam THREE
Edited by Marc Gaborieau, Gudrun Krämer, John Nawas and Everett Rowson
The Third Edition of Brill’s Encyclopaedia of Islam is an entirely new work, with new articles re ecting the great diversity 
of current scholarship. It appears in four substantial segments each year, both online and in print. 
The new scope includes comprehensive coverage of Islam in the twentieth century and of Muslim minorities 
all over the world.
Encyclopaedia of Islam THREE  2007-1
• June 2007
• ISBN 978 90 04 15017 1
• Paperback (x, 198 pp.)
• List price  EUR 109.- / US$ 153.-
• Price for subscribers to the series EUR 99.- / US$ 139.-
BRILL
P.O. Box 9000
2300 PA Leiden
The Netherlands
sales@brill.nl
BRILL
153 Milk St., 6th Floor
Boston, MA 02109 
USA
sales@brillusa.com
www.brill.nl
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
European Islam 
Between Religious 
Traditions and 
Secular Formations
A L E X A N D R E  C A E I R O  &  J E A N E T T E  J O U I L L I
The workshop “European Islam between Religious Traditions and Secu-
lar Formations” was held in Slubice (Poland) from 7-10 February. It was 
jointly organized by ISIM, Casa Arabe and its International Institute of 
Arab and Muslim World Studies, Kompetenzzentrum Orient-Okzident 
Marinz, and Europa -Universitat Viadrina Frankfurt/Oder. The workshop 
was a collaborative achievement between thirty participating scholars 
(see the full list at www.isim.nl under Events). 
The convenors—Alexandre Caeiro (ISIM), Jeanette S. Jouili (ISIM), 
Frank Peter (Frankfurt-Oder) and Armando Salvatore (L’Orientale, Na-
ples)—took Talal Asad’s work on tradition and secularity as the starting 
point for a reflection on the structures of European secular formations 
in their double relation to Christianity and the Enlightenment. 
The workshop opened with a lecture by Armando Salvatore entitled 
“What Went Wrong with Tradition in Europe? Post-Christian Secular 
Order and the Challenge of Reformed Tradition,” where he proposed a 
re-thinking of secularity on the basis of a re-reading of Habermas’ work 
on communicative action.
The workshop then took the form of a reading seminar divided into 
three thematic sessions. Participants critically discussed key texts from 
the disciplines of philosophy, political theory, sociology, and anthro-
pology, in a deliberate attempt to connect the study of European Islam 
more closely to important debates in the social sciences. 
The first session, “The European State and Historical Time: The Dia-
lectics of Assimilation and Marginalization,” attempted to question the 
assumptions upon which the binary opposition of continuity versus 
change—common in studies of European Muslims—rests. It began 
with a lecture by Ruth Mas (University of Colorado at Boulder) focusing 
on how calls for the reform of Islam relate understandings of time and 
history to specific sentiments and affects.
The following session, “A Living Tradition? Subject Formation, Disci-
plines and Bodily Practices,” was introduced by a lecture by Moham-
med Tabishat (UAE University/WIKO Berlin) on “The Body, the Secular, 
and the Islamic: An Exploration.” Drawing closely on Asad’s anthropol-
ogy of the body, Tabishat questioned the body-mind dichotomy still 
dominant in European conceptualizations of religion, as reflected in 
understandings of rituals in terms of symbolic practices. 
The last session on “The Structures of Dialogue: Disciplining, Antago-
nism, and Resentment” started with a lecture by Maleiha Malik of King’s 
College London where she explored how European liberal democra-
cies might design a political “dialogue” with Muslims whose political 
views seem to be incommensurable with liberal principles, notably by 
implementing what Malik, following William Connolly, calls “agonistic 
respect.” 
The workshop closed with an open discussion in which participants 
reflected upon the ways the theoretical texts of the previous days could 
or should be incorporated into the study of Islam/Muslims in Europe. 
The exercise and format of the workshop were stimulating for all par-
ticipants, and a follow-up is already being considered.
Alexandre Caeiro is Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM.
Email: caeiroa@yahoo.com
Jeanette Jouilli is Postdoctoral Fellow at ISIM. 
Email: jeajou@yahoo.fr
5 8  I S I M  R E V I E W  2 1  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 8
Editors’ Picks
Who Speaks for Islam? What a 
Billion Muslims Really Think 
By John L. Esposito & Dalia 
Mogahed
New York: Gallup Press, 2008
Based on a massive multi-year Gallup 
study in 35 countries, this book 
offers valuable data on the views of 
Muslims from various walks of life on 
such topics as religion, democracy, 
women’s rights, extremism, and the 
West. The insights, drawn on interview 
information from tens of thousands 
of informants both in the Muslim 
world and in the West, challenge the 
prevailing imaginations about Muslim 
peoples and their relationship to the 
modern world.
We Lived To Tell: Political Prison 
Memoirs of Iranian Women
By Azadeh Agah, Sousan Mehr & 
Shadi Parsi
Toronto: McGilligan, 2007
This book is perhaps the first English-
language collection of memoirs 
written by women who were political 
prisoners in Iran. It contains the 
accounts of three Iranian women who 
were detained for four-five years in 
the 1980s and now live in Canada. 
In first person narratives the authors 
document daily life among the women 
and children with whom they lived 
while in prison. 
Architect of Global Jihad: The Life 
of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus`ab 
al-Suri
By Brynjar Lia
New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008
A biography of a foremost theoretician 
of the global Jihadi movement, 
allegedly captured in Pakistan in 2005. 
Abu Mus`ab al-Suri was originally 
from Syria where he participated in 
the Islamist insurgency in the 1980s. 
With his extensive knowledge of 
Jihadi guerilla warfare, he trained a 
generation of young Jihadis at Al-
Qaida’s Afghan camps and helped 
to establish its European networks. 
The book also contains an English 
translation of two chapters of Al-Suri’s 
influential book The Global Islamic 
Resistance Call, in which he outlined a 
strategy for Al-Qaida.
The Public Sphere: Liberal 
Modernity, Catholicism, Islam and 
Religion
By Armando Salvatore
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007
This book explores the notion of 
the public sphere within Western 
and Islamic traditions, particularly 
Catholicism and Sunni Islam. It offers 
a critique of the classical Habermasian 
public sphere in the light of the 
author’s understanding of social and 
political processes in the Muslim 
world. Discarding conventional views 
of the public sphere as an exclusive 
legacy of Western political cultures it 
traces the genealogy of the modern 
public sphere across conventional 
borders between the Western and the 
Islamic world.
The Politics of the Veil
By Joan Wallach Scott
Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007
 
This book analyses the debate in 
France about the ban on the wearing 
of “conspicuous signs” of religious 
affiliation in public schools which 
was aimed at Muslim girls wearing 
headscarves. It situates the history 
and politics of the veil controversy 
in the context of French notions of 
racism, individualism, secularism, 
and sexuality. The author examines 
the dominant French view of French 
Muslims, particularly the discourse of 
the advocates of the ban. She shows 
the long history of racism behind the 
law and the conflicting approaches 
to sexuality that lie at the heart of the 
debate. 
Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa
Edited by Benjamin F. Soares & 
René Otayek
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007
This collection of essays explores 
how Muslim politics and the practice 
of Islam have been changing in sub-
Saharan Africa due to processes of 
political and economic liberalization 
and globalization. While the volume 
focuses on transnational networks, the 
question of the state, and new ways of 
being Muslim, it includes case studies 
of Muslim youths, activists, preachers, 
and ordinary Muslims, Islamic NGOs, 
secularism, Islamic law, minority rights, 
and the political process in thirteen 
countries. 
Arts
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What we saw upon awakening
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L i d a  A b d u l
Artist Lida Abdul reflects on the 
character of home and place in a 
series of film installations created 
in Afghanistan, including What 
we saw upon awakening and War 
games. Returning to her native 
country and finding it destroyed 
by invasion, war and catastrophe, 
Abdul involves the built landscape 
in an exploration of belonging, 
migration, power, and identity. 
Her work has been featured at the 
Venice Biennale, among others, and 
she received a Prince Claus Award 
in 2006. The first monograph of 
her work was published in 2007 
by the Prince Claus Fund Library 
and hopefulmonster editore, Italy.
For more information on the publication see 
the Prince Claus Fund website at 
www.princeclausfund.org or email 
info@princeclausfund.nl.
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